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CHESS 
GENERALSHIP 

BY 

FRANKLIN  K.  YOUNG 

FoZ.  7. 
GRAND   RECONNAISSANCE. 


"  He  who  first  devised  chessplay,  made  a  model  of  the 
Art  Militaries  representing  therein  all  the  concurrents 
and  contemplations  of  War,  without  omitting  any." 

"  Examen  de  Ingenios" 

Juan  Huarte,  1616. 


"  Chess  is  the  deepest  of  all  games;  it  is  constructed  to 
carry  out  the  principal  of  a  battle,  and  the  whole  theory  of 
Chess  lies  in  that  form  of  action*" 

Emanuel  Lasher. 


BOSTON 

INTERNATIONAL  PUBLISHING  CO. 

1910 


Copyright,  IplO, 
By  Franklin  K.   Young. 


Entered  at  Stationers*  Hall. 


All  rights  reserved. 


"Chess  is  the  gymnasium  for  the  mind — it  does  for  the 
brain  what  athletics  does  for  the  body." 

Henry  Thomas  Buckle. 


*6?7%f 


Gkorge  E.  Crosby  Co.,  Printers,  Boston,  Mass. 


YOUNG'S  CHESS  WORKS 

Minor  Tactics  of  Chess       -  $1.00 

An  eminently  attractive  treatment  of  the  game  of  Chess. — 

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In  this  book  one  finds  the  principles  of  strategy  and  logistics  applied  to  Chess 
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Grand  Tactics  of  Chess       -  3.50 

For  the  student  who  desires  to  enter  the  broader  channels  of  Chess,  the  best 
books  are  by  FRANKLIN  K.  YOUNG:  his  "Minor  Tactics"  and  his 
more  elaborate  "Grand  Tactics"  are  the  most  important  productions  of  mod- 
ern Chess  literature. — American  Chess  Magazine. 

Chess  Strategetics  Illustrated   -         -       2.50 

We  know  no  work  outside  of  the  masterpieces  of  Newton,  Hamilton  and 
Darwin,  which  so  organizes  and  systematizes  human  thought. 

— Chicago  Evening  Post. 


<■■:,     5 


"  There  are  secrets  that  the  children 
Are  not  taught  in  public  school; 
If  these  secrets  were  broadcasted, 
How  could  we  the  masses  rule? 
If  they  understood  Religion, 
Jurisprudence,  Trade  and  War, 
Would  they  groan  and  sweat  and  labor — 
Make  our  bricks  and  furnish  straw?" 

Anon. 


TO 
OF 

EPAMINONDAS 

THE   INVENTOR 
OF 

SCIENTIFIC    WARFARE 


"I  leave  no  sons 
To  perpetuate  my  name; 
But  I  leave  two  daughters — 
LEUCTRA  and  MANTINEA 
Who  will  transmit  my  fame 
To  remotest  posterity." 


"  For  empire  and  greatness  it  importeth  most  that  a 
people  do  profess  arms  as  their  principal  honor,  study  and 
occupation." 

Sir  Francis  Bacon. 


There  is  nothing  truly  imposing  but  Military  Glory." 

Napoleon. 


"  The  conquered  in  war,  sinking  beneath  the  tribute 
exacted  by  the  victor  and  not  daring  to  utter  their  impotent 
hatred,  bequeath  to  their  children  miseries  so  extreme  that 
the  aged  have  not  further  evil  to  fear  in  death,  nor  the  youth- 
ful any  good  to  hope  in  life." 

Xenocles. 


"  War  is  an  element  established  by  the  Deity  in  the 
order  of  the  World;  perpetual  peace  upon  this  Earth  we 
inhabit  is  a  dream." 

Von  Moltke. 


PREFACE 

"  To  become  a  good  General  one  well  may  begin  by  playing 
at  Chess." 

Prince  de  Conde . 


Except  the  theatre  of  actual  Warfare,  no  spot  known  to 
man  furnishes  such  facilities  for  the  practice  of  combined 
strategy,  tactics  and  logistics  as  does  the  surface  of  the 
Chess-board. 

To  those  familiar  with  the  Science  of  Strategetics,  it 
needs  no  proof  that  ability  to  play  a  good  game  at  Chess, 
indicates  the  possession  of  faculties  common  to  all  great 
military  commanders. 

At  a  certain  point,  the  talent  of  Morphy  for  Chess-play 
and  the  talent  of  Napoleon  for  Warfare  become  merged; 
and  beyond  this  point,  their  methods  of  thought  and  of 
action  are  identical. 

Opportunity  to  display,  and  in  most  spectacular 
fashion,  their  singular  and  superlative  genius,  was  not 
wanting  to  either. 

But  unlike  the  ferocious  Corsican,  whose  "only  desire 
is  to  find  myself  on  the  battle-field,' '  the  greatest  of  all 
Masters  at  Chess,  found  in  the  slaughter  of  his  fellow- 
creatures  no  incentive  sufficient  to  call  forth  those  un- 
surpassed strategetical  powers,  which  recorded  Chess- 
play  shows  he  possessed. 


viii  PREFACE 

From  this  sameness  of  talent,  common  to  the  great 
Chess-player  and  the  great  military  commander,  arises 
the  practical  utility  of  the  Royal  Game. 

For  by  means  of  Chess-play,  one  may  learn  and  prac- 
tice in  their  highest  interpretation,  mental  and  physical 
processes  of  paramount  importance  to  the  community 
in  time  of  extreme  peril. 

From  such  considerations  and  for  the  further  reason 
that  in  a  true  Republic  all  avenues  to  greatness  are 
open  to  merit,  scientific  Chess-play  should  be  intelli- 
gently and  systematically  taught  in  the  public  schools. 
"  A  people  desirous  of  liberty  will  entrust  its  defense  to 
none  but  thenselves,"  says  the  Roman  maxim,  and  in 
crises,  woe  to  that  land  where  the  ruler  is  but  a  child  in 
arms,  and  where  the  disinclination  of  the  people  towards 
its  exercise  is  equalled  by  their  unfamiliarity  with  the 
military  habit. 

Despite  the  ethics  of  civilization,  the  optimism  of  the 
"unco  guid"  and  the  unction  even  of  our  own  heart's 
deep  desire,  there  seems  no  doubt  but  that  each  genera- 
tion will  have  its  wars. 

"  Pax  perpetua,"  writes  Leibnitz,  "exists  only  in 
God's  acre."  Here  on  earth,  if  seems  that  men  forever 
will  continue  to  murder  one  another  for  various  reasons; 
all  of  which,  in  the  future  as  in  the  past,  will  be  good  and 
sufficient  to  the  fellow  who  wins;  and  this  by  processes 
differing  only  in  neatness  and  despatch. 

Whether  this  condition  is  commendable  or  not,  de- 
pends upon  the  point  of  view.  Being  irremediable,  such 
phase  of  the  subject  hardly  is  worth  discussing.  How- 
ever, the  following  by  a  well-qualified  observer,  is  interest- 
ing and  undeniably  an  intelligent  opinion,  viz: 


PREFACE  ix 

From  the  essay  on  "WAR,"  read  by  Prof.  John  Ruskin 
at  Woolwich,  (Eng.)  Military  Academy. 


"  All  the  pure  and  noble  arts  of  Peace  are  founded  on 
War;  no  great  Art  ever  rose  on  Earth,  but  among  a 
nation  of  soldiers. 

"  As  Peace  is  established  or  extended  the  Arts  decline. 
They  reach  an  unparalleled  pitch  of  costliness,  but  lose 
their  life,  enlist  themselves  at  last  on  the  side  of  luxury 
and  corruption  and  among  wholly  tranquil  nations, 
wither  utterly  away. 

"  So  when  I  tell  you  that  War  is  the  foundation  of  all 
the  Arts,  I  mean  also  that  it  is  the  foundation  of  all  the 
high  virtues  and  faculties  of  men. 

11  It  was  very  strange  for  me  to  discover  this  and  very 
dreadful — but  I  saw  it  to  be  quite  an  undeniable  fact. 

"We  talk  of  Peace  and  Learning,  of  Peace  and  Plenty, 
of  Peace  and  Civilization;  but  I  found  that  those  were 
not  the  words  which  the  Muse  of  History  coupled  to- 
gether; but  that  on  her  lips  the  words  were — Peace  and 
Selfishness,  Peace  and  Sensuality,  Peace  and  Corruption, 
Peace  and  Death. 

"  I  found  in  brief,  that  all  great  nations  learned  their 
truth  of  word  and  strength  of  thought  in  War;  that  they 
were  nourished  in  War  and  wasted  in  Peace;  taught  by 
War  and  deceived  by  Peace;  trained  by  War  and  be- 
trayed by  Peace;  that  they  were  born  in  War  and  ex- 
pired in  Peace. 

"  Creative,  or  foundational  War,  is  that  in  which 
the  natural  restlessness  and  love  of  contest  among  men, 
is  diciplined  into  modes  of  beautiful — though  it  may  be 
fatal — play;  in  which  the  natural  ambition  and  love  of 
Power  is  chastened  into  aggressive  conquest  of  surround- 
ing evil;  and  in  which  the  natural  instincts  of  self-defence 


x  PREFACE 

are  sanctified  by  the  nobleness  of  the  institutions  which 
they  are  appointed  to  defend. 

"  For  such  War  as  this  all  men  are  born;  in  such  War 
as  this  any  man  may  happily  die;  and  forth  from  such 
War  as  this  have  arisen  throughout  the  Ages,  all  the 
highest  sanctities  and  virtues  of  Humanity." 


That  our  own  country  may  escape  the  common  lot  of 
nations,  is  something  not  even  to  be  hoped. 

Defended  by  four  almost  bottomless  ditches,  neverthe- 
less it  is  a  certainty  that  coming  generations  of  Americans 
must  stand  in  arms,  not  only  to  repel  foreign  aggression, 
but  to  uphold  even  the  integrity  of  the  Great  Republic; 
and  with  the  hand-writing  of  coming  events  flaming  on 
the  wall,  posterity  well  may  heed  the  solemn  warning  of 
by-gone  centuries: 

"  As  man  is  superior  to  the  brute,  so  is  a  trained  and 
educated  soldier  superior  to  the  merely  brave,  numerous 
and  enthusiastic" 


"  The  evils  io  be  apprehended  from  a  standing  army  are 
remote  and  in  my  judgment,  not  to  be  dreaded;  but  the  con- 
sequence of  lacking  one  is  inevitable  ruin." 

Washington. 


CONTENTS 


PAGE 
PREFACE    VII 

INTRODUCTORY XIII 

CHESS  GENERALSHIP  3 

GRAND  RECONNAISSANCE 23 

Military  Examples 28 

ORGANIZATION 45 

Military  Examples 59 

TOPOGRAPHY  73 

Military  Examples 85 

MOBILITY 97 

Military  Examples 116 

NUMBERS  123 

Military  Examples 127 

TIME 139 

Military  Examples 142 

POSITION 147 

Military  Examples 158 

PRIME  STRATEGETIC  MEANS 169 

PRIME  STRATEGETIC  PROPOSITION 185 


"  The  progress  of  Science  universally  is  retarded,  because 
sufficient  attention  is  not  paid  to  explaining  essentials  in 
particular  and  exactly  to  define  the  terms  employed" 

Euclid. 

"  The  first  care  of  the  sage  should  be  to  discover  the  true 
character  of  his  pupils.  By  his  questions  he  should  assist 
them  to  explain  their  own  ideas  and  by  his  answers  he 
should  compel  them  to  perceive  their  falsities.  By  accurate 
definitions  he  should  gradually  dispel  the  incongruities  in 
their  earlier  education  and  by  his  subtlety  in  arousing  their 
doubts,  he  should  redouble  their  curiosity  and  eagerness 
for  information;  for  the  art  of  the  instructor  consists  in 
inciting  his  pupils  to  that  point  at  which  they  cannot  endure 
their  manifest  ignorance. 

"  Many,  unable  to  undergo  this  trial  and  confounded 
by  offended  self-conceit  and  lacking  the  fortitude  to  sustain 
correction,  forsake  their  master,  who  should  not  be  eager  to 
recall  them.  Others  who  learn  from  humiliation  to  distrust 
themselves  should  no  longer  have  snares  spread  for  their 
vanity.  The  master  should  speak  to  them  neither  with  the 
severity  of  a  censor  nor  with  the  haughtiness  of  a  sophist, 
nor  deal  in  harsh  reproaches  nor  importunate  complaints; 
his  discourse  should  be  the  language  of  reason  and  friend" 
ship  in  the  mouth  of  experience." 

Socrates. 


INTRODUCTORY 

"The  test  is  as  true  of  cerebral  power,  as  if  a  hundred 
thousand  men  lay  dead  upon  the  field;  or  a  score  of  hulks 
were  swinging  blackened  wrecks,  after  a  game  between  two 
mighty  admirals." 

Dr.  Oliver  Wendell  Holmes. 

(Opening  Address  at  Morphy  Banquet,  Boston,  1859.) 


Men  whose  business  it  is  to  understand  war  and  warfare 
often  are  amused  by  senseless  comparisons  made  by 
writers  who,  as  their  writings  show,  are  ignorant  even  of 
the  rudiments  of  military  art  and  science.  Of  course  a 
certain  license  in  expression  of  thought  is  not  to  be  denied 
the  layman;  he  cannot  be  expected  to  talk  with  the  exact- 
ness of  the  man  who  knows.  At  the  same  time  there 
is  a  limit  beyond  which  the  non-technical  man  passes 
at  his  peril,  and  this  limit  is  reached  when  he  poses  as  a 
critic  and  presumes  to  dogmatize  on  matters  in  regard  to 
which  he  is  uninformed. 

The  fanciful  conjectures  of  such  people,  well  are 
illustrated  by  the  following  editorial  faux  pas,  perpe- 
trated by  a  leading  metropolitan  daily,  viz : 

"  Everyone  knows  now  that  a  future  war  between  states 
having  similar  and  substantially  equal  equipments  will 
be  a  different  affair  from  any  war  of  the  past;  characterized 
by  a  different  order  of  generalship  and  a  radically  novel 
application  of  the  principles  of  strategy  and  tactics." 


xiv  INTRODUCTORY 

Many  in  the  struggle  to  obtain  their  daily  bread,  are 
tempted  to  essay  the  unfamiliar,  and  for  a  stipulated 
wage  to  pose  as  teachers  to  the  public. 

Such  always  will  do  well  to  write  modestly  in  regard 
to  sciences  which  they  have  not  studied  and  of  arts 
which  they  never  practiced,  and  especially  in  future 
comments  on  Military  matters,  such  people  may  profit 
by  the  appended  modicum  of  that  ancient  history,  which 
newspaper  men  as  a  class  so  affect  to  despise,  and  in 
regard  to  which,  as  a  rule,  they  are  universally  and 
lamentably,  ignorant. 

What  orders  of  Generalship  can  exist  in  the  future, 
different  from  those  which  always  have  existed  since 
war  was  made,  viz:  good  generalship  and  bad  general- 
ship? 

Ability  properly  to  conduct  an  army  is  a  concrete 
thing;  it  does  not  admit  of  comparison.  Says  Frederic 
the  Great: 

"  There  are  only  two  kinds  of  Generals — those  who 
know  their  trade  and  those  who  do  not." 

Hence,  "a  different  order  of  Generalship,"  suggested 
by  the  editorial  quoted,  implies  either  a  higher  or  a  lesser 
degree  of  ability  in  the  "  general  of  the  future  ";  and  as 
obviously,  it  is  impossible  that  he  can  do  worse  than 
many  already  have  done,  it  is  necessary  to  assume  that 
the  commander  of  tomorrow  will  be  an  improvement 
over  his  predecessors. 

Consequently,  to  the  military  mind  it  becomes  of 
paramount  interest  to  inquire  as  to  the  form  and  manner 
in  which  such  superiority  will  be  tangibly  and  visibly 
manifested,  viz: 

Will  the  general  of  the  future  be  a  better  general  than 
Epaminondas,  Alexander,  Hannibal,  Caesar,  Gustavus 
Adolphus,  Turenne,  Euguene,  Frederic,  Washington, 
Napoleon,  Von  Moltke? 

Will  he  improve  upon  that  application  of  the  principles 


INTRODUCTORY 


xv 


of  strategy  and  tactics  to  actual  warfare  which  comes 
down  to  us  of  today,  stamped  with  the  approval  of  these 
superlative  military  geniuses? 

Will  the  general  of  the  future  know  a  better  way  for 
making  war  than  acting  against  the  enemy's  communi- 
cations? 

Will  he  devise  a  better  method  of  warfare  than  that 
whose  motive  is  the  concentration  of  a  superior  force  upon 
the  strategetic  objective? 

Will  the  processes  of  his  prime  logistic  operations  be 
preferable  to  those  of  men  who  won  their  victories  before 
their  battles  were  fought,  by  combining  with  their 
troops  the  topography  of  the  country,  and  causing 
rivers  and  mountains  to  take  the  place  of  corps  d'armee? 

Will  the  general  of  the  future  renounce  as  obsolete 
and  worthless  that  military  organization  founded  centu- 
ries before  the  Christian  Era,  by  the  great  Theban, 
Epaminondas,  the  father  of  scientific  warfare;  that 
system  adopted  by  every  captain  of  renown  and  which 
may  be  seen  in  its  purity  in  the  greater  military  estab- 
lishments from  the  days  of  Rome  to  the  present  Imperial 
North  German  Confederation? 

Will  the  general  of  the  future  renounce  as  obsolete 
and  worthless  that  system  of  Minor  Tactics  utilized  by 
every  man  who  has  made  it  his  business  to  conquer  the 
World?  Will  he  propose  to  us  something  more  perfect 
than  the  primary  formation  of  forces  depicted  in  Plate 
XIII  of  the  Secret  Strategical  Instructions  of  Frederic  II? 

Will  the  general  of  the  future  renounce  as  obsolete 
and  worthless  those  intricate,  but  mathematically  exact, 
evolutions  of  the  combined  arms,  which  appertain  to  the 
Major  Tactics  of  men  who  are  remembered  to  this  day 
for  the  battles  that  they  won? 

Will  he  invent  processes  more  destructive  than  those 
whereby  Epaminondas  crushed  at  Leuctra  and  Mantinea 
the  power  of  Sparta,  and  the  women  of  Lacedaemon  saw 


xvi  INTRODUCTORY 

the  smoke  of  an  enemy's  camp  fire  for  the  first  time  in  six 
hundred  years? 

Than  those  whereby  Alexander,  a  youth  of  eighteen, 
won  Greece  for  his  father  at  Chaeronea  and  the  World 
for  himself  at  Issus  and  Arbela?  Than  those  whereby 
Hannibal  destroyed  seriatim  four  Roman  armies  at 
Trebia,  Thrasymenus,  Cannae  and  Herdonea? 

Will  he  find  out  processes  more  sudden  and  decisive 
than  those  whereby  Caesar  conquered  Gaul  and  Pompey 
and  the  son  of  Mithridates,  and  which  are  fitly  described 
only  in  his  own  language;  "Veni,  vidi,  vici"? 

What  will  the  general  of  the  future  substitute  for  the 
three  contiguous  sides  of  the  octagon  whereby  Tamer- 
lane the  Great  with  his  1,400,000  veterans  at  the  Plains 
of  Angora,  enveloped  the  Emperor  Bajazet  and  900,000 
Turks  in  the  most  gigantic  battle  of  record? 

Will  he  eclipse  the  pursuit  of  these  latter  by  Mizra, 
the  son  of  Tamerlane,  who  with  the  Hunnish  light 
cavalry  rode  two  hundred  and  thirty  miles  in  five  days 
and  captured  the  Turkish  capital,  the  Emperor  Bajazet, 
his  harem  and  the  royal  treasure? 

WTill  he  excel  Gustavus  Adolphus,  who  dominated 
Europe  for  twenty  years,  and  Turenne,  the  military  Atlas 
who  upheld  that  magnificent  civilization  which  em- 
bellishes the  reign  of  Louis  XIV? 

Will  he  do  better  than  Prince  Eugene,  who  victoriously 
concluded  eighteen  campaigns  and  drove  the  Turks  out 
of  Christendom? 

Will  he  discover  processes  superior  to  those  whereby 
Frederic  the  Great  with  22,000  troops  destroyed  at 
Rosbach  a  French  army  of  60,000  regulars  in  an  hour  and 
a  half,  at  the  cost  of  three  hundred  men;  and  at  Leuthern 
with  33,000  troops,  killed,  wounded  or  captured  54,000 
out  of  93,000  Austrians,  at  a  cost  of  3,900  men? 

Will  he  improve  on  those  processes  whereby  Napoleon 
with  40,000  men,  destroyed  in  a  single  year  five  Austrian 


INTRODUCTORY  xvii 

armies  and  captured  150,000  prisoners?  Will  he  im- 
prove on  Rivoli,  Austerlitz,  Jena,  Friedland,  Wagram, 
Dresden,  and  Ligny? 

Will  the  general  of  the  future  renounce  as  obsolete 
and  worthless  that  system  of  Grand  Tactics,  by  means 
of  which  the  mighty  ones  of  Earth  have  swept  before 
them  all  created  things? 

Will  his  system  surpass  in  grandeur  of  conception  and 
exactness  of  execution  the  march  of  Alexander  to  the 
Indus?  Will  he  reply  to  his  rival's  prayers  for  peace  and 
amity  as  did  the  great  Macedonian;  "There  can  be  but 
one  Master  of  the  World";  and  to  the  dissuasions  of  his 
friend;  "So  would  I  do,  were  I  Parmenio"? 

Will  he  do  things  more  gigantic  than  Hannibal's 
march  across  the  Alps? 

Than  the  operation  of  Alesia  by  Caesar;  where  the 
Romans  besieging  one  Gallic  army  in  a  fortified  city,  and 
themselves  surrounded  by  a  second  Gallic  army,  single 
handed  destroyed  both?  Than  the  circuit  of  the  Cas- 
pian Sea  by  the  200,000  light  cavalry  of  Tamerlane,  a 
feat  of  mountain  climbing  which  never  has  been  dupli- 
cated? Than  that  marvelous  combination  of  the 
principles  of  tactics  and  of  field  fortification,  whereby  in 
the  position  of  Bunzelwitz,  Frederic  the  Great,  with 
55,000  men,  successfully  upheld  the  last  remaining  prop 
of  the  Prussian  nation,  against  250,000  Russian  and 
Austrian  regular  troops,  commanded  by  the  best  gene- 
rals of  the  age? 

Will  he  conceive  anything  more  scientific  and  artistic 
than  the  manoeuvre  of  Trenton  and  Princeton  by 
Washington?  Than  the  capture  of  Burgoyne  at  Saratoga 
and  Cornwallis  at  Yorktown?  Than  the  manoeuvres 
of  Ulm,  of  Jena,  of  Landshut  ?  Than  the  manoeuvres 
of  Napoleon  in  1814?  Than  the  manoeuvre  of  Charleroi 
in  1815,  declared  by  Jomini  to  be  Napoleon's  master- 
piece?    Will  he  excel  the  manoeuvres  of  Kutosof  and 


xviii  INTRODUCTORY 

Wittsengen  in  1812-13  and  of  Blucher  on  Paris  in  1814 
and  on  Waterloo  in  1815;  each  of  which  annihilated  for 
the  time  being  the  military  power  of  France? 

Will  he  devise  military  conceptions  superior  to  those 
whereby  Von  Moltke  overthrew  Denmark  in  six  hours, 
Austria  in  six  days,  and  France  in  six  weeks? 


The  sapient  race  of  quill-drivers  ever  has  hugged  to  its 
breast  many  delusions;  some  of  which  border  upon  the 
outer  intellectual  darkness.  One  of  these  delusions  is 
that  most  persistently  advertised,  least  substantial,  but 
forever  darling  first  favorite  of  timid  and  inexperienced 
minds:  "  The  pen  is  mightier  than  the  sword" 

Explanation  of  the  invincible  ignorance  of  the  penny-a- 
liner  is  simple,  viz: 

Of  the  myriad  self-appointed  educators  to  the  public, 
few  are  familiar  even  with  the  rudimentary  principles  of 
Military  Science  and  almost  none  are  acquainted  even 
with  the  simplest  processes  of  Strategetic  Art.  Hence, 
like  all  who  discourse  on  matters  which  they  do  not 
understand,  such  writers  continually  confound  together 
things  which  have  no  connection. 

Ignorant  of  war  and  the  use  of  weapons;  bewildered  by 
the  prodigious  improvements  in  mechanical  details, 
they  immoderately  magnify  the  importance  of  such  im- 
provements, oblivious  to  the  fact  that  these  latter  relate 
exclusively  to  elementary  tactics  and  in  no  way  affect 
the  system  of  Strategy,  Logistics,  and  the  higher  branches 
of  Tactics. 

Of  such  people,  the  least  that  can  be  said  and  that  in 
all  charity,  is,  that  before  essaying  the  role  of  the 
pedagogue,  they  should  endeavor  to  grasp  that  most 
obvious  of  all  truths: 

"  A  man  cannot  teach  what  he  never  has  learned.11 

Says  Frederic  the  Great:    "Improvements  and  new 


INTRODUCTORY 


XIX 


discoveries  in  implements  of  warfare  will  be  made  con- 
tinually; and  generals  then  alive  must  modify  tactics  to 
comply  with  these  novelties.  But  the  Grand  Art  of 
taking  advantage  of  topographical  conditions  and  of  the 
faulty  disposition  of  the  opposing  forces,  ETERNALLY 
WILL  REMAIN  UNCHANGED  in  the  military 
system.' ' 


Naturally,  the  student  now  is  led  to  inquire: 

What  then  is  this  immutable  military  system?  What 
are  its  text  books,  where  is  it  taught  and  from  whom  is  it 
to  be  learned? 

In  answer  it  may  be  stated: 

At  the  present  day,  private  military  schools  make  no 
attempt  to  teach  more  than  elementary  tactics.  Even 
the  Governmental  academy  curriculum  aims  little  higher 
than  the  school  of  the  battalion. 

Scientific  Chess-play  begins  where  these  institutions 
leave  off,  and  ends  at  that  goal  which  none  of  these 
institutions  even  attempt  to  reach. 

Chess  teaches  to  conduct  campaigns,  to  win  battles, 
and  to  move  troops  securely  and  effectively  in  the 
presence  of  and  despite  the  opposition  of  an  equal  or 
superior  ememy. 

Military  schools  graduate  boys  as  second-lieutenants 
commanding  a  platoon.  Chess  graduates  Generals,  able 
to  mobilize  Corps  d'armee,  whatever  their  number  or 
location;  to  develop  these  into  properly  posted  integers 
of  a  grand  Strategic  Front  and  to  manoeuvre  and  operate 
the  army  as  a  Strategetic  Unit,  in  accordance  to  the  laws 
of  the  Strategetic  art  and  the  principles  of  the  Strategetic 
science. 

By  precept  and  by  actual  practice,  Chess  teaches  what 
is  NOT  taught  in  any  military  school — that  least  under- 


xx  INTRODUCTORY 

stood  and  most  misunderstood;  that  best  guarded  and 
most  invaluable  of  all  State  Secrets — 
The  profession  of 


GENERALSHIP 


"  Books  will  speak  plain  when  counsellors  blanch. 
Therefore  it  is  good  to  be  conversant  with  them;  especially 
the  books  of  such  as  themselves  have  been  actors  upon  the 
stage." 

Sir  Francis  Bacon. 


"  At  this  moment,  Europe,  which  fears  neither  God  nor 
devil,  grovels  in  terror  before  a  little  man  hardly  five  feet  in 
height;  who,  clad  in  a  cocked  hat  and  grey  great-coat  and 
mounted  upon  a  white  horse,  plods  along  through  mud  and 
darkness;  followed  by  the  most  enthusiastic,  most  devoted 
and  most  efficient  band  of  cut-throats  and  robbers,  the 
world  has  ever  seen." 


"  Many  good  soldiers  are  but  poor  generals." 

Hannibal. 
"  No  soldier  serving  under  a  victorious  commander,  ever 
has  enough  of  war." 

Caesar. 


"  Officers  always  should  be  chosen  from  the  nobility  and 
never  from  the  lower  orders  of  society;  for  the  former,  no 
matter  how  dissolute,  always  retain  a  sense  of  honor,  while 
the  latter,  though  guilty  of  atrocious  actions,  return  to  their 
homes  without  compunction  and  are  received  by  their 
families  without  disapprobation." 

Frederic  the  Great. 


At  the  terrible  disaster  of  Cannae,  the  Patrician  Consul 
Aemilius  Paulus  and  80,000  Romans  died  fighting  sword 
in  hand;  while  the  Plebian  Consul,  Varro,  fled  early  in 
the  battle.  Upon  the  return  of  the  latter  to  Rome,  the 
Senate,  instead  of  ordering  his  execution,  with  withering 
sarcasm  formally  voted  him  its  thanks  and  the  thanks 
of  the  Roman  people,  "that  he  did  not  despair  of  the 
Republic." 


"  Among  us  we  have  a  man  of  singular  character —  one 
Phocion.  He  seems  not  to  know  that  he  lives  in  our 
modern  age  and  at  incomparable  Athens,  He  is  poor,  yet 
is  not  humiliated  by  his  poverty;  he  does  good,  yet  never 
boasts  of  it;  and  gives  advice,  though  he  is  certain  it  will 
not  be  followed.  He  possesses  talent  without  ambition  and 
serves  the  state  without  regard  to  his  own  interest  At  the 
head  of  the  army,  he  contents  himself  with  restoring  dis- 
cipline and  beating  the  enemy.  When  addressing  the 
assembly,  he  is  equally  unmoved  by  the  disapprobation  or 
the  applause  of  the  multitude. 

"  We  laugh  at  his  singularities  and  we  have  discovered 
an  admirable  secret  for  revenging  ourselves  for  his  con- 
tempt. He  is  the  only  general  we  have  left — but  we  do  not 
employ  him;  he  is  the  most  upright  and  perhaps  the  most 
intelligent  of  our  counsellors — but  we  do  not  listen  to  him. 
It  is  true,  we  cannot  make  him  change  his  principles,  but, 
by  Heaven,  neither  shall  he  induce  us  to  change  ours;  and 
it  never  shall  be  said  that  by  the  example  of  his  super- 
annuated virtues  and  the  influence  of  his  antique  teachings, 
Phocion  was  able  to  correct  the  most  polished  and  amiable 
people  in  the  world. 

Callimedon. 


GENERALSHIP 


CHESS 
GENERALSHIP 

"  In  Chess  the  soldiers  are  the  men  and  the  General  is  the 
mind  of  the  player." 

Emanuel  Lasher. 


"  It  is  neither  riches  nor  armies  that  make  a  nation 
formidable;  but  the  courage  and  genius  of  the  Commander- 
in-Chief" 

Frederic  the  Great. 


"Ho\  Ye  Macedonians!  Because  together  we  have 
conquered  the  World,  think  ye  to  give  law  to  the  blood  of 
Achilles  and  to  withstand  the  dictates  of  the  Son  of  Jupiter? 

Choose  ye  a  new  commander,  draw  yourselves  up  for 

battle;  I  will  lead  against  you  those  Persians  whom  ye  so 

despise,  and  if  you  are  victorious,  by  Mehercule,  I  will  do 

everything  that  you  desire." 

Alexander  the  Great 


"  It  is  I  and  I  alone,  who  give  you  your  glory  and  your 

Napoleon. 


"My  thoughts  are  not  your  thoughts,  neither  are  your 
ways,  My  ways,  saith  the  Lord" 

Holy  Bible. 


4  GRAND  "&&CONNAISSANCE 

By  authority  indisputable,  the  ex-cathedra  dictum  of  the 
greatest  of  the  Great  Captains,  we  have  been  informed  that 
the  higher  processes  of  the  military  system,  eternally  will 
remain  unchanged. 

As  a  necessary  corollary,  it  follows  that  these  processes 
always  have  been  and  always  will  be  comprehended  and 
employed  by  every  great  Captain. 

Equally,  it  is  self-evident,  that  capability  to  comprehend 
these  higher  processes,  united  with  ability  properly  to 
utilize  them  to  win  battles  and  campaigns,  constitutes 
genius  for  Warfare. 

Moreover,  we  are  further  informed  by  the  same  un- 
impeachable authority,  that  so  irresistible  is  genius  for 
warfare,  that  united  to  courage,  it  is  formidable  beyond 
the  united  financial  and  military  resources  of  the  State. 
In  corroboration  of  this,  we  have  the  testimony  of  well- 
qualified  judges.     Says  the  Count  de  Saxe: 

"  Unless  a  man  is  born  with  talent  for  war  and  this 
talent  is  brought  to  perfection,  it  is  impossible  for  him 
to  be  more  than  an  indifferent  general." 


In  these  days,  more  or  less  degenerate  from  the 
soldierly  standpoint,  the  fantastic  sophistries  of  Hel- 
vetius  have  vogue,  and  most  people  believe  book- 
learning  to  be  all-in-all. 

Many  are  so  weak-minded,  as  really  to  believe,  that 
because  born  in  the  Twentieth  Century,  they  necessarily 
are  the  repository  of  all  the  virtues,  and  particularly  of 
all  the  knowledge  acquired  by  their  ancestors  from  re- 
motest generations.  Few  seem  to  understand  that  the 
child,  even  of  ultra-modern  conditions,  is  born  just  as 
ignorant  and  often  invincibly  so,  as  were  the  sons  of 
Ham,  Shem  and  Japhet,  and  most  appear  to  be  unaware, 
that: 


GENERALSHIP  5 

Only  by  intelligent  reflection  upon  their  own  experience 
and  upon  the  experiences  of  others7  can  one  acquire  knowl- 
edge. 

The  triviality  of  crowding  the  memory  with  things 
that  may  or  may  not  be  true,  is  the  merest  mimicry  of 
education. 

Real  education  is  nothing  more  than  the  fruit  of  ex- 
perience; and  he  who  acts  in  conformity  to  such  knowl- 
edge, alone  is  wise.  Thus  to  act,  implies  ability  to 
comprehend.  But  there  are  those  in  whom  capability 
is  limited;  hence,  all  may  not  be  wise  who  wish  to  be  so, 
and  these  necessarily  remain  through  life  very  much  as 
they  are  born. 

The  use  of  knowledge  would  be  infinitely  more  certain, 
if  our  understanding  of  its  accurate  application  were  as 
extensive  as  our  needs  require.  We  have  only  a  few 
ideas  of  the  attributes  of  matter  and  of  the  laws  of 
mechanics,  out  of  an  infinite  number  of  secrets  which 
mankind  never  can  hope  to  discover.  This  renders  our 
feeble  adaptations  in  practice  of  the  knowledge  we 
possess,  of  times  inadequate  for  the  result  we  desire; 
and  it  seems  obvious  that  if  Nature  had  intended  man 
to  attain  to  the  superlative,  she  would  have  endowed 
him  with  intelligence  and  have  communicated  to  him 
information,  infinitely  superior  to  that  we  possesss. 

The  universal  blunder  of  mankind  arises  from  an 
hallucination  that  all  minds  are  created  equal;  and  that 
by  mere  book-learning,  i.e.,  simply  by  memorizing 
what  somebody  says  are  facts  it  is  possible  for  any  man 
to  attain  to  superior  and  even  to  superlative  ability. 


Such  profoundly,  but  utterly  mis-educated  people, 
not  unnaturally  may  inquire,  by  what  right  speaks  the 
eminent  warrior  previously  quoted.  These  properly 
may  be  informed  in  the  words  of  Frederic  the  Great: 


6  GRAND    RECONNAISSANCE 

"The  Count  de  Saxe  is  the  hero  of  the  bravest  action  ever 
done  by  man."    viz., 

A  great  battle  was  raging. 

Within  a  magnificent  Pavilion  in  the  centre  of  the 
French  camp,  the  King,  the  nobility  and  the  high  Ecclesi- 
astics of  the  realm  were  grouped  about  a  plain  iron  cot. 

Prone  upon  this  cot,  wasted  by  disease,  lay  the  Count 
de  Saxe,  in  that  stupor  which  often  precedes  and  usually 
presages  dissolution. 

The  last  rites  of  the  Church  had  been  administered, 
and  the  assemblage  in  silence  and  apprehension,  awaited 
the  approach  of  a  victorious  enemy  and  the  final  gasp  of  a 
general  who  had  never  lost  a  battle. 

The  din  of  strife  drawing  nearer,  penetrated  the  coma 
which  enshrouded  the  soul  of  the  great  Field-Marshal. 

Saxe  opened  his  eyes.  His  experienced  ear  told  him 
that  his  army,  routed  and  disordered,  was  flying  before 
an  exultant  enemy. 

The  giant  whose  pastime  it  was  to  tear  horseshoes  in 
twain  with  his  bare  hands  and  to  twist  nails  into 
corkscrews  with  his  fingers,  staggered  to  his  feet,  hoarsely 
articulating  fierce  and  mandatory  ejaculations. 

Hastily  clothed,  the  Count  de  Saxe  was  placed  in  a 
litter  and  borne  out  of  his  pavilion  into  that  chaos 
of  ruin  and  carnage  which  invariably  accompanies  a  lost 
battle.  Around  him,  behind  and  in  front,  swarmed  his 
broken  battalions  and  disorganized  squadrons;  while  in 
pursuit  advanced  majestically  in  solid  column,  the 
triumphant  English. 

Saxe  demanded  his  horse  and  armor. 

Clad  in  iron  and  supported  in  the  saddle  on  either 
hand,  this  modern  Achilles  galloped  to  the  front  of  his 
army;  then,  at  the  head  of  the  Scotch  Guards,  the  Irish 
Brigade,  and  French  Household  troops,  Saxe  in  person, 
led  that  series  of  terrific  hand-to-hand  onslaughts  which 


GENERALSHIP  7 

drove  the  English  army  from  the  field  of  battle,  and 
gained  the  famous  victory  of  Fontenoy. 


" Furthermore,' '  declares  this  illustrious  Generalissimo 
of  Louis  XIV; 

"  It  is  possible  to  make  war  without  trusting  anything 
to  accident;  this  is  the  highest  point  of  skill  and  perfection 
within  the  province  of  a  general." 

''Most  men,"  writes  Vergetius,  "imagine  that  strength 
and  courage  are  sufficient  to  secure  victory.  Such  are 
ignorant  that  when  they  exist,  stratagem  vanquishes 
strength  and  skill  overcomes  courage.' ' 

In  his  celebrated  work,  Institutorum  Rei  Militaris, 
that  source  from  whence  all  writers  derive  their  best 
knowledge  of  the  military  methods  of  the  ancients;  and 
by  means  of  which,  he  strove  to  revive  in  his  degenerate 
countrymen  that  intelligent  valor  which  distinguishes 
their  great  ancestors — the  famous  Roman  reiterates  this 
solemn  warning: 

"Victory  in  war  depends  not  on  numbers,  nor  on 
courage;  skill  and  discipline  only,  can  ensure  it." 

The  emphasis  thus  laid  by  these  great  warriors  on 
genius  for  warfare  is  still  further  accentuated  by  men 
whose  dicta  few  will  dispute,  viz., 

"The  understanding  of  the  Commander,"  says  Frederic 
the  Great,  "  has  more  influence  on  the  outcome  of  the 
battle  or  campaign,  than  has  the  prowess  of  his  troops." 

Says  Napoleon: 

"The  general  is  the  head,  the  whole  of  an  army.  It 
was  not  the  Roman  army  that  subjugated  Gaul,  it  was 
Caesar;  nor  was  it  the  Carthagenian  army  that  made 
the  Republic  tremble  to  the  gates  of    Rome,  it  was 


8  GRAND    RECONNAISSANCE 

Hannibal;  it  was  not  the  Macedonian  army  which 
reached  the  Indus,  it  was  Alexander;  it  was  not  the 
French  army  which  carried  war  to  the  Weser  and  the 
Inn,  it  was  Turenne;  it  was  not  the  Prussian  army  which 
for  seven  years  defended  Prussia  against  the  three  strong- 
est powers  of  Europe,  it  was  Frederic  the  Great.' ' 

From  such  opinions  by  men  whose  careers  evince 
superlative  knowledge  of  the  subject,  it  is  clear,  that: 

I.  There  exists  a  system  of  Strategetics  common  to  all 
great  commanders; 

II.  That  understanding  of  this  system  is  shown  by  the 
skillful  use  of  it; 

III.  That  such  skill  is  derived  from  innate  capability; 

IV.  That  those  endowed  by  Nature  with  this  talent, 
must  bring  their  gifts  to  perfection,  by  intelligent  study. 

So  abstruse  are  the  processes  of  this  greatest  of  all 
professions,  that  comprehension  of  it  has  been  evidenced 
by  eleven  men  only,  viz. : 

Epaminondas,  Alexander,  Caesar,  Hannibal,  Gus- 
tavus  Adolphus,  Turenne,  Eugene,  Frederic,  Washing- 
ton, Napoleon,  Von  Moltke. 

Comprehension  of  this  system  can  be  attained,  only 
by  innate  capability  brought  to  perfection  by  intelligent 
study  of  the  words  and  achievements  of  these  great 
Captains. 

For  life  is  so  short  and  our  memories  in  general  so 
defective,  that  we  ought  to  seek  instruction  only  from 
the  purest  sources. 

None  but  men  endowed  by  Nature  with  the  military 
mind  and  trained  in  the  school  of  the  great  Captains,  are 
able  to  write  intelligently  on  the  acts  and  motives  of 
generals  of  the  first  order.  All  the  writings  of  mere 
literati  relative  to  these  uncommon  men,  no  matter  how 
excellent  such  authors  may  be,  never  can  rise  to  anything 
more  than  elegant  phraseology. 


GENERALSHIP  9 

It  is  of  enlightened  critics,  such  as  the  former,  that  the 
youthful  student  always  is  first  in  need.  Such  will 
guide  him  along  a  road,  in  which  he  who  has  no  con- 
ductor may  easily  lose  himself.  They  will  correct  his 
blunders  considerately,  recollecting  that  should  these  be 
ridiculed  or  treated  with  severity,  talent  might  be  stifled 
which  might  hereafter  bloom  to  perfection. 

It  is  a  difficult  matter  to  form  the  average  student, 
and  to  impart  to  him  that  degree  of  intelligent  audacity 
and  confident  prudence  which  is  requisite  for  the  proper 
practice  of  the  Art  of  Strategetics. 

To  secure  proficiency,  the  student  from  the  beginning 
must  cheerfully  submit  himself  to  a  mental  discipline, 
which  properly  may  be  termed  severe;  in  order  to  make 
his  faculties  obedient  to  his  will. 

Secondly,  he  must  regularly  exercise  these  faculties, 
in  order  to  make  them  active  and  to  acquire  the  habit  of 
implicitly  conforming  to  the  laws  of  the  Art;  to  make 
himself  familiar  with  its  processes,  and  to  establish  in 
his  mind  that  confidence  in  its  practice  which  can  come 
only  through  experience. 

The  student  daily  should  exercise  his  mind  in  the 
routine  of  deployments,  developments,  evolutions,  ma- 
noeuvres, and  operations,  both  on  the  offensive  and  on 
the  defensive.  These  exercises  should  be  imprinted  on 
the  memory  by  closely  reviewing  the  lesson  of  the  pre- 
vious day. 

Even  with  all  this  severe  and  constant  effort,  time  is 
necessary  for  practical  tactics  to  become  habitual;  for 
the  student  must  become  so  familiar  with  these  move- 
ments and  formations  that  he  can  execute  them  instantly 
and  with  precision. 

To  acquire  this  degree  of  perfection,  much  study  is 
necessary;  it  is  a  mistake  to  think  otherwise.  But  this 
study  is  its  own  sufficient  reward,  for  the  student  soon 
will  find  that  it  has  extended  his  ideas,  and  that  he  is 
beginning  to  think  in  the  GREAT. 


10  GRAND    RECONNAISSANCE 

At  the  same  time  the  student  should  thoroughly 
instruct  himself  in  military  history,  topography,  logic, 
mathematics,  and  the  science  of  fortification.  With 
all  of  these  the  strategist  must  be  familiar. 

But  his  chief  aim  must  be  to  perfect  his  judgment  and 
to  bring  it  to  the  highest  degree  of  broadness  and 
exactness. 

This  is  best  done  by  contemplation  of  the  works  of  the 
Great  Masters. 

The  past  history  of  Chess-play,  is  the  true  school  for 
those  who  aspire  to  precedence  in  the  Royal  Game.  It  is 
their  first  duty  to  inform  themselves  of  the  processes  of 
the  great  in  every  age,  in  order  to  shun  their  errors  and 
to  avail  of  their  methods. 

It  is  essential  to  grasp  that  system  of  play  common  to 
the  Masters;  to  pursue  it  step  by  step.  Particularly  is 
it  necessary  to  learn  that  he  who  can  best  deduce  con- 
sequences in  situations  whose  outcome  is  in  doubt,  is 
the  competitor  who  will  carry  off  the  prize  from  others 
who  act  less  rationally  than  himself. 

Especially,  should  the  student  be  wary  in  regard  to 
what  is  termed  chess  analysis,  as  applied  to  the  so-called 
"openings"  and  to  the  mid-game.  Most  chess  analysts 
are  compilers  of  falsities  occasionally  interspersed  with 
truth.  Among  the  prodigious  number  of  variations 
which  they  pretend  to  establish  or  refute,  none  may  be 
implicitly  relied  on  in  actual  play;  few  are  of  value 
except  for  merely  elementary  purposes,  and  many  are 
fallacies  fatal  to  the  user. 

The  reason  for  this  is:  whenever  men  invited  by  curi- 
osity, seek  to  examine  circumstantially  even  the  less 
intricate  situations  on  the  Chess-board,  they  at  once 
become  lost  in  a  labyrinth  abounding  in  obscurities  and 
contradictions.  Those,  who  ignorant  of  the  synthetic 
method  of  calculation,  are  compelled  to  depend  upon 
their  analytic  powers,  quickly  find  that  these,  on  account 


GENERALSHIP  11 

of   the   number    of    unknown    quantities,    are    utterly- 
inadequate. 

Any  attempt  to  calculate  the  true  move  in  Chess-play 
by  analysis,  other  than  in  situations  devoid  of  unknown 
quantities,  is  futile. 

Yet  it  is  of  such  folly  that  the  mediocre  mind  is  most 
enamoured.  Content  with  seeing  much,  it  is  oblivious 
to  what  it  cannot  see;  and  the  analytical  system  consists 
merely  in  claiming  that  there  is  nothing  to  see,  other 
than  what  it  does  see. 

This  is  that  slender  reed  upon  which  the  so-called 
"chess-analyst"  hangs  his  claims,  oblivious  to  the  basic 
truth  that  in  analysis,  unless  all  is  known,  nothing  is 
known. 

Many  delude  themselves  to  the  contrary  and  strive  to 
arrive  at  correct  conclusions  without  first  having  ar- 
ranged clearly  before  their  minds  all  the  facts. 

Hence,  their  opinions  and  judgments,  being  founded  in 
ignorance  of  all  the  facts,  are  to  that  extent  defective; 
and  their  conclusions  necessarily  wrong. 

Through  action  taken  upon  incomplete  knowledge,  men  ] 
are  beguiled  into  error;  and  it  is  to  such  unreason  that 
most  human  catastrophies  are  to  be  attributed. 


Most  of  those  who  attempt  to  write  on  Strategetics, 
and  whether  applied  to  Chess-play  or  to  Warfare,  very 
quickly  are  compelled  to  seek  refuge  in  vague  phrases; 
in  order  to  conceal  their  uncertain  grasp  on  the  subject 
discussed.  The  uninformed  believe  in  them,  because  of 
their  reputation,  and  are  satisfied  that  the  thing  is  so, 
without  understanding  WHY. 

Words  intended  to  convey  instruction,  should  not  be 
used  except  in  their  proper  meaning.  Each  word  should 
be  defined  for  the  student  and  its  use  regulated.  The 
true  use  of  words  being  established,  there  is  no  longer 


12  GRAND    RECONNAISSANCE 

danger  from  a  play  upon  them;  or,  from  different  and 
confused  ideas  annexed  to  them,  either  by  the  persons 
who  read,  or  who  employ  them. 

By  means  of  this  warning,  the  student  easily  may 
detect  the  empty  mouthings  of  enthusiastic  inexperience, 
and  equally  so,  the  casuistries  of  the  subtle  expert;  who 
often  uses  language  merely  to  conceal  from  youthful 
talent,  knowledge  which  if' imparted,  might  be  fatal  to 
his  domination. 

As  the  student  progresses  toward  proficiency,  he,  sooner 
or  later,  will  come  to  realize,  that  of  all  disgusting  things, 
to  a  mind  which  revolts  at  nonsense,  reasoning  ill  is 
the  worst. 

It  is  distressing,  to  be  afflicted  with  the  absurdities  of 
men,  who,  victims  of  the  fancy,  confound  enthusiasm 
with  capability  and  mistake  mania  for  talent.  The 
world  is  full  of  such  people,  who,  in  all  honesty  thinking 
themselves  philosophers,  are  only  visionaries  enamoured 
of  their  own  lunatic  illusions. 

The  true  discipline  for  the  student  who  aspires  to 
proficiency  at  Chess-play,  is,  in  every  succeeding  game, 
to  imitate  more  closely  the  play  of  the  Great  Masters; 
and  to  endeavor  to  take  his  measures  with  more  atten- 
tion and  judgment  than  in  any  preceding. 

Every  player  at  Chess  has  defects;  many  have  very 
great  ones.  In  searching  for  these  one  should  not  treat 
himself  tenderly,  and  when  examining  his  faults,  he  should 
grant  himself  no  quarter. 

Particularly  should  the  student  cultivate  confidence 
in  and  rigidly  adhere  to  the  standard  of  skill,  as  inter- 
preted by  that  immutable  System  of  Chess-play,  of  which 
Morphy  is  the  unapproachable  and  all-sufficient  ex- 
ponent. 

Observing  the  lack  of  method  displayed  by  the  in- 
competent Chess-commander,  the  student  of  this  system 
will  remark  with  astonishment,  the  want  of  plan  and 


GENERALSHIP  13 

the  entire  absence  of  co-operation  between  the  various 
Chessic  corps  d'armee,  which  under  such  leadership  are 
incapable  of  a  general  effort. 

How  dense  is  such  a  leader  in  the  selection  of  a  project, 
how  slow  and  slovenly  in  its  execution;  how  many  oppor- 
tunities does  he  suffer  to  escape  him  and  how  many 
enormous  faults  does  he  not  commit?  To  such  things, 
the  numerically  weaker  but  more  skillful  opponent,  often 
is  indebted  for  safety  and  ultimately  for  success. 

One  who  is  opposed  by  such  blockheads,  necessarily 
must  gain  advantages  continually;  for  conduct  so  op- 
posite to  all  the  laws  of  the  Art,  is,  in  itself,  sufficient  to 
incur  ruin.  It  is  for  such  negligence  on  his  own  part 
that  one  often  has  cause  bitterly  to  reproach  himself. 
But  such  errors,  especially  on  the  part  of  great  players, 
are  exemplary  lessons  for  the  student,  who  from  them 
may  learn  to  be  more  prudent,  circumspect,  and  wise. 


Those  who  make  a  mere  pastime  of  Chess,  who  have 
no  desire  for  the  true  benefit  of  the  game,  do  not  deserve 
information. 

Such  people  are  more  numerous  than  may  be  supposed. 
They  have  few  coherent  ideas  and  are  usually  influenced 
by  mere  chatter  and  by  writers  whose  sole  excuse  is 
enthusiasm. 

These  players  at  the  game  cannot  benefit  by  example. 
The  follies  of  others  afford  them  no  useful  lesson.  Each 
generation  of  such  "wood-shifters,"  has  blindly  followed 
in  the  footsteps  of  those  preceding  and  daily  is  guilty  of 
errors  which  times  innumerable  have  been  fully  exposed. 

It  is  the  darling  habit  of  such  folk  to  treat  the  great 
things  in  Chess  with  levity  and  to  dignify  those  in- 
significant matters  which  appertain  to  the  game  when 
used  as  a  plaything. 

Such  people  are  merely  enthusiastic;  usually  they  are 


14  GRAND    RECONNAISSANCE 

equally  frivolous.  They  do  everything  from  fancy, 
nothing  from  design.  Their  zeal  is  strong,  but  they  can 
neither  regulate  nor  control  it. 

Such  bear  about  their  Chessic  disabilities  in  their 
character.  Inflated  in  good  fortune,  groveling  in  ad- 
versity, these  players  never  attain  to  that  sage  con- 
templation, which  renders  the  scientific  practice  of 
Chess  so  indescribably  beautiful. 

There  is  another  class  of  Chess-players  who  from  mere 
levity  of  mind  are  incapable  of  steadily  pursuing  any 
fixed  plan;  but  who  overturn,  move  by  move,  even  such 
advantages  as  their  good  fortune  may  have  procured. 
There  are  others,  who,  although  possessed  of  great  vi- 
vacity of  mind  and  eager  for  information,  yet  lack  that 
patience  necessary  to  receive  instruction. 

Lastly,  there  are  not  a  few  whose  way  of  thinking  and 
the  validity  of  whose  calculations,  depend  upon  their 
good  or  ill  digestion. 

It  is  in  vain  that  such  people  endeavor  to  divine 
things  beyond  their  understanding.  Hence  it  is,  that 
among  those  incapable  of  thought,  or  too  indolent  for 
mental  effort,  the  game  proceeds  in  easy  fashion  until 
routine  is  over.  Afterward,  at  each  move,  the  most 
probable  conjecture  passes  for  the  best  reason  and 
victory  ultimately  rests  with  him  whose  blunders  are 
least  immediately  consequential. 


Understanding  of  high  art  is  dispensed  only  to  the 
few;  the  great  mass  neither  can  comprehend  nor  enjoy  it. 
In  spite  of  the  good  natured  Helvetius,  all  are  not  wise 
who  wish  to  be  so  and  men  ever  will  remain  what  Nature 
made  them.  It  is  impossible  for  the  stream  to  rise 
higher  than  its  source. 

"The  progress  of  human  reason,"  writes  the  great 
Frederic,  "is  more  slow  than  is  imagined;  the  true  cause 


GENERALSHIP  15 

of  which  is  that  most  men  are  satisfied  with  vague 
notions  of  things  and  but  few  take  time  for  examination 
and  deep  inquiry. 

"Some,  fettered  by  prejudice  from  their  infancy,  wish 
not,  or  are  unable  to  break  their  chains;  others,  delight- 
ing in  frivolity  know  not  a  word  of  mathematics  and 
enjoy  life  without  allowing  their  pleasures  to  be  in- 
terrupted by  a  moment  of  reflection.  Should  one  think- 
ing man  in  a  thousand  be  discovered  it  will  be  much ;  and 
it  is  for  him  that  men  of  talent  write. 

"The  rest  naturally  are  offended,  for  nothing  so  en-  I 
rages  the  mediocre  mind  as  to  be  compelled  to  admit  to 
itself  its  own  inferiority.     Consequently,  they  consign 
book,  author,  and  reader  conjointly  to  Satan.     So  muchf 
easier  is  it  to  condemn  than  to  refute,  or  to  learn." 


The  early  success  of  many  young  students  does  not 
permit  them  to  observe  that  they  often  have  departed 
from  the  rules  of  the  Art.  As  they  have  escaped 
punishment  for  their  errors,  they  remain  unacquainted 
with  the  dangers  to  which  they  were  exposed.  Con- 
stant good  fortune  finally  makes  them  over-confident  and 
they  do  not  suspect  it  necessary  to  change  their  measures, 
even  when  in  the  presence  of  an  able  foe. 

Thus,  the  youthful  tyro,  inconsiderate,  inconsistent, 
and  turbulent,  and  oblivious  to  the  innumerable  dangers 
by  which  he  is  surrounded,  plays  his  pieces  hither  and 
thither,  as  fancy  and  inclination  dictate,  culling  bouquets 
of  the  most  gorgeous  flowers  of  the  imagination;  thought- 
less of  the  future  and  perfectly  happy  because  he  cannot 
reflect. 

To  reason  exactly,  the  student  first  must  rid  his  mind 
of  all  preconceived  notions;  he  must  regard  the  matter 
under  consideration  as  a  blank  sheet  of  paper,  upon 
which  nothing  is  to  be  written  save  those  things  which 


16  GRAND    RECONNAISSANCE 

by  the  processes  of  logic  and  demonstration,  are  es- 
tablished as  facts. 

There  is  much  difference  between  the  Art  of  Logic 
and  mere  conjecture. 

The  calculations  of  arithmeticians,  though  rigorous  and 
exact,  are  never  difficult;  because  they  relate  to  known 
quantities  and  to  the  palpable  objects  of  nature.  But 
when  it  is  required  to  argue  from  combining  circum- 
stances, the  least  ignorance  of  uncertain  and  obscure 
facts  breaks  the  chain  and  we  are  deceived  every  moment. 

This  is  no  defect  of  the  understanding,  but  error 
arising  from  plausible  ideas,  which  wear  the  face  of  and 
are  too  quickly  accepted  for  truth.  A  long  chapter  can 
be  written  on  the  different  ways  in  which  men  lose 
themselves  in  their  conjectures.  Innumerable  examples 
of  this  are  not  wanting,  and  all  because  they  have 
suffered  themselves  to  be  hurried  away  and  thus  to  be 
precipitate  in  drawing  their  conclusions. 

The  part  that  the  General,  whether  in  Chess-play  or  in 
Warfare,  has  to  act,  always  is  more  difficult  because  he 
must  not  permit  himself  the  least  mistake,  but  is  bound 
to  behave  with  prudence  and  sagacity  throughout  a 
long  series  of  intricate  processes.  A  single  false  deduc- 
tion, or  a  movement  of  the  enemy  unintelligible  to  a 
commander,  may  lead  him  to  commit  an  irremediable 
error;  and  in  cases  wherein  the  situation  is  beyond 
comprehension,  his  ignorance  is  invincible. 

For  however  extensive  the  human  mind  may  be,  it 
never  is  sufficiently  so  to  penetrate  those  minute  com- 
binations necessary  to  be  developed  in  order  to  foresee 
and  regulate  events,  the  sequence,  utility  and  even 
existence  of  which,  depend  upon  future  contingencies. 

Incidents  which  are  past,  can  be  explained  clearly, 
because  the  reasons  therefor  are  manifest.  But  men 
easily  deceive  themselves  concerning  the  future,  which, 


GENERALSHIP  17 

by  a  veil  of  innumerable  and  impenetrable  secondary 
causes,  is  concealed  from  the  most  prying  inspection. 

In  such  situations,  how  puerile  are  the  projects  even 
of  the  greatest  Strategist.  To  him,  as  much  as  to  the 
tyro,  is  the  future  hidden;  he  knows  not  what  shall 
happen,  even  on  the  next  move.  How  then  may  he 
foresee  those  situations  which  secondary  causes  later 
may  produce? 

Circumstances  most  often  oblige  him  to  act  contrary 
to  his  wishes;  and  in  the  flux  and  reflux  of  fortune,  it  is  the 
part  of  prudence  to  conform  to  system  and  to  act  with 
consistency.     It  is  impossible  to  foresee  all  events. 


"It  is  not  possible,"  writes  the  Count  de  Saxe,  "to 
establish  a  system  without  first  being  acquainted  with 
the  principles  that  must  necessarily  support  it." 

In  corroboration  of  this  is  the  opinion  of  Frederic  the 
Great : 

"Condemned  by  my  unfortunate  stars  to  philoso- 
phies on  contingencies  and  on  probabilities  I  employ  my 
whole  attention  to  examine  the  principle  on  which  my 
argument  must  rest  and  to  procure  all  possible  informa- 
tion on  that  point.  Deprived  of  such  precaution,  the 
edifice  I  erect,  wanting  a  base,  would  fall  like  a  house  of 
cards." 

Everyone  who  does  not  proceed  on  principle,  is  in- 
consistent in  his  conduct.  Equally  so,  whenever  the 
principle  on  which  one  acts  is  false,  i.e.,  does  not  apply 
to  the  existing  situation;  all  deductions  based  thereon,  if 
applied  to  the  existing  situation,  necessarily  are  false. 

"Those  principles  which  the  Art  of  Warfare  pre- 
scribes, never  should  be  departed  from,"  writes  Frederic 
the  Great,  "and  generals  rigidly  should  adhere  to  those 
circumspections  and  never  swerve  from  implicit  obedience 
to  laws,  upon  whose  exact  observance  depends  the 
safety  of  their  armies  and  the  success  of  their  projects." 


18  GRAND    RECONNAISSANCE 

Thus  the  student  will  clearly  see  that  all  other  cal- 
culations, though  never  so  ingeniously  imagined,  are  of 
small  worth  in  comparison  with  comprehension  of  the 
use  of  Strategetic  principles.  By  means  of  these  latter, 
we  are  taught  to  control  the  raging  forces  which  dominate 
in  the  competitive  arts  and  to  compel  obedience  from 
friend  and  foe  alike. 

"To  the  shame  of  humanity  it  must  be  confessed," 
writes  Frederic  the  Great,  "that  what  often  passes  for 
authority  and  consequence  is  mere  assumption,  used  as  a 
cloak  to  conceal  from  the  layman  the  extreme  of  official 
indolence  and  stupidity. 

"To  follow  the  routine  of  service,  to  be  busied  concern- 
ing food  and  clothing,  and  to  eat  when  others  eat,  to 
fight  when  others  fight,  are  the  whole  warlike  deeds  of 
the  majority  and  constitute  what  is  called  having  seen 
service  and  grown  grey  in  arms. 

"The  reason  why  so  many  officers  remain  in  a  state 
of  mediocrity,  is  because  they  neither  know,  nor  trouble 
themselves  to  inquire  into  the  causes  either  of  their 
victories  or  defeats,  although  such  causes  are  exceed- 
ingly real." 

In  this  connection,  writes  Polybius,  the  friend  and 
biographer  of  Hannibal: 

"Having  made  ourselves  masters  of  the  subject  of 
Warfare,  we  shall  no  longer  ascribe  success  to  Fortune 
and  blindly  applaud  mere  conquerors,  as  the  ignorant  do ; 
but  we  shall  approve  and  condemn  from  Principle  and 
Reason." 

To  the  Chess-student  nothing  can  be  more  conclusive 
than  the  following: 

"My  success  at  Chess-play,"  writes  Paul  Morphy,  "Is 
due  to  rigid  adherence  to  fixed  rules  and  Principles." 

"Chess  is  best  fought  on  Principles,  free  from  all  decep- 
tion and  trickery."  Wilhelm  Steinitz. 


GRAND 
RECONNAISSANCE 


"Man  can  sway  the  future,  only  by  foreseeing  through  a 
clear  understanding  of  the  present,  to  what  far  off  end 
matters  are  tending." 

Caesar. 


"From  the  erroneous  ideas  they  form  in  regard  to  good 
and  evil,  the  ignorant,  the  mis-educated  and  the  inex- 
perienced always  act  without  precisely  knowing  what  they 
ought  to  desire,  or  what  they  ought  to  fear;  and  it  is  not  in 
the  end  they  propose,  but  in  the  choice  of  means,  that  most 
deceive  themselves. " 

Aristotle. 


GRAND 
RECONNAISSANCE 


11  In  every  situation  the  principal  strategical  requirements 
must  clearly  be  defined  and  all  other  things  must  be  sub- 
ordinated to  these  considerations.11 

Frederic  the  Great. 

"One  should  seek  to  obtain  a  knowledge  of  causes,  rather 
than  of  effects;  and  should  endeavor  to  reason  from  the 
known,  to  the  unknown." 

Euclid. 


The  province  of  Grand  Reconnaissance  is  exactly  to  deter- 
mine the  relative  advantages  and  disadvantages  in  time, 
numbers,  organization,  topography,  mobility  and  positionf 
which  appertain  to  hostile  armies  contained  in  the  same 
strategetic  plane;  and  to  designate  those  Corps  dyarmee 
by  which  such  advantages  are  materially  expressed. 

Those  processes  which  appertain  to  the  making  of 
Grand  Reconnaissance,  necessarily  are  argumentative; 
inasmuch  as  all  the  facts  never  are  determinate. 

Consequently,  talent  of  the  highest  order  is  required 
for  the  deducing  of  conclusions  which  never  can  be  based 
upon  exact  knowledge,  and  which  always  must  con- 
template the  presence  of  numerous  unknown  quantities. 


24  GRAND    RECONNAISSANCE 

The  responsibilities  inherent  to  Grand  Reconnaissance 
never  are  to  be  delegated  to,  nor  thrust  upon  subor- 
dinates. Scouts,  spies,  and  informers  of  every  kind, 
have  their  manifold  and  proper  uses,  but  such  uses 
never  rise  above  furnishing  necessary  information  in 
regard  to  topographical,  tactical,  and  logistic  details. 

The  Commander-in-chief  alone  is  presumed  to  possess 
knowledge  and  skill  requisite  to  discern  what  strate- 
getically  is  fact  and  what  is  not  fact;  and  to  ascribe  to 
each  fact  its  proper  place  and  sequence. 

Lack  of  military  talent  and  of  Strategetic  knowledge, 
never  is  more  strikingly  shown  than  by  negligence  or 
inability  in  this  regard. 

Incompetents,  ignorant  of  this  truth,  and  oblivious  to 
its  importance,  devolve  such  vital  responsibility  upon 
subordinates;  and  later,  these  legalized  murderers 
palliate  the  slaughter  of  their  troops  and  the  national 
shame  by  publicly  reprimanding  men  serving  at  shillings 
per  month,  for  failing  in  a  service,  which  were  the  latter 
able  to  perform,  would  entitle  them  to  the  gold  epaulets 
and  general's  pay,  of  which  their  commander  is  the 
unfit  recipient. 


Knowledge  of  the  number,  organization,  position  and 
movements  of  the  enemy's  troops  is  the  basic  element 
for  correct  calculation  in  campaign  and  battle. 

Such  things  to  be  accurately  estimated  must  be 
closely  inspected.  All  speculation  and  all  conjecture  in 
regard  to  these  matters  is  but  frivolity. 

It  is  by  being  precipitate  and  hasty  in  making  such 
conclusions,  that  men  are  deceived,  for  to  judge  rightly 
of  things  before  they  become  clearly  shown  is  most 
difficult. 

To  act  on  uncertainty  is  WRONG. 


GRAND    RECONNAISSANCE  25 

We  do  not  know  all  the  facts  and  a  single  iota  of  light 
later  on  may  oblige  us  to  condemn  that  which  we  pre- 
viously have  approved. 

In  the  making  of  Grand  Reconnaissance,  one  always 
must  be  wary  of  placing  too  much  confidence  in  ap- 
pearances and  in  first  impressions.  Especially  must 
care  be  taken  not  to  magnify  the  weaknesses  of  the 
hostile  army,  nor  the  efficacy  of  the  kindred  position. 

Also,  one  never  should  underrate : 

1.  The  talents  of  the  opposing  commander;  nor 

2.  The  advantages  possessed  by  the  opposing  army: 


(a) 

In  numbers, 

(b) 

In  organization, 

(c) 

In  position, 

(d) 

In  topography, 

(e) 

In  time, 

(0 

In  mobility. 

It  is  a  first  essential,  constantly  to  note  the  movements 
of  the  enemy,  in  order  to  detect  his  plans  and  the  exact 
location  of  his  corps. 

These  things  are  the  only  reliable  guides  for  determin- 
ing the  true  course  of  procedure.  It  must  be  left  to  the 
enemy  to  show  by  his  movements  and  the  posts  which 
he  occupies,  the  measures  he  projects  for  the  future,  and 
until  these  are  known,  it  is  not  proper  to  ACT.    Hence: 

PRINCIPLE. 

All  movements  of  Corps  Offensive  should  be  governed  by 
the  POSITION  of  the  hostile  army,  and  all  movements 
of  Corps  Defensive  should  be  governed  by  the  MOVE- 
ME  NTS  of  the  hostile  army. 


26  GRAND    RECONNAISSANCE 

As  soon  as  the  enemy  begins  a  movement,  his  inten- 
tions become  clear.  It  is  then  possible  to  make  precise 
calculations. 

But  be  not  hasty  to  build  conclusions  upon  uncertain 
information  and  do  not  take  any  resolutions  until  certain 
what  are  the  numbers,  the  position,  the  objectives,  and 
the  projects  of  the  enemy. 

However  interesting  an  Undertaking  may  appear,  one 
should  not  be  seduced  by  it  while  ill-informed  of  the 
obstacles  to  be  met  and  the  possibility  of  not  having 
sufficient  force  in  the  theatre  of  action. 

Chimerical  schemes  should  be  abandoned  at  their 
inception.  Reason,  instead  of  extravagancies  of  the 
fancy,  always  must  be  the  guide.  Men,  most  courageous, 
often  undertake  fearful  difficulties,  but  impracticable 
things  they  leave  to  lunatics. 

In  all  situations,  one  must  beware  of  venturing  be- 
yond his  depth.  It  is  wiser  to  keep  within  the  limits 
which  the  knowledge  we  possess  shall  prescribe. 

Especially  in  crises,  one  must  proceed  most  cautiously 
until  sure  information  is  acquired;  for  over-haste  is 
exceedingly  dangerous,  when  exact  knowledge  is  lacking 
of  the  enemy's  numbers,  position,  and  movements. 

PRINCIPLE. 

Situations  always  should  be  contemplated  as  they  E  XIS  T, 
never  as  they  0  UGHT  to  be,  or,  perhaps,  MA  Y  be. 

In  every  important  juncture,  each  step  must  be  pro- 
foundly considered;  as  little  as  possible  should  be  left  to 
chance. 

Particularly,  must  one  never  be  inflated  and  rendered 
careless  and  negligent  by  success;  nor  made  spiritless  and 
fearful  by  reverses.  At  all  times  the  General  should  see 
things  only  as  they  are  and  attempt  what  is  dictated  by 


GRAND    RECONNAISSANCE  27 

that  Strategetic  Principle  which  dominates  the  given 
situation.     Fortune  often  does  the  rest. 


"Napoleon  bending  over  and  sometimes  lying  at  full 
length  upon  his  map,  with  a  pair  of  dividers  opened  to  a 
distance  on  the  scale  of  from  17  to  20  miles,  equal  to  22  to  25 
miles  over  country,  and  marking  the  positions  of  his  own 
and  of  the  hostile  armies  by  sticking  into  the  map  pins 
surmounted  by  little  balls  made  of  diverse  colored  sealing 
wax;  in  the  twinkling  of  an  eye  calculated  those  wonderful 
concentrations  of  his  Corps  d'armee  upon  decisive  points 
and  dictated  those  instructions  to  his  Marshals  which  in 
themselves  are  a  title  to  glory." 

Baron  de  Jomini. 


28  GRAND    RECONNAISSANCE 


MILITARY   EXAMPLES 

"Phillip,  King  of  Macedonia,  is  the  single  confidant  of 
his  own  secrets,  the  sole  dispenser  of  his  treasure,  the  most 
able  general  of  all  Greece,  the  bravest  soldier  in  his  army. 
He  foresees  and  executes  everything  himself;  anticipates 
events,  derives  all  possible  advantages  from  them  and  yields 
to  them  when  to  yield  is  necessary. 

His  troops  are  extremely  well  disciplined,  he  exercises 
them  incessantly.  Always  himself  at  their  head,  they 
perform  with  arms  and  baggage  marches  of  three  hundred 
stadia  with  alarming  expedition  and  making  no  difference 
between  summer  or  winter,  between  fatigue  and  rest." 

He  takes  no  step  without  mature  reflection,  nor  proceeds 
to  a  second  until  he  is  assured  of  the  success  of  the  first  and 
his  operations  are  always  dominated  by  considerations  of 
time  and  place." 

Apollodorus. 


The  facility  with  which  one  familiar  with  the  Strate- 
getic  Art  may  make  Grand  Reconnaissance,  even  of  an 
invisible  theatre  of  action,  and  may  evolve  accurate  de- 
ductions from  a  mass  of  inexact  and  contradictory  reports 
is  illustrated  by  the  following  practical  examples,  viz: 


GRAND    RECONNAISSANCE  29 


FIRST  EXAMPLE. 

(From  the  New  York  Journal,  Dec.  26,  1899 
By  Franklin  K.  Young.) 


"The  position  of  the  British  armies  is  deplorable. 

"With  the  single  exception  of  Gen.  Buller's  force,  the 
situation  of  these  bodies  of  British  troops,  thus  un- 
fortunately circumstanced,  is  cause  for  the  greatest 
anxiety. 

"Strong  indications  point  to  a  grand  offensive  move- 
ment on  the  part  of  the  Boers,  with  the  object  of  term- 
inating the  war  in  one  campaign  and  by  a  single  blow. 

"True,  this  movement  may  be  but  a  feint,  but  if  it  be 
a  true  movement,  it  is  difficult  to  over-estimate  the 
gravity  of  the  situation  of  the  British  in  South  Africa. 

"For  if  this  movement  is  a  true  military  movement,  it 
shows  as  clearly  as  the  sun  in  the  sky  to  those  who  know 
the  Strategetic  Art,  that  the  Boer  armies  are  in  transition 
from  the  defensive  to  an  offensive  plan  of  campaign,  with 
the  purpose  of  capturing  DeArr  and  from  thence  advanc- 
ing in  force  against  the  chief  British  depot,  Capetown." 


The  United  States  War  Department,  Report  on  the 
British-Boer  War,  published  June  14,  1901,  contains  the 
following: 

(By  Capt.  S.  L'H.  Slocum,  December  25,  1899. 
U.  S.  Military  Attache  with  the  British  Army.) 

"I  consider  the  present  situation  to  be  the  most 
critical  for  the  English  forces,  since  hostilities  began. 


30  GRAND    RECONNAISSANCE 

Should  the  Boers  assume  offensive  operations,  the  Eng- 
lish armies  with  their  long  and  thinly  guarded  lines  of 
communication,  would  be  placed  in  great  jeopardy." 


(By  Chas.  S.  Goldman,  war  correspondent  with 
Gen.  Buller  and  Lord  Roberts  in  the  South  African 
Campaign.     MacMillan  &  Co.,  1902.) 

"Had  the  defence  (of  Cape  Colony)  been  entrusted 
to  less  capable  hands  than  those  of  Gen.  French,  who, 
with  a  mere  handful  of  troops  succeeded  not  only  in 
checking  the  Boer  advance,  but  in  driving  them  back  on 
Colesberg,  it  is  not  unreasonable  to  suppose  that  the 
enemy  would  have  been  able  to  push  on  south  and  west 
to  Craddock  and  Hex  River  range  and  thus  bring  about  a 
state  of  affairs  which  might  have  shaken  British  rule  in 
South  Africa  to  its  foundation." 


GRAND    RECONNAISSANCE  31 


SECOND  EXAMPLE. 

(Boston  Globe,  Jan.  12,  1900.    By  Franklin  K.  Young.) 

"Lord  Roberts'  first  object  will  be  the  rescue  of  Lord 
Methuen's  army  now  blockaded  near  Magersfontein  by 
Gen.  Conje. 

"As  the  first  step  to  effect  this,  the  British  commander- 
in-chief  at  once  and  with  all  his  force,  will  occupy  the 
line  from  Naauwpoort  to  De  Arr.  There,  he  will  await 
the  arrival  of  twenty-two  transports  now  en  route  from 
England. 

"With  these  reinforcements,  he  will  advance  directly 
to  the  Modder  River  by  the  route  previously  taken  by 
Lord  Methuen." 


(By  Chas.  S.  Goldmann,  Sp.  Cor.  British  Army.) 

"Slow  to  recognize  their  opportunities,  the  enemy  were 
still  in  the  midst  of  preparation,  when  Gen.  French 
reached  De  Arr.  Meanwhile  a  detachment  under  Major 
McCracken  occupied  Naauwpoort,  to  which  place 
thirty  days'  supplies  for  3000  men  and  1100  animals 
had  been  ordered. 

"In  the  ten  weeks  of  fighting  which  ensued,  prior 
to  the  arrival  of  the  British  main  army,  Gen.  French  by 
his  skillful  tactics  held  a  powerful  force  of  Boers  at  bay, 
checked  their  descent  into  the  southern  part  of  the 
colony,  defeated  their  attempt  to  display  the  Vierkleur 
across  the  cape  peninsular,  and  materially  influenced, 
if  not  absolutely  determined,  the  entire  future  of  the 
campaign." 


32  GRAND    RECONNAISSANCE 

(By  Chas.  S.  Goldmann,  Sp.  Cor.  with  British  Army.) 

"Arriving  at  Capetown  on  Jan.  10,  Lord  Roberts 
decided  that  the  line  of  march  should  lead  by  way  of 
Bloemfontein  to  Pretoria,  initiating  the  operation  by 
the  concentration  of  large  forces  on  the  Modder  River, 
forming  there  an  advanced  base." 


GRAND    RECONNAISSANCE 


THIRD  EXAMPLE. 

(Boston  Globe,  Jan.  21,  1900.     By  Franklin  K.  Young.) 

"It  is  plain  that  when  the  Boers  took  position  at  Col- 
enso  they  prepared  their  plan  for  the  protection  of  their 
flanks;  to  deny  this  would  be  to  assume  that  men  who 
had  displayed  superb  military  sagacity  were  ignorant 
of  the  simplest  processes  of  warfare. 

"What  that  plan  is  will  be  unfolded  very  rapidly 
should  Gen.  Buller  attempt  to  pierce  the  line  of  Boer 
vedettes  posted  upon  the  Spion  Kop  and  concealing  as 
near  as  can  be  determined  from  the  present  meagre  facts, 
either  the  Second,  or  the  Fourth  Ambuscade. 

"In  either  case  it  signifies  that  the  Boers  are  confident 
of  annihilating  Gen.  Buller's  army  if  it  should  cross  the 
Tugela. 

"About  this  time  the  Boers  are  watching  Gen.  Warren 
and  his  command  and  watching  him  intently.  Some- 
thing may  happen  to  him." 


(London  Times,  Jan.  22,  1900.) 

"On  Friday,  Jan.  19,  Gen.  Warren  began  a  long, 
circuitous  march  to  the  westward  for  the  purpose  of 
turning  the  right  of  the  Boer  position. 

"This  attempt  was  abandoned  on  account  of  the  long 
ridge  running  from  Spion  Kop  being  occupied  by  the 
Boers  in  such  strength  as  to  command  the  entire  route. 

"Saturday,  Jan.  20,  Gen.  Warren,  having  crossed  the 
Tugela  River  with  the  bulk  of  his  troops,  ordered  a 
frontal  attack.    Our  men  behaved  splendidly  under  a 


34  GRAND    RECONNAISSANCE 

heavy  cross-fire  for  seven  hours.  Our  casualties  were 
slight.  Three  lines  of  rifle  fire*  were  visible  along  the 
Boer  main  position. 

(*The  Second  Ambuscade.  Vide  "Secret  Instructions" 
of  Frederic  the  Great.) 

(British  War  Office  Bulletin,  Jan.  22, 1900.) 

"Gen.  Warren  has  been  engaged  all  day  chiefly  on  his 
left,  which  he  has  swung  forward  a  couple  of  miles." 

(Signed)  Buller. 

(British  War  Office  Bulletin,  Jan.  24,  1900.) 

"Gen.  Warren  holds  the  position  he  gained  two  days 
ago.  The  Boer  position  is  on  higher  ground  than  ours 
and  can  be  approached  only  over  bare  and  open  slopes. 
An  attempt  will  be  made  tonight  to  seize  Spion  Kop. 

(Signed)  Buller. 

(British  War  Office  Bulletin,  Jan.  25,  1900.) 

"Gen.  Warren's  troops  last  night  occupied  Spion  Kop, 
surprising  the  small*  garrison  which  fled." 

(Signed)  Buller. 

(*Merely  the  outposts  and  vedettes  of  the  Second 
Ambuscade.) 

(British  War  Office  Bulletin,  Jan.  26,  1900.) 

"Gen.  Warren's  garrison,  I  am  sorry  to  say,  I  find  this 
morning  had  in  the  night  abandoned  Spion  Kop. 

(Signed)  Buller. 

(British  War  Office  Bulletin,  Jan.  28,  1900.) 

"I  decided  that  a  second  attack  on  Spion  Kop  was 
useless*  and  that  the  enemy's  right  was  too  strong  to 


GRAND    RECONNAISSANCE  35 

allow  me  to  force  it.     Accordingly  I  decided  to  withdraw 
the  troops  to  the  south  side  of  the  Tugela  River." 

(Signed)  Buller. 

(*The  proffer  of  an  untenable  post  always  is  the  bait 
of  the  Second  Ambuscade.) 

(London  Daily  Mailf  Jan.  29,  1900.) 

"The  richest  and  what  was  hitherto  considered  the 
most  powerful  nation  in  the  world  is  today  in  the  humili- 
ating position  of  seeing  its  armies  beaten  back  with  heavy 
losses  by  two  small  states." 


36  GRAND    RECONNAISSANCE 

FOURTH  EXAMPLE. 

(Boston  Globe,  Feb.  16,  1900,  by  Franklin  K.  Young.) 

"Lord  Roberts'  communications  for  nearly  two  hun- 
dred miles  are  exposed  to  the  attack  of  an  enemy,  who 
at  any  moment  is  liable  to  capture  and  destroy  his  supply 
and  ammunition  trains  and  to  reduce  the  British  army 
to  a  condition  wherein  it  will  be  obliged  to  fight  a  battle 
under  most  disadvantageous  circumstances.' ' 


(  From  United  States  War  Department  Report  on  the 
British  Boer  War.  By  Capt.  S.  L'H.  Slocum,  U.  S. 
Attache  with  British  Army.) 

"Feb.  15,  1900.  The  main  supply  park  of  the  army 
was  attacked  by  the  enemy  near  Watervale  Drift. 

"This  park  consisted  of  one  hundred  ox- wagons  con- 
taining rations  and  one  hundred  more  wagons  filled  with 
ammunition.  One  hundred  and  fifty  of  these  wagons 
and  three  thousand  oxen  were  captured  by  the  Boers. 

"The  loss  of  these  rations  and  munitions  was  a  most 
serious  blow.  Lord  Roberts  was  here  confronted  by  a 
crisis  which  would  have  staggered  and  been  the  undoing 
of  many  commanders-in-chief  placed  as  he  was. 

"He  was  in  the  enemy's  country,  cut  off  from  his  base 
of  supplies  on  the  raliroad  and  with  an  unknown  number 
of  the  enemy  in  his  rear  and  upon  his  line  of  communica- 
tion. His  transport  was  nearly  all  captured  and  his  army 
was  suddenly  reduced  to  three  days  full  rations  on  the 
eve  of  a  great  movement  and  the  country  afforded  no  food 
whatever.  The  crisis  still  further  developed  when  a  cou- 
rier brought  the  report  that  the  Boers  were  in  position  at 
Watervale  Drift  and  commanding  the  ford  with  artillery." 


GRAND    RECONNAISSANCE  37 


FIFTH  EXAMPLE. 

(Boston  Globe,  Feb.  25, 1900.    By  Franklin  K.  Young.) 

"There  is  reason  to  believe  that  should  worse  come  to 
worse,  the  Boer  Army,  should  it  be  compelled  to  abandon 
its  position,  will  be  able  to  save  its  personnel  by  a  rapid 
flight  across  the  Modder.  Of  course,  in  this  case,  the 
Boers  would  lose  their  supplies  and  cannon." 


(From  United  States  War  Department,  Report  on  the 
British  Boer  War.  By  Capt.  S.  L'H.  Slocum,  U.  S. 
Attache,  with  British  Army.) 

"The  enemy,  under  Cronje,  with  all  his  transport  was 
in  all  practical  effect  surrounded,  although  by  abandon- 
ing his  wagons  and  supplies,  a  large  number  of  the  Boers 
undoubtedly  could  have  escaped.' ' 


38  GRAND    RECONNAISSANCE 

(Boston  Sunday  Times,  March,  1900.  By  Franklin 
K.  Young.) 

"Cronje's  conduct  was  heroic  and  imbecile  in  the  ex- 
treme. As  the  commander  on  the  ground  he  is  entitled 
to  all  the  glory  and  must  assume  all  the  blame.  One  of 
the  ablest  of  the  Boer  generals,  he  is  the  only  one  in 
the  whole  war  to  make  a  mistake. 

"Cronje's  first  duty  was  to  decide  whether  he  should 
stand  or  run;  he  decided  to  run,  which  was  proper,  but 
having  so  decided  he  should  have  run  at  once  and  not 
have  stopped  running  until  safe  on  the  north  bank  of 
the  Vaal  River. 

"Properly  he  sent  his  siege  guns  and  trains  off  to  the 
north  across  the  Vaal  and  improperly  held  his  position 
in  force  on  the  British  front,  instead  of  withdrawing  his 
personnel  after  his  material. 

"This  blunder,  like  all  blunders  of  a  commander-in- 
chief,  quickly  produced  blunders  by  his  subordinates. 
Commander  Ferrera  permitted  French  to  get  around 
Cronje's  left  flank  without  a  battle.  The  presence  of 
this  force  on  his  rear  cut  Cronje  off  from  his  natural 
line  of  retreat  across  the  Vaal  and  compelled  him  to 
flee  toward  Bloemfontein. 

"Even  now  Cromje  was  all  right;  he  easily  and  bril- 
liantly out-manoeuvred  the  British  and  gained  the  pro- 
tection of  the  Modder  River.  But  a  second  time  he 
blundered.  Instead  of  first  executing  Ferrera  and  then 
abandoning  everything  and  devoting  all  his  efforts  to 
saving  his  men,  he  neglected  an  obvious  and  inperative 
military  duty  and  clung  to  his  slow-moving  cannon  and 
wagons. 

"Finally  he  took  position  on  the  Modder  and  resolved 
to  fight  the  whole  British  army.     This  was  fatal. 

"Then  for  the  fourth  time  he  blundered.  Having 
made  his  decision  to  fight  he  should  not  have  surrendered 


GRAND    RECONNAISSANCE  39 

to  the  British  on  the  anniversary  of  Majuba  Hill.  On 
the  contrary,  surrounded  by  the  mightiest  army  the 
British  empire  ever  put  in  the  field  and  enveloped  in 
the  smoke  of  a  hundred  cannon,  Cronje,  upon  a  rampart 
formed  by  his  dead  army  and  with  his  last  cartridge 
withstanding  the  destroyers  of  his  country,  would  have 
presented  to  posterity  a  more  spectacular  and  seemingly 
a  more  fitting  termination  of  the  career  of  the  Lion  of 
South  Africa." 


"Mere  hope  of  attaining  their  desires,  coupled  with 
ignorance  of  the  processes  necessary  to  their  accomplishment, 
is  the  common  delusion  and  the  certain  destruction  of  the 
inexperienced"  Plato. 


ORGANIZATION 


"To  employ  in  warfare  an  uninstructed  people  is  to 
destroy  the  nation." 

Chinese  Saying. 


Antiochus,  King  of  Syria,  reviewing  his  immense  but 
untrained  and  undisciplined  army  at  Ephesus,  asked  of 
Hannibal,  "if  they  were  not  enough  for  the  Romans." 

"Yes,"  replied  the  great  Carthagenian,  "enough  to  glut 
the  bloodthirstiness,  even  of  the  Romans." 


"A  man  in  the  vigor  of  life  and  capable  of  sustaining  the 
heaviest  fatigues,  but  untrained  in  warfare,  is  fitted  not  to 
bear  arms,  but  to  bear  baggage." 

Timoleon. 


ORGANIZATION 


"The  chief  distinction  between  an  army  and  a  mob  is  the 
good  order  and  discipline  of  the  former  and  the  disorderly 
behavior  of  the  latter." 

Washington. 


"It  is  the  duty  of  the  commander-in-chief  frequently 
to  assemble  the  most  prudent  and  experienced  of  his 
generals  and  to  consult  with  them  as  to  the  state  of  his 
own  and  of  the  enemies'  troops. 

"He  must  examine  which  army  has  the  better  weapons, 
which  is  the  better  trained  and  disciplined;  superior  in 
condition  and  most  resolute  in  emergencies. 

"He  must  note  whether  himself  or  the  adversary  has 
the  superior  infantry,  cavalry  or  artillery,  and  particu- 
larly must  he  discern  any  marked  lack  in  quantity  and 
quality  of  men  or  horses,  and  any  difference  in  equipment 
of  those  corps  which  necessarily  will  be  or  because  of 
such  reason,  advantageously  may  be  opposed  to  each 
other. 

"Advantages  in  Organization  determine  the  field  of 
battle  to  be  preferred,  which  latter  should  be  selected  with 
the  view  of  profiting  to  the  uttermost  by  the  use  of 
specially  equipped  corps,  to  whom  the  enemy  is  not  able 
to  oppose  similar  troops. 

"If  a  general  finds  himself  superior  to  his  enemy  he 
must  use  all  means  to  bring  on  an  engagement,  but  if  he 
sees  himself  inferior,  he  must  avoid  battle  and  endeavor 


46  GRAND    RECONNAISSANCE 

to  succeed  by  surprises,  stratagems  and  ambuscades; 
which  last  skillfully  managed  often  have  gained  the 
victory  over  foemen  superior  in  numbers  and  in  strength." 

Vergetius. 


Advantage  in  Organization  consists  in  having  one  or  more 
Corps  d'armee  which  in  equipment  or  in  composition  are  so 
superior  to  the  hostile  corps  to  which  they  may  become  op- 
posed, as  entails  to  them  exceptional  facilities  for  the  execu- 
tion of  those  major  tactical  evolutions  that  appertain  to  any 
tactical  area  made  up  of  corresponding  geometric  or  sub- 
geometric  symbols. 

PRINCIPLE. 

Advantage  in  Organization  determines  the  choice  of  a 
prospective  battlefield;  and  the  latter  always  should  be  com- 
posed of  those  tactical  areas  which  permit  of  the  fullest 
exercise  of  the  powers  peculiar  to  kindred  corps  oVarmee. 

Every  corps  d'armee  thus  especially  equipped  should 
be  constantly  and  energetically  employed  in  the  pros- 
pective battle;  and  usually  it  will  eventuate  as  the  Prime 
Tactical  Factor  in  the  decisive  Major  Tactical  evolution. 


Notions  most  mistaken  prevail  in  regard  to  the  Pawns 
and  Pieces  of  the  Chessboard. 

To  suppose  that  the  Chessmen  per  se  may  be  utilized 
to  typify  the  different  arms  of  the  military  service  is  a 
fallacy. 

Many  unfamiliar  with  the  technicalities  of  Strategetic 
Science  delude  themselves  that  the  Pawns,  on  account 
of  their  slow  and  limited  movements  properly  are  to  be 
regarded  as  Infantry;  that  the  Knights  because  topped 


ORGANIZATION  47 

by  horses'  heads  thereby  qualify  as  light  Cavalry;  the 
Bishops,  for  reasons  unknown,  often  are  held  to  represent 
Artillery;  the  Rooks,  because  of  their  swift,  direct  and 
far-reaching  movements  are  thought  to  duplicate  heavy 
Cavalry;  while  the  Queen,  in  most  of  these  unsophis- 
ticated philosophies,  is  supposed  to  constitute  a  Reserve. 

Nothing  can  be  further  from  the  truth  than  such  as- 
sumptions. 

As  a  fundamental  of  military  organization  applied 
to  Chessplay,  each  Chesspiece  typifies  in  itself  a  complete 
Corps  d'armee.  Each  of  these  Chessic  corps  d'armee  is 
equal  to  every  other  in  strength,  but  all  differ,  more  or 
less,  in  construction  and  in  facilities,  essential  to  the 
performance  of  diverse  and  particular  duties. 

Thus  it  is  that  while  every  Chesspiece  represents  a 
perfectly  appointed  and  equally  powerful  body  of  troops, 
these  corps  d'armee  in  Chessplay  as  in  scientific  warfare 
are  not  duplicates,  except  to  others  of  their  own  class. 
Each  of  these  corps  d'armee  is  made  up  of  Infantry, 
Cavalry  and  Artillery  in  correct  proportion  to  the  service 
they  are  to  perform  and  such  proportions  are  determined 
not  by  simple  arithmetic,  but  by  those  deployments, 
developments,  evolutions,  and  manoeuvres,  which  such 
corps  d'armee  is  constructed  promptly  and  efficiently  to 
execute. 

The  Chessmen,  therefore,  do  not  as  individuals  repre- 
sent either  infantry,  cavalry  or  artillery. 

But  in  the  same  manner  as  the  movements  of  troops 
over  the  surface  of  the  earth,  exemplify  the  attributes  of 
the  three  kindred  grand  columns  in  the  greater  logistics 
of  a  campaign;  so  do  those  pecularities  which  appertain 
to  the  moves  of  the  different  Chesspieces  exemplify  the 
action  of  the  three  chief  arms  of  the  military  service; 
either  singly  or  in  combination  against  given  points 
in  given  times,  in  the  evolutions  of  the  battlefield,  viz: 


48  GRAND    RECONNAISSANCE 


CORPS  D'ARMEE  EN  MARCH. 

The  march  of: 

(a)  Infantry,  alone,  or  of 

(b)  Cavalry,  alone,  or  of 

(c)  Artillery,  alone,  or.  of 

(d)  Infantry  and  Cavalry,  or  of 

(e)  Infantry  and  Artillery,  or  of 
(/)  Cavalry  and  Artillery,  or  of 

(g)     Infantry,  Cavalry  and  Artillery, 

is  indicated  by  the  movement  of  any  Chesspiece  from  a 
given  point  to  an  unoccupied  adjacent  point. 

The  march  of: 

(a)    Cavalry,  alone,  or  of 

(6)     Artillery,  alone,  or  of 

(c)     Cavalry  and  Artillery, 
is  indicated  by  the  movement  of  any  Chesspiece  from  a 
given  point  to  an  unoccupied  point,  not  an    adjacent 
point. 

CORPS  D'ARMEE  EN  ASSAULT. 

The  Charge  of  Infantry  is  indicated  by  the  movement 
of  any  Chesspiece  from  a  given  point  to  an  occupied  ad- 
jacent point;  posting  itself  thereon  and  capturing  the 
adverse  piece  there  located. 

The  Charge  of  Cavalry  is  indicated  by  the  movement 
of  any  Chesspiece  from  a  given  point  to  an  occupied 
point  not  an  adjacent  point;  posting  itself  thereon  and 
capturing  the  adverse  piece  there  located. 


ORGANIZATION  49 


CORPS  D'ARMEE  FIRE  EFFECT. 

Infantry: 
Offensive  Fire  Effect.     Compelling  an  adverse  piece 
to  withdraw  from  its  post  upon  an  adjacent  occupied 
point. 

Defensive  Fire  Effect.  Preventing  an  adverse  piece 
from  occupying  an  adjacent  unoccupied  point. 

Artillery: 
Offensive  Fire  Effect.     Compelling  an  adverse  piece 
to  withdraw  from  its  post  upon  an  occupied  point  not  an 
adjacent  point. 

Defensive  Fire  Effect.  Preventing  an  adverse  piece 
from  occupying  an  unoccupied  point  not  an  adjacent 
point. 


50  GRAND    RECONNAISSANCE 


CHESSIC  CORPS  D'ARMEE. 

The  Corps  oVarmee  of  the  Chessboard  are  divided  into 
two  classes :  viz : 

I.       Corps  of  Position. 
II.       Corps  of  Evolution. 


CORPS  D'ARMEE  OF  POSITION. 

"  The  Pawns  are  the  soul  of  Chess;  upon  their  good  or  bad 
arrangement  depends  the  gain  or  loss  of  the  garnet 

Philidor. 

The  eight  Pawns,  by  reason  of  their  limited  move- 
ments, their  inability  to  move  backward  and  the  peculi- 
arity of  their  offensive  and  defensive  powers,  are  best 
adapted  of  the  Chesspieces  to  perform  those  functions 
which  in  the  Military  Art  appertain  to  Corps  of  Position. 

Each  Corps  of  Position  has  its  particular  and  desig- 
nated Point  of  Mobilization  and  of  Development,  which 
differ  with  the  various  Strategic  Fronts. 

Upon  each  Corps  of  Position  devolves  the  duties  of 
maintaining  itself  as  a  consistent  integer  of  the  es- 
tablished, or  projected  kindred  Pawn  Integral;  as  a 
possible  kindred  Promotable  Factor  and  as  a  Point  of 
Impenetrability  upon  the  altitude  of  an  opposing  Pawn. 

Corps  of  Position  take  their  individual  appelation 
from  their  posts  in  a  given  formation,  viz : 

1.  Base  Corps. 

2.  Pivotal  Corps. 

3.  Minor  Vertex  Corps. 

4.  Minor  Corps  Aligned. 

5.  Major  Vertex  Corps. 

6.  Major  Corps  Aligned. 

7.  Corps  Enpotence. 


ORGANIZATION 

8. 

Minor  Corps  Enceinte. 

9. 

Major  Corps  Enceinte. 

10. 

Corps  Echeloned. 

11. 

Corps  En  Appui. 

12. 

Base  Corps  Refused. 

13. 

Pivotal  Corps  Refused. 

14. 

Minor  Vertex  Corps  Refused. 

15. 

Minor  Corps  Aligned  Refused. 

16. 

Major  Vertex  Corps  Refused. 

17. 

Major  Corps  Aligned  Refused. 

18. 

Major  Corps  Refused  Enpotence, 

19. 

Corps  en  Major  Crochet. 

20. 

Corps  en  Minor  Crochet. 

21. 

Corps  en  Crochet  Aligned. 

22. 

Corps  Doubly  Aligned. 

23. 

Grand  Vertex  Corps. 

51 


The  above  formations  by  Corps  of  Position  are  de- 
scribed and  illustrated  in  detail  in  preceding  text-books 
by  the  author,  entitled  : 

The  Minor  Tactics  of  Chess. 

The  Grand  Tactics  of  Chess. 

The  normal  use  of  Corps  of  Position  is  limited  to 
Lines  of  Mobilization,  of  Development  and  to  the  Simple 
Line  of  Manoeuvre. 


52  GRAND    RECONNAISSANCE 


CORPS  D'ARMEE  OF  EVOLUTION. 

"Every  man  in  Alexander's  army  is  so  well  trained  and 
obedient  that  at  a  single  word  of  command,  officers  and 
soldiers  make  any  movement  and  execute  any  evolution  in 
the  art  of  warfare. 

"Only  such  troops  as  themselves  can  check  their  career 
and  oppose  their  bravery  and  expertness.11 

Caridemus. 


The  eight  Pieces,  by  reason  of  their  ability  to  move  in 
all  directions,  the  scope  of  their  movements  and  the 
peculiar  exercises  of  their  offensive  and  defensive  powers, 
are  best  adapted  of  the  Chesspieces  to  perform  those 
functions  which  in  the  Military  Art  appertain  to  Corps 
of  Evolution. 

Corps  of  Evolution  acting  offensively,  take  their  in- 
dividual appelations  from  the  points  which  constitute 
their  objective  in  the  true  Strategetic  Horizon,  viz: 

1.  Corps  of  the  Right. 

2.  Corps  of  the  Centre. 

3.  Corps  of  the  Left. 

Corps  of  Evolution  acting  defensively,  take  their  in- 
dividual appelations  from  the  particular  duties  they  are 
required  to  perform,  viz: 

1.  Supporting  Corps. 

2.  Covering  Corps. 

3.  Sustaining  Corps. 

4.  Corps  of  Impenetrability. 

5.  Corps  of  Resistance. 


ORGANIZATION  53 

The  normal  use  of  Corps  of  Evolution  is  limited  to 
Lines  of  Manoeuvre.  When  acting  on  a  Simple  Line  of 
Manoeuvre,  a  Corps  of  Evolution  may  deploy  on  the 
corresponding  Line  of  Mobilization;  but  it  has  nothing 
in  common  with  the  Line  of  Development,  which  latter 
appertains  exclusively  to  Corps  of  Position. 

Any  corps  d'armee,  whether  of  Position  or  of  Evolution 
may  be  utilized  upon  a  Line  of  Operations. 

THE  KING. 

Regarded  as  a  Chessic  Corps  d'armee,  the  King 
marches  as  infantry,  cavalry  and  artillery;  but  it  attacks 
as  infantry  exclusively  and  never  as  cavalry  or  artillery. 

Although  every  situation  upon  the  Chessboard  con- 
templates the  presence  of  both  Kings,  either,  or  neither, 
or  both,  may,  or  may  not  be  present  in  any  given  Strate- 
getic  Horizon. 

Whenever  the  King  is  present  in  a  given  Strategetic 
Horizon  the  effect  of  his  co-operation  is  mathematically 
outlined,  thus: 

I.  At  his  maximum  of  efficiency,  the  King  occupies 
the  centre  of  a  circle  of  one  point  radius.  His  offensive 
power  is  equally  valid  against  all  eight  points  contained 
in  his  circumference,  but  his  defensive  power  is  valid  for 
the  support  from  a  minimum  of  one  point  to  a  maximum 
of  five  points. 

II.  At  his  medium  of  efficiency  the  King  occupies  the 
centre  of  a  semi-circle  of  one  point  radius. 

His  offensive  power  is  valid  against  all  five  points  con- 
tained in  his  semi-circumference,  and  his  defensive 
power  is  valid  for  the  support  from  a  minimum  of  one,  to 
a  maximum  of  five  points. 

III.  At  his  minimum  of  efficiency,  the  King  occupies 
the  centre  of  a  quadrant  of  one  point  radius.  Both  his 
offensive  and  his  defensive  powers  are  valid  against  all 
three  points  contained  in  his  segment. 


54  GRAND    RECONNAISSANCE 

THE  QUEEN. 

Regarded  as  a  Chessic  Corps  d'armee  the  Queen 
marches  and  attacks  as  infantry,  cavalry  and  artillery. 

Either,  neither,  or  both  Queens  may  be  present  in  any 
given  Strategetic  Horizon;  and  whenever  present  the 
effect  of  her  co-operation  mathematically  is  outlined, 
viz: 

At  her  maximum  of  efficiency  the  Queen  occupies  the 
common  vertex  of  one  or  more  unequal  triangles,  whose 
aggregate  area  is  from  a  minimum  of  21  to  a  maximum 
of  27  points.  Her  offensive  power  is  equally  valid 
against  all  of  these  points;  but  her  defensive  power  is 
valid  for  the  support  from  a  minimum  of  one  point  to  a 
maximum  of  five  points. 

THE  ROOK. 

Regarded  as  a  Chessic  Corps  d'armee  the  Rook  marches 
and  attacks  as  infantry,  cavalry  and  artillery. 

From  one  to  four  Rooks  may  be  present  in  any  given 
Strategetic  Horizon;  and  whenever  present  the  effect  of 
its  co-operation  mathematically  is  outlined,  viz : 

At  her  maximum  of  efficiency,  the  Rook  occupies  the 
common  angle  of  four  quadrilaterals,  whose  aggregate 
area  always  is  14  points.  The  Offensive  Power  of  the 
Rook  is  equally  valid  against  all  these  points,  but  his  de- 
fensive power  is  valid  for  the  support  of  only  two  points. 

THE  BISHOP. 

Regarded  as  a  Chessic  Corps  d'armee,  the  Bishop 
marches  and  attacks  as  infantry,  cavalry  and  artillery. 

From  one  to  four  Bishops  may  be  present  in  any 
Strategetic  Horizon;  and  whenever  present  the  effect  of 
its  co-operation  mathematically  is  outlined,  viz: 


ORGANIZATION  55 

At  its  maximum  of  efficiency,  the  Bishop  occupies  the 
common  vertex  of  four  unequal  triangles,  having  a 
maximum  of  13  and  a  minimum  of  9  points.  His 
offensive  power  is  valid  against  all  of  these  points  but  his 
defensive  power  is  valid  only  for  the  support  of  two 
points. 

KNIGHT. 

Regarded  as  a  Chessic  Corps  d'armee  the  Knight 
marches  and  attacks  as  cavalry  and  artillery. 

From  one  to  four  Knights  maybe  present  in  any  given 
Strategetic  Horizon;  and  whenever  present  the  effect  of 
its  co-operation  mathematically  is  outlined,  viz: 

At  its  maximum  of  efficiency,  the  Knight  occupies  the 
centre  of  an  octagon  of  two  points  radius,  having  a 
minimum  of  two  points  and  a  maximum  of  eight  points 
area.  His  offensive  power  is  equally  valid  against  all 
of  these  eight  points,  but  his  defensive  power  is  valid  for 
the  support  of  only  one  point. 

THE  PAWN. 

Regarded  as  a  Chessic  Corps  d'armee,  the  Pawn  at  its 
normal  post  marches  as  infantry  and  cavalry.  Should 
an  adverse  corps,  however,  take  post  within  the  kindred 
side  of  the  Chessboard;  that  Pawn  upon  whose  altitude 
the  adverse  Piece  appears,  at  once  loses  its  equestrian 
attributes  and  marches  and  attacks  exclusively  as  in- 
fantry. 

Located  at  any  other  point  than  at  its  normal  post,  the 
Pawn  is  composed  exclusively  of  infantry  and  never  acts 
either  as  cavalry  or  artillery. 

From  one  to  eight  Pawns  may  be  present  in  any  Strat- 
egetic Horizon;  and  whenever  present  the  effect  of  its 
co-operation  mathematically  is  outlined  as  follows: 


56  GRAND    RECONNAISSANCE 

At  its  maximum  of  efficiency  the  Pawn  occupies  the 
vertex  of  a  triangle  of  two  points.  Its  offensive  power  is 
equally  valid  against  both  of  these  points;  but  its  de- 
fensive power  is  valid  for  the  support  of  only  one  point. 


ORGANIZATION  57 


POTENTIAL    COMPLEMENTS. 

Subjoined  is  a  table  of  the  potential  complements  of 
the   Chesspieces. 


The  King 

—  6tb  units. 

The  Queen 

—22*       " 

The  Rook 

—  14       " 

The  Bishop 

-8|      » 

The  Knight 

-5i       " 

The  Pawn 

-  U       " 

The  student  clearly  should  understand  that  this  table 
does  not  indicate  prowess,  but  relates  exclusively  to 
normal  facilities  for  bringing  force  into  action. 


The  relative  advantage  in  Organization  possessed  by 
one  army  over  an  opposing  army  always  can  be  de- 
termined by  the  following,  viz  : 

RULE. 
1.  Above  a  line,  set  down  in  order  those  abbreviations 
which  properly  designate  the  White  corps  d'armee  present 
in  a  given  Strategetic  Situation;  and  below  the  line,  set 
down  those  abbreviations  which  in  like  manner  designate 
the  Black  corps  d'armee,  viz : 

K+Q+R+R+P+P+P+P 


K+Q+R+B+P+P+P+P+P 


2.  Cancel  all  like  symbols  and  resolve  the  unlike 
symbols  remaining,  into  their  respective  Potential  com- 
plements, viz: 

R  14 

B  +  P  8J  +  1J  10i 


58  GRAND    RECONNAISSANCE 

3.  Subtract  the  lesser  Potential  total  from  the  greater 
and  the  difference  will  be  the  relative  advantage  in 
Organization. 

4.  To  utilize  the  relative  advantage  in  Organization 
select  a  battlefield  in  which  the  Strategic  Key,  the 
Tactical  Keys  and  the  Points  of  Command  of  the  True 
Strategetic  Horizon  are  situated  upon  the  perimeters 
of  those  geometric  and  sub-geometric  symbols  which 
appertain  to  the  corps  d'armee  whose  superior  poten- 
tiality is  established  by  Section  2. 

5.  To  neutralize  the  relative  disadvantage  in  Organi- 
zation, occupy  the  necessary  posts  upon  the  battle- 
field selected  in  such  a  manner  that  the  kindred  decisive 
points  are  situated  not  upon  the  perimeters  of  the 
geometric  and  sub-geometric  symbols  appertaining  to 
the  adverse  corps  d'armee  of  superior  potentiality; 
while  the  adverse  decisive  points  are  situated  upon  the 
perimeters  of  the  geometric  and  sub-geometric  symbols 
which  appertain  to  the  kindred  corps  d'armee  of  inferior 
potentiality. 


ORGANIZATION  59 


MILITARY  EXAMPLES. 

"Men  habituated  to  luxury  cannot  contend  with  an  army 
accustomed  to  fatigue  and  innured  to  want." 

Caesar. 

"That  wing  with  which  you  propose  to  engage  the  enemy 
should  be  composed  of  your  best  troops." 

Epaminondas. 


The  Sacred  Band  of  the  Thebans  was  composed  of  men 
selected  for  valor  and  character.  Epaminondas  called 
them  Comrades  and  by  honorable  rewards  and  distinctions 
induced  them  to  bear  without  murmur  the  hardest 
fatigues  and  to  confront  with  intrepidity  the  greatest 
dangers. 

At  Leuctra  (371  B.C.)  and  again  at  Mantinea  (362 
B.C.) the  right  wing  of  the  Lacedaemonian  Army,  com- 
posed exclusively  of  Spartans  and  for  six  hundred  years 
invincible,  was  overthrown  and  destroyed  by  the  Sacred 
Band  led  by  Epaminondas. 

This  formidable  body  of  Theban  warriors  was  mas- 
sacred by  Alexander  the  Great  at  the  Battle  of  Chaeronae 
(338  B.C.) 


The  Macedonian  Phalanx  was  devised  by  Philip, 
King  of  Macedon.  It  was  made  up  of  heavy  infantry 
accoutred  with  cuirass,  helmet,  greaves,  and  shield. 
The  principal  weapon  was  a  pike  twenty-four  feet  long. 

The  Phalanx  had  a  front  of  two  hundred  and  fifty-six 
files  and  a  depth  of  sixteen  ranks.  A  file  of  sixteen  men 
was  termed  Lochos;  two  files  were  called  Dilochie;  four 


60  GRAND    RECONNAISSANCE 

files  made  a  Tetrarchie;  eight  files  a  Taxiarchie  and 
thirty-two  of  the  last  constituted  a  simple  Phalanx  of 
4096  men.  A  grand  Phalanx  had  a  front  of  one  thousand 
and  twenty-four  files  and  a  depth  of  sixteen  ranks. 
It  was  made  up  of  four  simple  Phalanxes  and  contained 
16,384  men. 

With  this  formation  of  his  infantry,  Alexander  the 
Great,  when  eighteen  years  of  age,  destroyed  the  Allied 
Athenian — Theban — Boeotian  army  at  Chaeronae,  the 
hosts  of  Persia  at  the  river  Grancius  (334  B.C.)  at 
Issus  (333  B.C.)  and  Arbela  (331  B.C.)  and  conquered 
Porus,  King  of  India  at  the  Hydaspes  (326  B.C.) 

The  Spanish  Heavy  Cavalry  and  Nubian  Infantry  of 
Hannibal  was  a  reproduction  of  that  Macedonian  organi- 
zation whereby  Alexander  the  Great  had  conquered  the 
world. 

With  this  formation  Hannibal  maintained  himself  for 
fifteen  years  in  the  richest  provinces  of  Italy  and  de- 
stroyed seven  Roman  armies,  at  the  Trebia  (218  B.C.)  at 
Lake  Trasymenus  (217  B.C.)  at  Cannae  (216  B.C.)  and 
at  Herdonea  (212  B.C.)  at  Herdonea  (210  B.C.)  at 
Locri  (208  B.C.)  and  at  Apulia  (208  B.C.) 

At  Zama  (202  B.C.)Hannibars  effacement  as  a  military 
factor  was  directly  due  to  his  lack  of  that  organization 
which  had  been  the  instrument  of  his  previous  successes; 
a  circumstance  thus  commented  on  by  the  victorious 
Roman  commander,  Scipio  Africanus; 

"Hitherto  I  have  been  opposed  by  an  army  without  a 
general;  now  they  send  against  me  a  General  without  an 
army." 


The  Tenth  Legion  of  Caesar  was  the  quintessence  of 
that  perfection  in  elementary  tactics  devised  by  the 
Romans  to  accord  with  the  use  of  artillery. 


ORGANIZATION  61 

The  fundamentals  of  minor  tactics  as  elucidated  by 
Epaminondas  and  exploited  by  Alexander  the  Great  and 
Hannibal  are  unchanged  in  the  Legion,  but  by  sub- 
division of  the  simple  Phalanx  into  ten  Cohorts,  a  neces- 
sary and  maximum  gain  in  mobility  was  effected. 

The  Roman  Legion  consisted  of  6100  infantry  and  726 
cavalry,  divided  into  the  Militarain  Cohort  of  1105 
heavy  foot,  132  Cuirassiers  and  nine  ordinary  Cohorts, 
each  containing  555  heavy  foot  and  66  Cuirassiers.  The 
Legion  was  drawn  up  in  three  lines;  the  first  of  which 
was  termed  Principes,  the  second  Hastati,  and  the  third 
Triarii.  The  infantry  were  protected  by  helmet,  cuirass, 
greaves  and  shield;  their  arms  were  a  long  sword,  a  short 
sword,  five  javelins  and  two  large  spears. 

With  this  formation  Caesar  over-run  Spain,  Gaul, 
Germany,  Britain,  Africa,  Greece,  and  Italy.  The 
Scots  alone  withstood  him  and  the  ruins  of  a  triple  line 
of  Roman  entrenchments  extending  from  the  North  to 
the  Irish  Seas  to  this  day  mark  the  southern  boundary 
of  the  Scottish  Highlands  and  the  northern'limit  of  Roman 
dominion. 

At  Pharseleus,  Pompey  made  the  inexplicable  blunder 
of  placing  his  best  troops  in  his  right  wing,  which  was 
covered  by  the  river  Enipeus  and  inferior  troops  on  his 
left  wing  which  was  in  the  air.  By  its  first  charge,  the 
Tenth  Legion  destroyed  the  latter,  out-flanked  the  entire 
Pompeian  army,  drove  it  backward  into  the  river  and 
single  handed  won  for  Caesar  undisputed  dominion  of  the 
Earth. 


The  Scots  Volunteers  of  Gustavus  Adolphus  consisted 
of  two  brigades  aggregating  about  12,000  foot,  made  up 
of  Scottish  gentlemen  who  for  various  reasons  were 
attracted  to  the  Continental  Wars. 

At  Leipsic,  (Sept.  7,  1631)  20,000  Saxons,  constituting 
one-half  of  the  allied  Protestant  army,  were  routed  at 


G2  GRAND    RECONNAISSANCE 

the  first  charge,  put  to  flight  and  never  seen  again. 
Tilly's  victorious  right  wing  then  turned  upon  the  flank 
of  the  King's  army.  Three  regiments  of  the  Scots  Vol- 
unteers on  foot  held  in  check  in  open  field  12,000  of  the 
best  infantry  and  cavalry  in  Europe,  until  Gustavus  had 
destroyed  the  Austrian  main  body  and  hastened  to  their 
aid  with  the  Swedish  heavy  cavalry. 

The  Castle  of  Oppenheim  was  garrisoned  by  800  Span- 
ish infantry.  Gustavus  drew  up  2,000  Swedes  to  esca- 
lade the  place.  Thirty  Scots  Volunteers,  looking  on 
observed  that  the  Spaniards,  intently  watching  the  King 
had  neglected  to  guard  the  opposite  side  of  the  fortress. 
Beckoning  to  their  aid  about  a  hundred  of  their  comrades, 
they  scaled  the  wall,  captured  the  garrison  and  opened 
the  gates  to  the  king.  Gustavus  entered  on  foot,  hat 
in  hand.  "My  brave  Scots,"  said  he,  "you  carry  in 
your  scabbards,  the  key  to  every  castle  in  Europe." 


The  Van-Guard  of  Frederic  the  Great  is  the  perfect 
adaptation  of  the  minor  tactics  of  Epaminondas  to 
gunpowder.  This  choice  body  was  made  up  of  the  best 
troops  in  the  army  divided  into  infantry,  cuirassiers; 
dragoons  and  light  artillery. 

The  Van-Guard,  a  miniature  army  in  itself,  always 
marched  between  the  main  body  and  the  enemy;  it 
always  led  in  the  attack,  followed  by  that  wing  contain- 
ing the  best  soldiers,  in  two  lines;  and  supported  by 
the  heavy  cavalry  on  that  flank. 

At  Rosbach  (Nov.  5,  1757)  the  Prussian  Van-Guard, 
composed  of  4,800  infantry,  2,500  cavalry  and  30  guns, 
annihilated  70,000  French  regular  troops,  by  evolutions 
so  rapidly  executed  that  the  Prussian  main  army  was 
unable  to  overtake  either  pursuers  or  pursued  and  had 
no  part  in  the  battle,  other  than  as  highly  interested 
spectators. 


ORGANIZATION  63 

The  Continentals  of  the  Revolutionary  army  under 
Washington  were  made  up  of  troops  enlisted  for  the 
war  and  trained  by  Baron  von  Steuben,  a  Major-General 
in  the  Prussian  service,  who  had  served  throughout  the 
Seven  Years  War  under  Frederic  the  Great. 

The  Continentals,  without  firing  a  shot,  carried  by 
assault,  Stony  Point  (July  16,  1779),  Paulus  Hook  (July 
20,  1779)  and  the  British  intrenchments  at  Yorktown 
(Oct.  19,  1781).  Of  these  troops,  the  Baron  von  Steu- 
ben writes : 

"I  am  satisfied  with  having  shown  to  those  who  under- 
stand the  Art  of  Warfare,  an  American  army  worthy  of 
their  approbation;  officers  who  know  their  profession  and 
who  would  do  honor  to  any  army  in  Europe;  an  infantry 
such  as  England  has  never  brought  into  the  field,  soldiers 
temperate,  well-drilled  and  obedient  and  the  equal  of  any 
in  the  world." 


The  Consular  Guard  was  the  reproduction  of  the  Van 
Guard  of  Frederic  the  Great,  but  its  sphere  of  action  was 
strangely  restricted  by  Bonaparte,  who,  instead  of  plac- 
ing his  best  troops  in  the  front  of  his  army,  as  is  the 
practice  of  all  other  of  the  Great  Captains ;  subordinated 
their  functions  to  that  of  a  reserve  and  to  personal  attend- 
ance upon  himself. 

This  Corps  d' elite  was  but  once  notably  in  action;  at 
Marengo  (June  14,  1800)  it  undoubtedly  saved  the  day 
for  France,  by  maintaining  the  battle  until  the  arrival  of 
Gen.  Desaix  and  his  division. 


The  Imperial  Guard  of  Napoleon  was  the  development 
of  the  Consular  Guard  of  Bonaparte.  Under  the  Em- 
pire the  Guard  became  an  independent  army,  consisting 
of  light  and  heavy  infantry,  horse  and  field  artillery, 


64  GRAND    RECONNAISSANCE 

cuirassiers,  dragoons,  hussars  and  chasseurs,  and  com- 
posed of  the  best  troops  in  the  French  service. 

The  functions  of  this  fine  body,  like  that  of  its  pro- 
totype, was  limited  to  the  duties  of  a  reserve  and  to 
attendance  upon  the  person  of  the  Emperor;  and  per- 
haps next  to  announcement  of  victory,  Napoleon's 
favorite  bulletin  always  read,  "The  Imperial  Guard  was 
not  engaged.' ' 

Many  were  the  unavailing  remonstrances  made  by  his 
advisors  against  this  policy,  which  judged  by  the  practice 
of  the  great  masters  of  warfare,  is  putting  the  cart  before 
the  horse;  and  seemingly  is  that  speck  of  cloud  in  Napo- 
leon's political  sky,  which  properly  may  be  deemed  a 
precursor  of  St.  Helena. 

At  Austerlitz  (Dec.  2,  1805),  the  cuirassiers  of  the 
French  Imperial  Guard  routed  a  like  body  of  Russian 
cavalry.  At  Eylau  (Nov.  7,  1807)  the  Guard,  as 
at  Marengo  again  saved  the  day,  after  the  corps  d'armee 
of  Soult  and  Angereau  had  been  destroyed,  by  maintain- 
ing the  battle  until  the  arrival  of  Ney  and  Davuost.  In 
the  retreat  from  Russia  (1812)  the  Guard  then  number- 
ing 64,000  men  was  nearly  destroyed.  What  was  left 
of  it  won  at  Ligny  (June  16,  1815),  Napoleon's  last 
victory  and  at  Waterloo  (June  18,  1815),  one  of  its  two 
surviving  divisions  covered  the  flight  of  the  French 
army,  while  the  other  escorted  Napoleon  in  safety  to 
Paris. 


The  Royal  Prussian  Guard,  under  Von  Moltke,  was 
organized  and  utilized  in  accord  with  the  teachings  of 
Frederic  the  Great. 

Its  most  notable  achievement  occurred  in  the  cam- 
paign of  1870.  The  right  flank  of  the  French  having 
been  turned  by  the  battle  of  Woerth  (Aug.  4,  1870)  and 
Marshal  MacMahon's  army  being  driven  to  the  west- 


ORGANIZATION  65 

ward,  it  became  the  paramount  object  of  Von  Moltke  to 
seize  the  country  in  rear  of  Metz  and  thus  prevent  the  re- 
treat of  Marshall  Bazine  across  the  Moselle  River. 

The  Royal  Prussian  Guard  out-marching  both  friends 
and  enemies  first  reached  the  Nancy  road  (Aug.  18,  1870) 
and  until  the  German  corps  reached  the  battle-field  this 
body  of  picked  troops  successfully  withstood  the  assault 
of  nearly  the  entire  French  army.  In  the  first  half-hour 
the  Guard  lost  8,000  men. 

As  the  result  of  all  this,  Marshal  Bazine  with  150,000 
men  was  forced  back  into  and  taken  in  the  intrenched 
camp  at  Metz;  and  the  Emperor  Napoleon  III,  Marshal 
MacMahon  and  a  second  French  army  of  140,000  men 
was  captured  at  Sedan  (Sept.  1,  1870),  in  an  attempt  to 
rescue  Marshal  Bazine. 


66  GRAND    RECONNAISSANCE 

"J  must  tell  you  beforehand  this  will  be  a  bloody  touch. 
Tilly  has  a  great  army  of  old  lads  with  iron  faces  that  dare 
look  an  enemy  in  the  eye;  they  are  confident  of  victory,  have 
never  been  beaten  and  do  not  know  what  it  means  to  fly. 
Tilly  tells  his  men  he  will  beat  me  and  the  old  man  is  as 
likely  to  do  it  as  to  say  it." 

Gustavus  Adolphus. 


"Tilly's  men  were  rugged,  surly  fellows;  their  faces 
mangled  by  wounds  and  scars  had  an  air  of  hardy  courage. 
I  observed  of  them  that  their  clothes  were  always  dirty, 
their  armor  rusty  from  winter  storms  and  bruised  by 
musket-balls,  their  weapons  sharp  and  bright.  They 
were  used  to  camp  in  the  open  fields  and  to  sleep  in  the 
frosts  and  rain.  The  horses  like  the  men  were  strong  and 
hardy  and  knew  by  rote  their  exercises.  Both  men  and 
animals  so  well  understood  the  trade  of  arms  that  a 
general  command  was  sufficient;  every  man  was  fit  to 
command  the  whole,  and  all  evolutions  were  performed  in 
order  and  with  readiness,  at  a  note  of  the  trumpet  or  a 
motion  of  their  banners. 

"The  7th  of  Sept.  (1631)  before  sunrise,  the  Swedish 
army  marched  from  Dieben  to  a  large  field  about  a  mile 
from  Leipsic,  where  we  found  old  Tilly's  army  in  full 
battalia  in  admirable  order,  which  made  a  show  both 
glorious  and  terrible. 

"Tilly,  like  a  fair  gamester,  had  taken  up  but  one  side 
of  the  plain,  and  left  the  other  side  clear  and  all  the 
avenues  open  to  the  King's  approach,  nor  did  he  stir 
to  the  charge  until  the  Swedish  army  was  fully  drawn  up 
and  was  advancing  toward  him.  He  had  with  him  44,000 
old  soldiers  and  a  better  army  I  believe  never  was  so 
soundly  beaten. 


ORGANIZATION  67 

******  "Then  was  made  a 

most  dreadful  slaughter,  and  yet  there  was  no  flying. 
Tilly's  men  might  be  killed  or  knocked  down,  but  no  man 
turned  his  back,  nor  would  give  an  inch  of  ground, 
save  as  they  were  marched,  wheeled,  or  retreated  by 
their  officers.  *****  About  six 
o'clock  the  field  was  cleared  of  the  enemy  except  at  one 
place  on  the  King's  front,  where  some  of  them  rallied; 
and  though  they  knew  that  all  was  lost,  they  would  take 
no  quarter,  but  fought  it  out  to  the  last  man,  being  found 
dead  the  next  day  in  rank  and  file  as  they  were  drawn 
op." 


Perfection  in  Organization  is  attained  when  troops 
instantly  and  intelligently  act  according  to  order  and 
execute  with  exactness  and  precision  any  and  every 
prescribed  evolution. 


TOPOGRAPHY 


"Let  us  not  consider  where  we  shall  give  battle,  but  where 

we  may  gain  the  victory." 

Phocion. 


"There  can  be  no  discretion  in  a  movement  which  forsakes 

the  advantage  in  ground" 

Gustavus  Adolphus. 


"That  battlefield  is  best  which  is   adapted   to   the  full 

use  of  the  chief  constituents  of  your  army  and  unfavorable  to 

the  mass  of  the  enemy. 

Napoleon. 


TOPOGRAPHY 


"The  ground  is  the  CHESSBOARD  of  we  cannibals; 
and  it  is  the  selection  and  use  made  of  it,  that  decides  the 
knowledge  or  the  ignorance  of  those  by  whom  it  is  occupied.77 

Frederic  the  Great. 


The  highest  use  of  Topography  consists  in  reducing  a 
superior  adverse  force  to  the  inferior  force,  by  minimizing 
the  radius  of  action  of  the  hostile  Corps  d'armee. 

This  is  effected  by  so  posting  the  kindred  corps  that  in  the 
resulting  Strategetic  Horizons,  impassable  natural  barriers 
are  presented  to  the  march  of  hostile  corps  toward  their 
respective  objectives. 

On  the  surface  of  the  earth  such  natural  barriers  are 
formed  by  mountains,  rivers,  lakes,  swamps,  forests, 
deserts,  the  ocean,  and  the  boundaries  of  neutral  States. 

On  the  Chess-board  these  topographical  conditions  are 
typified  by  peculiarities  and  limitations  in  the  movements 
of  the  Chess-pieces,  viz.: 

I.  The  sides  of  the  Chess-board  which  terminate  all 
movements  of  the  chess  pieces. 

II.  That  limitation  of  the  movements  of  the  Chess- 
pieces  which  makes  it  impossible  for  them  to  move  other 
than  in  straight  lines. 


74  GRAND    RECONNAISSANCE 

III.  The  inability  of  the  Queen  to  move  on  obliques. 

IV.  The  inability  of  the  Rook  to  move  either  on 
obliques  or  on  diagonals. 

V.  The  inability  of  the  Bishop  to  move  either  on 
obliques,  verticals,  or  horizontals. 

VI.  The  inability  of  the  Knight  to  move  either  on 
diagonals,  verticals,  or  horizontals,  and  the  limitation  of 
its  move  to  two  squares  distance. 

VII.  The  inability  of  the  Pawn  to  move  either  on 
obliques  or  horizontals,  and  the  limitation  of  its  first  move 
to  two  squares  and  of  its  subsequent  moves  to  one  square. 

VIII.  The  limitation  of  the  King's  move  to  one 
square. 

These  limitations  and  impediments  to  the  movements 
of  the  Chess-pieces,  are  equivalent  in  Chess-play  to  ob- 
stacles interposed  by  Nature  to  the  march  of  troops 
over  the  surface  of  the  earth. 

Prefect  Generalship,  in  its  calculations,  so  combines 
these  insurmountable  barriers  with  the  relative  positions 
of  the  contending  armies,  that  the  kindred  army  becomes 
at  every  vital  point  the  superior  force. 

This  effect  is  produced  by  merely  causing  rivers  and 
mountains  to  take  the  place  of  kindred  Corps  d'armee. 

It  is  only  by  the  study  of  Chessic  topography  that  the 
tremendous  problems  solved  by  the  chess  player  become 
manifest: 

Instead  of  calculations  limited  to  one  visible  and  un- 
changeable Chess-board  of  sixty-four  squares,  the  divina- 
tions of  the  Chess-master  comprehend  and  harmonize  as 
many  invisible  Chess-boards  as  there  are  Chess-pieces  con- 
tained in  the  Topographical  Zone. 

Furthermore,  all  these  surfaces  differ  to  the  extent  and 
in  conformity  to  that  particular  sensible  horizon,  apper- 
taining to  the  Chess-piece  from  which  it  emanates. 


TOPOGRAPHY  75 

The  enormous  difficulties  of  Chess-play,  like  those  of 
warfare,  arise  from  the  necessity  of  combining  in  a  single 
composite  topographical  horizon,  all  those  differing, 
sensible  horizons  which  appertain,  not  merely  to  the 
kindred,  but  also  to  the  hostile  corps;  and  to  do  this  in 
such  a  manner,  as  to  minimize  the  hostile  powers  for 
offence  and  defence,  by  debarring  one  or  more  of  the 
hostile  pieces  from  the  true  Strategetic  Horizon. 

To  divide  up  the  enemy's  force,  by  making  natural 
barriers  take  the  place  of  troops,  is  the  basis  of  those  pro- 
cesses which  dominate  Grand  Manoeuvres. 

Of  all  the  deductions  of  Chess-play  and  of  warfare, 
such  combinations  of  Strategy  and  Topography  are  the 
most  subtle  and  intangible.  The  highest  talent  is 
required  in  its  interpretation,  and  mastery  of  it,  more 
than  of  any  other  branch  of  Strategetics,  proclaims  the 
great  Captain  at  war,  or  at  chess. 

TOPOGRAPHY  OF  THE  KING 

From  the  view-point  of  the  King,  the  surface  of  the 
Chess-board  takes  on  the  topographical  aspectof  a  vast 
expanse  of  open,  level  country. 

This  vista  is  void  of  insurmountable  natural  obstacles, 
other  than  the  sides  and  extremities.  The  latter  col- 
lectively may  be  regarded,  for  strategical  purposes, 
either  as  the  Ocean,  or  the  boundaries  of  neutral  States. 

To  the  King,  this  vast  territory  is  accessible  in  all 
directions.  At  his  pleasure  he  may  move  to  and  occupy 
either  of  the  sixty-four  squares  of  the  Chess-board,  in  a 
minimum  of  one  and  in  a  maximum  of  seven  moves. 
The  only  obstacles  to  his  march  are  distance  and  the 
opposition  of  an  enemy. 

The  Strategical  weakness  of  the  Topographical  Horizon 


76  GRAND    RECONNAISSANCE 

peculiar  to  the  King  arises  from  its  always  taking  on  and 
maintaining  the  physical  form  of  a  plain.  Consequently 
it  is  vulnerable  to  attack  from  all  sides  and  what  is  far 
worse,  it  readily  is  commanded  and  from  a  superior 
topographical  post,  by  every  adverse  piece,  except  the 
King  and  Pawn. 

Thus,  the  hostile  Queen,  without  being  attacked  in  re- 
turn, may  enfilade  the  King  along  all  verticals,  horizon- 
tals and  diagonals;  the  Rooks,  along  all  verticals  and 
horizontals;  the  Bishops,  along  all  diagonals  of  like  color; 
and  the  Knights  along  all  obliques. 

TOPOGRAPHY  OF  THE  QUEEN 

From  the  view-point  of  the  Queen,  the  surface  of  the 
Chess-board  takes  on  the  topographical  aspect  of  a  series 
of  wide,  straight  valleys  separated  by  high,  impassable 
mountain  ranges,  unfordable  rivers,  and  impentrable 
forests  and  morasses.  These  valleys,  which  number  never 
less  than  three,  nor  more  than  eight,  in  the  same  group, 
are  of  varying  length  and  always  converge  upon  and 
unite  with  each  other  at  the  point  occupied  by  the  Queen. 

These  valleys  contained  in  the  Queen's  topographical 
horizon  may  be  classified,  viz. : 

Class  I,  consists  of  those  groups  made  up  of  three 
valleys. 

Class  II,  of  those  groups  made  up  of  five  valleys. 

Class  III,  of  those  groups  made  up  of  eight  valleys  of 
lesser  area;  and 

Class  IV,  of  those  groups  made  up  of  eight  valleys  of 
greater  area. 

Groups  of  the  first  class  always  have  an  area  of  twenty 
points;  those  of  the  second  have  an  area  of  twenty-three 
points;  those  of  the  third  have  an  area  of  twenty-five 


TOPOGRAPHY  77 

points,  and  those  of  the  fourth  have  an  area  of  twenty- 
seven  points.  Such  areas  always  are  exclusive  of  that 
point  upon  which  the  Queen  is  posted. 

Although  impassable  natural  barriers  restrict  the 
movement  of  the  Queen  to  less  than  one-half  of  the 
Topographical  Zone,  these  obstacles  always  are  inter- 
sected by  long  stretches  of  open  country  formed  by 
intervening  valleys. 

Hence,  the  march  of  this  most  mobile  of  the  Chess- 
pieces  always  is  open  either  in  three,  five,  or  eight  direc- 
tions, and  it  always  is  possible  for  her,  unless  impeded  by 
the  interference  of  kindred  or  hostile  corps,  to  reach  any 
desired  point  on  the  Chess-board  in  two  moves. 

The  weakness  peculiar  to  the  Topographical  Horizon 
which  appertains  to  the  Queen,  originates  in  the  fact  that 
it  never  commands  the  origins  of  obliques.  Conse- 
quently, every  post  of  the  Queen,  is  open  to  unopposed 
attack  by  the  hostile  Knights. 


TOPOGRAPHY  OF  THE  ROOK 

From  the  view-point  of  the  Rook,  the  surface  of  the 
Chess-board  takes  on  a  topographical  aspect  which  varies 
with  the  post  occupied. 

Placed  at  either  Rl  or  R8  the  Rook  occupies  the  central 
point  of  a  great  valley,  15  points  in  length,  which  winds 
around  the  slope  of  an  immense  and  inaccessible  moun- 
tain range.  This  latter,  in  extent,  includes  the  remainder 
of  the  Topographical  Zone. 

With  the  Rook  placed  at  R2  or  R7,  this  great  mountain 
wall  becomes  pierced  by  a  long  valley  running  at  right 
angles  to  the  first,  but  the  area  open  to  the  movement 
of  the  Rook  is  not  increased. 

Placed  at  Kt2,  B3,  K4,  or  Q4,  the  Rook  becomes  en- 
closed amid  impassable  natural  barriers.     But  although 


78  GRAND    RECONNAISSANCE 

in  such  cases  it  always  occupies  the  point  of  union  of  four 
easily  traversed  although  unequal  valleys,  its  area  of 
movement  is  neither  increased  nor  diminished,  remaining 
always  at  fourteen  points  open  to  occupation. 

Unless  impeded  by  the  presence  of  kindred  or  adverse 
corps  on  its  logistic  radii,  the  Rook  always  may  move 
either  in  two,  three,  or  four  directions,  and  it  may  reach 
any  desired  point  on  the  Chess-board  in  two  moves. 

The  weakness  peculiar  to  the  Topographical  Horizon 
of  the  Rook  lies  in  the  fact  that  it  never  commands  the 
origins  of  diagonals  or  obliques.  Hence  it  is  open  to 
unopposed  attack  along  the  first  from  adverse  Queen, 
King,  Bishops  and  Pawns,  and  along  the  second  from 
adverse  Knights. 


TOPOGRAPHY  OF  THE  BISHOP 

From  the  view-point  of  the  Bishop,  the  surface  of  the 
Chess-board  takes  on  a  topographical  aspect  most  for- 
bidding. 

To  this  Chess-piece  at  least  one-half  of  the  Topo- 
graphical Zone  is  inaccessible,  and  under  any  circum- 
stances his  movements  are  limited  to  the  thirty-two 
squares  of  his  own  color. 

Thus,  the  Topographical  Horizon  of  the  Bishop  takes 
the  form  of  a  broken  country,  dotted  with  high  hills, 
deep  lakes,  impenetrable  swamps,  and  thick  woodlands. 
But  between  these  obstacles  thus  set  about  by  Nature, 
run  level  valleys,  varied  in  extent  and  easy  of  access. 
This  fact  so  modifies  this  harshest  of  all  sensible  horizons 
as  to  make  the  Bishop  next  in  activity  to  the  Rook. 

Within  its  limited  sphere  of  action,  the  Bishop  may 
move  in  either  one  or  four  directions  with  a  minimum  of 
nine  and  a  maximum  of  fourteen  points  open  to  his 
occupation.       Unimpeded  by  other  corps   blocking  his 


TOPOGRAPHY  79 

route  of  march,  the  Bishop  may  reach  any  desired  point 
of  his  own  color  on  the  chess  board  in  two  moves. 

The  weakness  peculiar  to  the  topographical  horizon 
of  the  Bishop  is  its  liability  to  unopposed  attack  along 
verticals  and  horizontals  by  the  hostile  King,  Queen  and 
Books;  and  along  obliques  by  the  hostile  Knights. 


TOPOGRAPHY  OF  THE  KNIGHT 

From  the  view-point  of  the  Knight,  the  surface  of  the 
Chess-board  takes  on  the  aspect  of  a  densely  wooded 
and  entirely  undeveloped  country;  made  up  of  a  pro- 
fusion of  ponds,  rivulets,  swamps,  etc.,  none  of  which  are 
impassable  although  sufficient  to  impede  progress. 

Unless  interfered  with  by  kindred  or  hostile  corps,  or 
the  limitations  of  the  Chess-board,  the  Knight  always 
may  move  either  in  two,  four,  six,  or  eight  directions. 
It  may  reach  any  desired  point  in  a  minimum  of  one  and 
a  maximum  of  six  moves,  and  may  occupy  the  sixty-four 
squares  of  the  Chess-board  in  the  same  number  of 
marches. 

The  weakness  of  the  topographical  horizon  of  the 
Knight  lies  in  the  fact  that  it  never  commands  ad- 
jacent points,  nor  any  of  those  distant,  other  than  the 
termini  of  its  own  obliques.  Hence  it  is  open  to  un- 
opposed attack  along  verticals  and  horizontals  from  the 
adverse  King,  Queen  and  Rooks,  and  along  diagonals 
from  the  adverse  King,  Queen,  Bishop  and  Pawns. 


TOPOGRAPHY  OF  THE  PAWN 

From  the  point  of  view  of  the  Pawn,  the  surface  of  the 
Chess-board  takes  on  the  topographical  aspect  of  a 
country  which  as  it  is  entered,  constantly  becomes  wilder 
and  more  rugged. 


80  GRAND    RECONNAISSANCE 

The  march  of  the  Pawn  always  is  along  a  valley  situ> 
ated  between  impracticable  natural  barriers,  and  the 
possible  movements  of  the  Pawn  always  decrease  as  the 
distance  traveled  increases. 

Unhindered  by  either  kindred  or  hostile  corps,  the 
Pawn  may  reach  any  point  of  junction  in  the  kindred 
Logistic  Horizon,  which  is  contained  within  its  altitude, 
in  a  minimum  of  five  and  in  a  maximum  of  six  moves. 
It  may  march  only  in  one  direction,  except  in  capturing, 
when  it  may  acquire  the  option  of  acting  in  three  direc- 
tions. 

The  weakness  of  the  topographical  horizon  of  the 
Pawn  originates  in  its  inability  to  command  the  adjacent 
country.  Therefore,  it  is  exposed  to  unopposed  attack 
along  verticals  and  horizontals  by  the  hostile  King, 
Queen  and  Rooks ;  along  diagonals  by  the  adverse  King, 
Queen  and  Bishops,  and  along  obliques  by  the  adverse 
Knights. 


TOPOGRAPHY  OF  THE  TOPOGRAP- 
HICAL ZONE 

That  normal  and  visible  surface  of  the  Chess-board 
termed  the  Topographical  Zone  is  bounded  by  four  great 
natural  barriers,  impassable  to  any  Chess-piece. 

The  two  sides  of  the  zone  may  be  held  to  typify  either 
the  Ocean  or  the  boundaries  of  neutral  States.  The  two 
extremities  of  the  Chess-board  while  holding  the  pre- 
viously announced  relation  to  Chess-pieces  contained  in 
the  Topographical  Zone,  also  holds  another  and  radically 
different  relation  to  those  Chess-pieces  not  contained  in 
the  Topographical  Zone,  viz:. 

In  the  latter  case,  the  two  extremities  of  the  chess- 
board are  to  be  regarded  as  two  great  mountain  ranges, 


TOPOGRAPHY  81 

each  of  which  is  pierced  by  eight  defiles,  the  latter  being 
the  sixteen  points  of  junction  contained  in  the  kindred 
and  adverse  logistic  horizons. 

In  the  arena  thus  formed  by  these  four  great  natural 
barriers,  two  hostile  armies  composed  of  the  thirty-two 
Chess-pieces,  are  contending  for  the  mastery. 

Meanwhile,  beyond  these  great  mountain  ranges,  are 
advancing  to  the  aid  of  the  combatants,  two  other  armies, 
represented  by  the  power  of  promotion  possessed  by  the 
Pawns.  Each  of  these  two  hypothetical  armies  is  assail- 
ing the  outer  slope  of  that  range  of  mountains  which  lies 
in  the  rear  of  the  hostile  force.  Its  effort  is  to  pass  one 
of  the  eight  defiles  and  by  occupying  a  Point  of  Junction 
in  the  kindred  Logistic  Horizon,  to  gain  entrance  into 
the  Topographical  Zone.  Then  in  the  array  of  a  Queen, 
or  some  other  kindred  piece,  it  purposes  to  attack  de- 
cisively, the  adverse  Strategetic  Rear. 

To  oppose  the  attack  of  this  hypothetical  hostile  army, 
whose  movements  always  are  typified  by  the  advance  of 
the  adverse  Pawns,  is  the  duty  of  the  kindred  column  of 
manoeuvre. 

Primarily  this  labor  falls  upon  the  kindred  Pawns. 
Upon  each  Pawn  devolves  the  duty  of  guarding  that 
defile  situated  directly  on  its  front,  by  maintaining  itself 
as  a  Point  of  Impenetrability  between  the  corresponding 
hostile  pawn  and  the  kindred  Strategic  Rear. 

Conversely,  a  second  duty  devolves  upon  each  Pawn; 
and  as  an  integer  of  the  Column  of  Support,  it  con- 
tinually must  threaten  and  whenever  opportunity  is 
presented  it  decisively  must  assault  the  defile  on  its 
front,  for  the  purpose  of  penetrating  to  the  kindred 
logistic  horizon  and  becoming  promoted  to  such  kindred 
piece,  as  by  attacking  the  adverse  Determinate  Force 
in  flank,  in  rear,  or  in  both,  may  decide  the  victory  in 
favor  of  the  kindred  army. 


82  GRAND    RECONNAISSANCE 

Every  variety  of  topography  has  peculiar  requirements 
for  its  attack  and  its  defence;  and  situations  even  though 
but  little  different  from  each  other,  nevertheless  must  be 
treated  according  to  their  particular  nature. 

In  order  to  acquire  the  habit  of  selecting  at  a  glance 
the  correct  posts  for  an  army  and  of  making  proper 
dispositions  of  the  kindred  corps  with  rapidity  and  pre- 
cision, topography  should  be  studied  with  great  attention, 
for  most  frequently  it  happens  that  circumstances  do 
not  allow  time  to  do  these  things  with  deliberation. 

PRINCIPLE 

Acting  either  offensively  or  defensively,  one  never  should 
proceed  in  such  a  way  as  to  allow  the  enemy  the  advantage 
of  ground ; 

That  is  to  say :  Kindred  corps  never  should  be  exposed 
to  unopposed  adverse  radii  of  offence,  when  the  effect 
of  such  exposure  is  the  loss  of  kindred  material,  or  of 
time  much  better  to  be  employed,  than  in  making  a  nec- 
essary and  servile  retreat  from  an  untenable  post. 

On  the  contrary,  every  kindred  topographical  ad- 
vantage should  unhesitatingly  be  availed  of;  and  par- 
ticular attention  continually  should  be  paid  to  advancing 
the  kindred  corps  to  points  offensive  where  they  cannot 
be  successfully  attacked. 

Pains  always  must  be  taken  to  select  advantageous 
ground.  Indifferent  posts  must  never  be  occupied  from 
sheer  indolence  or  from  over-confidence  in  the  strength 
of  the  kindred,  or  the  weakness  of  the  adverse  army. 

Particularly  must  one  beware  of  permitting  the  enemy 
to  retain  advantages  in  topography;  always  and  at  once 
he  should  be  dislodged  from  posts  whose  continued  occu- 
pation may  facilitate  his  giving  an  unforeseen  and  often 
a  fatal  blow. 


TOPOGRAPHY  83 

The  full  importance  of  topography  perhaps  is  best  ex- 
pressed in  the  following  dictum  by  the  great  Frederic: 


PRINCIPLE 

"Whenever  a  general  and  decisive  topographical  advantage 
is  presented,  one  has  merely  to  avail  of  this,  without  troub- 
ling about  anything  further." 

The  relative  advantage  in  Topography  possessed  by 
one  army  over  an  opposing  army,  always  can  be  deter- 
mined by  the  following,  viz : 

RULE 

1.  If  the  principal  adverse  Corps  of  Position  are 
situated  upon  points  of  a  given  color,  and  if  the  principal 
Kindred  Corps  of  Position  are  situated  upon  points  not 
of  the  given  color,  then: 

That  army  which  has  the  more  Corps  of  Evolution  able 
to  act  against  points  of  the  given  color,  and  the  equality 
in  Corps  of  Evolution  able  to  act  against  points  of  the 
opposite  color,  has  the  relative  advantage  in  Topography. 

2.  To  utilize  the  relative  advantage  in  Topography, 
construct  a  position  in  which  the  kindred  Corps  of  Posi- 
tion necessary  to  be  defended  shall  occupy  a  point  upon 
the  sub-geometric  symbol  of  a  kindred  Corps  of  Evolu- 
tion; which  point  shall  be  a  Tactical  Key  of  a  True 
Strategetic  Horizon  of  which  the  kindred  Corps  of  Evo- 
lution is  the  Corps  of  the  Centre  and  of  which  either  the 
adverse  King  or  an  undefendable  adverse  piece  is  the 
second  Tactical  Key. 

3.  To  neutralize  the  relative  disadvantage  in  Topog- 
raphy, eliminate  that  adverse  Corps  d'armee  which  is  able 
to  act  simultaneously  by  its  geometric  symbol  against 
the  principal  Kindred  Corps  of  Position  upon  a  given 


84  GRAND    RECONNAISSANCE 

color;  and  by  its  sub-geometric  symbol  against  points  of 
opposite  color. 


Perfection  in  Defensive  Topography  is  attained  when- 
ever the  ground  occupied  nullifies  hostile  advantages  in 
Time,  Organization,  Mobility,  Numbers  and  Position. 

Perfection  in  Offensive  Topography  is  attained  when- 
ever the  ground  occupied  accentuates  the  kindred  ad- 
vantages in  Time,  Organization,  Mobility,  Numbers  and 
Position. 


TOPOGRAPHY  85 


MILITARY  EXAMPLES 

"When  you  intend  to  engage  in  battle  endeavor  that  your 
CHIEF  advantage  shall  arise  from  the  ground  occupied 
by  your  army.11  Vegetius. 

To  cross  the  Granicus,  Alexander  the  Great  selected 
a  fordable  spot  where  the  river  made  a  long,  narrow 
bend,  and  attacked  the  salient  and  both  sides  simul- 
taneously. The  Persians  thus  outflanked  were  easily 
and  quickly  routed;  whereupon  the  Grecian  army  in 
line  of  Phalanxes,  both  flanks  covered  by  the  river  and 
its  retreat  assured  by  the  fords  in  rear,  advanced  to 
battle  in  harmony  with  all  requirements  of  Strategetic 
Art. 


At  Issus,  Alexander  the  Great  so  manoeuvred  that  the 
Persian  army  of  more  than  a  million  men  was  confined 
in  a  long  valley  not  over  three  miles  in  width,  having  the 
sea  on  the  left  hand  and  the  Amanus  Mountains  on  the 
right,  thus  the  Grecians  had  a  battlefield  fitted  to  the 
size  of  their  army,  and  fought  in  Phalanxes  in  line,  both 
wings  covered  by  impassable  natural  barriers  and  retreat 
assured,  by  open  ground  in  rear. 


At  the  Trebia,  Hannibal  by  stratagems  now  undis- 
cernible,  induced  the  consul  Sempronius  to  pass  the 
river  and  following  along  the  easterly  bank  to  take  posi- 
tion with  his  army  upon  the  lowlands  between  an  un- 
fordable  part  of  the  stream  and  the  Carthagenians. 

Upon  this,  Hannibal  detached  his  youngest  brother 
Margo  to  cut  off  the  retreat  of  the  Romans  from  the 
ford  by  which  they  had  crossed  the  Trebia;  advanced  his 


86  GRAND    RECONNAISSANCE 

infantry  by  Phalanxes  in  line  and  overthrowing  the  few 
Roman  horse,  assailed  the  hostile  left  wing  with  10,000 
heavy  cavalry.  The  destruction  of  the  Roman  army  was 
completed  by  the  simultaneous  attack  of  their  right 
wing  by  Margo  and  the  impossibility  of  repassing  the 
river  in  their  rear. 


By  one  of  the  most  notable  marches  in  surprise  re- 
corded in  military  annals,  Hannibal  crossed  the  seem- 
ingly impassible  marshes  of  the  river  Po,  and  turned 
the  left  flank  of  the  Roman  army,  commanded  by  the 
Consul  C.  Flaminius.  Then  the  great  Carthagenian 
advanced  swiftly  toward  the  city  of  Rome,  devasting  the 
country  on  either  hand. 

In  headlong  pursuit  the  Consul  entered  a  long  narrow 
valley,  having  Lake  Trasymenus  on  the  one  hand  and 
the  mountains  on  the  other. 

Suddenly  while  entombed  in  this  vast  ravine,  the 
Roman  army  was  attacked  by  infantry  from  the  high 
ground  along  its  right  flank;  and  in  front  and  rear  by  the 
Carthagenian  heavy  cavalry,  while  the  lake  extending 
along  its  left  flank  made  futile  all  attempts  to  escape. 


At  Cannae,  Hannibal  reproduced  the  evolutions  of 
Alexander  the  Great  at  the  passage  of  the  Granicus. 
Selecting  a  long  bend  in  the  Aufidus,  Hannibal  forded 
the  river  and  took  position  by  Phalanxes  in  line,  his 
flanks  covered  by  unfordable  parts  of  the  stream  and  his 
retreat  assured  by  the  fords  by  which  he  had  crossed, 
while  as  at  Issus,  the  ground  on  his  front  though  fitting 
his  own  army,  was  so  confined  as  to  prevent  the  Romans 
engaging  a  force  greater  than  his  own.  Beyond  Hanni- 
bal's front,  the  hostile  army  was  posted  in  a  wide  level 


TOPOGRAPHY  87 

plain,  suited  to  the  best  use  of  the  vastly  superior  Car- 
thagenian  heavy  cavalry,  both  for  the  evolutions  of  the 
battle  and  the  subsequent  pursuit  and  massacre  of  the 
Romans . 

At  the  River  Arar  (58  B.C.)  Caesar  achieved  his  first 
victory.  Following  leisurely  but  closely  the  marauding 
Helvetii,  he  permitted  three-fourths  of  their  army  to 
cross  to  the  westerly  side  of  the  river;  then  he  fell  upon 
the  remainder  with  his  whole  army. 


An  eye-witness  thus  describes  the  famous  passage  of 
the  Lech  by  Gustavus  Adolphus: 

"Resolved  to  view  the  situation  of  the  enemy,  his 
majesty  went  out  the  2nd  of  April  (1632)  with  a  strong 
body  of  horse,  which  I  had  the  honor  to  command. 
We  marched  as  near  as  we  could  to  the  bank  of  the  river, 
not  to  be  too  much  exposed  to  the  enemy's  cannon;  and 
having  gained  a  height  where  the  whole  course  of  the 
river  might  be  seen,  we  drew  up  and  the  king  alighted 
and  examined  every  reach  and  turning  of  the  river  with 
his  glass.  Toward  the  north,  he  found  the  river  fetching 
a  long  reach  and  doubling  short  upon  itself.  '  There  is 
the  point  will  do  our  business/  says  the  king,  '  and  if 
the  ground  be  good,  we  will  pass  there,  though  Tilly 
do  his  worst'." 

He  immediately  ordered  a  small  party  of  horse  to 
bring  him  word  how  high  the  bank  was  on  each  side  and 
at  the  point,  "and  he  shall  have  fifty  dollars"  says  the 
king,  "who  will  tell  me  how  deep  the  water  is." 

*****  The  depth  and  breadths  of 
the  stream  having  been  ascertained,  and  the  bank  on  our 
side  being  ten  to  twelve  feet  higher  than  the  other  and  of 
a  hard  gravel,  the  king  resolved  to  cross  there;  and  him- 
self gave  directions  for  such  a  bridge  as  I  believe  never 
army  passed  before  nor  since. 


88  GRAND    RECONNAISSANCE 

The  bridge  was  loose  plank  placed  upon  large  tressels 
as  bricklayers  raise  a  scaffold  to  build  a  wall.  The 
tressels  were  made  some  higher  and  some  lower  to  answer 
to  the  river  as  it  grew  deeper  or  shallower;  and  all  was 
framed  and  fitted  before  any  attempt  was  made  to  cross. 

At  night,  April  4th  the  king  posted  about  2,000  men 
near  the  point  and  ordered  them  to  throw  up  trenches  on 
either  side  and  quite  around  it;  within  which  at  each  end 
the  king  placed  a  battery  of  six  pieces  and  six  cannon  at 
the  point,  two  guns  in  front  and  two  at  each  side.  By 
daylight,  all  the  batteries  were  finished,  the  trenches 
filled  with  musketeers  and  all  the  bridge  equipment  at 
hand  in  readiness  for  use.  To  conceal  this  work  the  king 
had  fired  all  night  at  other  places  along  the  river. 

At  daylight,  the  Imperialists  discovered  the  king's 
design,  when  it  was  too  late  to  prevent  it.  The  muske- 
teers and  the  batteries  made  such  continual  fire  that  the 
other  bank  twelve  feet  below  was  too  hot  for  the  Im- 
perialists; whereupon  old  Tilly  to  be  ready  for  the  king 
on  his  coming  over  on  his  bridge,  fell  to  work  and  raised 
a  twenty-gun  battery  right  against  the  point  and  a 
breast-work  as  near  the  river  as  he  could  to  cover  his 
men;  thinking  that  when  the  King  should  build  his 
bridge,  he  might  easily  beat  it  down  with  his  cannon. 

But  the  King  had  doubly  prevented  him;  first  by 
laying  his  bridge  so  low  that  none  of  Tilly's  shot  could 
hurt  it,  for  the  bridge  lay  not  above  half  a  foot  above  the 
water's  edge;  and  the  angle  of  the  river  secured  it  against 
the  batteries  on  the  other  side,  while  the  continual  fire 
beat  the  Imperialists  from  those  places  where  they  had 
no  works  to  cover  them. 

Now,  in  the  second  place,  the  King  sent  over  four 
hundred  men  who  cast  up  a  large  ravelin  on  the  other 
bank  just  where  he  planned  to  land;  and  while  this  was 
doing  the  King  laid  over  his  bridge. 


TOPOGRAPHY  89 

Both  sides  wrought  hard  all  the  day  and  all  the  night 
as  if  the  spade,  not  the  sword,  was  to  decide  the  con- 
troversy; meanwhile  the  musketry  and  cannon-balls  flew 
like  hail  and  both  sides  had  enough  to  do  to  make  the 
men  stand  to  their  work.  The  carnage  was  great; 
many  officers  were  killed.  Both  the  King  and  Tilly 
animated  the  troops  by  their  presence. 

About  one  o'clock  about  the  time  when  the  King  had 
his  bridge  finished  and  in  heading  a  charge  of  3000  foot 
against  our  ravelin  was  brave  old  Tilly  slain  by  a  musket 
bullet  in  the  thigh. 

We  knew  nothing  of  this  disaster  befallen  them,  and 
the  King,  who  looked  for  blows,  the  bridge  and  ravelin 
being  finished,  ordered  to  run  a  line  of  palisades  to  take 
in  more  ground  and  to  cover  the  first  troops  he  should 
send  over.  This  work  being  finished  the  same  night,  the 
King  sent  over  his  Guards  and  six  hundred  Scots  to  man 
the  new  line. 

Early  in  the  morning  a  party  of  Scots  under  Capt. 
Forbes  of  Lord  Rae's  regiment  was  sent  abroad  to  learn 
something  of  the  enemy  and  Sir  John  Hepburn  with  the 
Scots  Brigade  was  ordered  to  pass  the  bridge,  draw  up 
outside  the  ravelin,  and  to  advance  in  search  of  the 
enemy  as  soon  as  the  horse  were  come  over. 

The  King  was  by  this  time  at  the  head  of  his  army  in 
full  battle  array,  ready  to  follow  his  vanguard  and  expect- 
ing a  hot  day's  work  of  it.  Sir  John  sent  messenger 
after  messenger  entreating  for  permission  to  advance, 
but  the  King  would  not  suffer  it;  for  he  was  ever  on  his 
guard  and  would  not  risk  a  surprise.  So  the  army  con- 
tinued on  this  side  of  the  Lech  all  day  and  the  next  night. 
In  the  morning  the  King  ordered  300  horse,  600  horse 
and  800  dragoons  to  enter  the  wood  by  three  ways,  but 
sustaining  each  other;  the  Scots  Brigade  to  follow  to  the 
edge  of  the  wood  in  support  of  all,  and  a  brigade  of 


90  GRAND    RECONNAISSANCE 

Swedish  infantry  to  cover  Sir  John's  troops.    So  warily 
did  this  famous  warrior  proceed. 

The  next  day  the  cavalry  came  up  with  us  led  by 
Gustavus  Horn;  and  the  King  and  the  whole  army 
followed,  and  we  marched  on  through  the  heart  of 
Bavaria.  His  Majesty  when  he  saw  the  judgment  with 
which  old  Tilly  had  prepared  his  works  and  the  dangers 
we  had  run,  would  often  say,  "That  day's  work  is 
every  way  equal  to  the  victory  of  Leipsic." 


With  but  55,000  troops  in  hand  and  surrounded  by  the 
united  Austrian  and  Russian  armies  aggregating  a 
quarter  of  a  million  men;  Frederic  the  Great  availing  of  a 
swamp,  a  few  hills,  a  rivulet  and  a  fortified  town,  con- 
structed a  battlefield  upon  which  his  opponents  dared  not 
engage  him. 

'  This  famous  camp  of  Bunzlewitz  is  one  of  the  wonders 
of  the  military  art.  It  also  is  an  illustration  of  the  in- 
ability of  the  Anglo-Saxon  to  reason;  for  to  this  day 
many  who  wear  epaulets,  accepting  the  dictum  of  a 
skillfully  hoodwinked  French  diplomat  at  the  seige  of 
Neisse,  (Dec,  1740)  commonly  assert  that  "the  great 
Frederic  was  a  bad  engineer." 


Washington  compelled  the  British  to  evacuate  Boston, 
merely  by  occupying  with  artillery  Dorchester  Heights, 
the  tactical  key  of  the  theatre  of  action  and  thus  pre- 
venting either  ingress  or  egress  from  the  harbor. 


At  Trenton  the  Hessian  column  was  unable  to  escape 
from  Washington's  accurate  evolutions,  on  account  of 
being  imprisoned  in  an  angle  formed  by  the  unfordable 
Delaware  river. 


TOPOGRAPHY  91 

At  Yorktown,  the  British  army  under  Lord  Cornwallis 
was  captured  entire,  being  cut  off  from  all  retreat  by  the 
ocean  on  the  right  flank  and  the  James  river  in  rear. 


Bonaparte  made  his  reputation  at  Toulon  (1793) 
merely  by  following  the  method  employed  by  Washing- 
ton in  the  seige  of  Boston. 


Bonaparte  gained  his  first  success  in  Italy  because  the 
allied  Piedmontese  and  Austrian  armies,  although  thrice 
his  numbers,  were  separated  by  the  Appenine  mountains : 


Bonaparte's  success  at  Castiglione  was  due  to  the 
separation  of  the  Austrian  army  into  two  great  isolated 
columns  by  the  Lake  of  Garda. 


At  Areola,  Bonaparte  occupied  a  great  swamp  upon 
the  hostile  strategic  center  and  the  Austrian  army  was 
destroyed  by  its  efforts  to  dislodge  him. 


At  Rivoli,  the  Austrian  army  purposed  to  unite  its  five 
detached  wings  upon  a  plateau  of  which  Bonaparte  was 
already  in  possession.  All  were  ruined  in  the  effort  to 
dislodge  the  French  from  this  Tactical  Center. 


The  Austrian  army  was  unable  to  escape  after  Marengo 
on  account  of  the  Po  river  in  its  rear. 


At  Austerlitz  the  left  wing  of  the  Austro-Russian  army 
was  caught  between  the  French  army  and  a  chain  of 
lakes  and  rivulets  and  totally  destroyed. 


92  GRAND    RECONNAISSANCE 

At  Friedland  the  Russian  army  was  caught  between 
the  French  in  front  and  the  Vistula  river  in  rear  and 
totally  destroyed. 


At  Krasnoe,  the  Russians  under  Kutosof,  occupied 
the  strategic  center'  and  were  covered  by  the  Dnieper. 
To  force  the  passage  of  the  river  cost  Napoleon  30,000 
men. 


At  the  Beresina,  the  Russians  under  Benningsen, 
occupied  the  Strategic  Center  and  were  covered  by  the 
unfordable  river.  To  force  the  passage  cost  Napoleon 
20,000  men. 


At  Leipsic,  Napoleon  was  caught  between  the  allied 
army  and  the  Elbe.  The  retreat  across  the  river  cost  the 
French  50,000  men. 


At  Waterloo,  the  high  plateau  sloping  gradually  to  a 
plain,  various  hamlets  on  front  and  flank  and  the  forest 
in  rear,  made  a  perfect  topography  for  a  defensive  battle. 


At  Sedan,  the  Emperor,  Napoleon  III,  and  his  army 
were  enclosed  between  the  Prussian  army  and  the  frontier 
of  Belgium  and  captured. 


"Where  the  real  general  incessantly  sees  prepared  by 
Nature  means  admirably  adapted  for  his  needs,  the  com- 
mander lacking  such  talents  sees  nothing." 

Hannibal. 


MOBILITY 


"Success  in  an  operation  depends  upon  the  secrecy  and 
celerity  with  which  the  movements  are  made." 

Napoleon. 


"An  eye  unskilled  and  a  mind  untutored  can  see  but  little 
where  a  trained  observer  detects  important  movements" 

Von  Moltke. 


"Caesar  is  a  marvel  of  vigilance  and  rapidity,  he  finishes 
a  war  in  a  march." 

Cicero. 


MOBILITY 


"Victory  lies  in  the  legs  of  the  soldier." 

Frederic  the  Great. 

"The  principal  part  of  the  soldier's  efficiency  depends 
upon  his  legs. 

"The  personal  abilities  required  in  all  manoeuvres  and 
in  battles  are  totally  confined  to  them. 

"Whoever  is  of  a  different  opinion  is  a  dupe  to  ignorance 
and  a  novice  in  the  profession  of  arms." 

Count  de  Saxe. 


"It  is  easier  to  beat  an  enemy  than  commonly  is  sup- 
posed"  says  Napoleon,  "the  great  Art  lies  in  making  noth- 
ing but  decisive  movements." 

To  the  proficient  in  Strategetics  the  truth  of  the  fore- 
going dictum  is  self-evident.  Nevertheless,  it  remains 
to  instruct  the  student  how  to  select  from  a  multitude  of 
possible  movements,  that  particular  movement  or  series 
of  movements,  which  in  a  given  situation  are  best  cal- 
culated to  achieve  victory. 

Whatever  may  be  such  series  of  movements,  obviously, 
it  must  have  an  object,  i.e.,  a  specific  and  clearly  defined 
purpose.  Equally  so,  all  movements  made  on  such  line 
of  movement  must  each  have  an  objective,  i.e.,  a  termi- 
nus. These  objectives,  like  cogs  in  a  gear,  intimately 
are  connected  with  other  objectives  or  termini,  so  that  the 


98  GRAND    RECONNAISSANCE 

project  thus  formed  constitutes  always  an  exact  and  often 
a  vast  scheme. 

Frequently  it  happens  that  the  occupation  of  an 
objective,  valid  in  a  given  situation,  is  not  valid  in  an 
ensuing  situation  for  the  "reasons : 

1.  That  the  object  of  the  given  line  of  movement  is 
become  unattainable,  or, 

2.  Because  it  has  become  no  longer  worth  attaining, 
or, 

3.  Because  such  belated  attainment  may  be  direct 
cause  of  disaster. 

PRINCIPLE 

In  order  to  select  the  decisive  movement  in  a  given  situ- 
ation it  is  necessary  first  to  determine  both  the  object  and 
the  objective,  not  merely  of  the  required  movement,  but  also 
of  that  series  of  movements,  which  collectively  constitute  the 
projected  line  of  movement;  together  with  the  object  and  the 
objective  of  every  movement  contained  therein. 

The  mathematician  readily  will  perceive,  and  the 
student  doubtless  will  permit  himself  to  be  informed, 
that: 

Before  the  true  object  and  the  true  objective  of  any 
movement  can  be  determined  it  first  is  necessary  to 
deduce  the  common  object  of  all  movement. 

As  is  well  known,  the  combined  movements  of  the 
Chess-pieces  over  the  surface  of  the  Chess-board  during 
a  game  at  Chess  are  infinite. 

These  calculations  are  so  complex  that  human  per- 
ception accurately  can  forecast  ultimate  and  even  im- 
mediate results  only  in  comparatively  few  and  simple 
situations.  Such  calculable  outcomes  are  limited  to  the 
earlier  stages  of  the  opening,  to  the  concluding  phases  of  a 
game;   and  to  situations  in  the  mid-game  wherein  the 


MOBILITY  99 

presence  of  but  few  adverse  pieces  minimizes  the  volume 
of  effort  possible  to  the  opponent. 
Consequently,  it  is  self-evident,  that: 

PRINCIPLE 

Situations  on  the  Chess-board  require  for  their  demon- 
stration a  degree  of  skill  which  decreases  as  the  hostile 
power  of  resistance  decreases. 

All  power  for  resistance  possessed  by  an  army  emanates 
from  its  ability  to  move.  This  faculty  of  Mobility  is 
that  inestimable  quality  without  which  nothing  and  by 
means  of  which  everything,  can  be  done. 

From  this  truth  it  is  easy  to  deduce  the  common  object 
of  all  movement,  which  obviously  is: 

To  minimize  the  mobility  of  the  opposing  force. 

The  hostile  army  having  the  ability  to  move  and  con- 
sequently a  power  for  resistance  equal  to  that  possessed 
by  the  kindred  army;  it  becomes  of  the  first  importance  to 
discover  in  what  way  the  kindred  army  is  superior  to 
that  adverse  force,  which  in  the  Normal  Situation  on  the 
Chess-board  is  its  exact  counterpart  in  material,  position 
and  formation. 

Such  normal  superiority  of  the  White  army  over  the 
Black  army  is  found  in  the  fact  that: 

1.  The  former  has  the  privilege  of  making  the  initial 
move  of  the  game. 

2.  This  privilege  of  first  move  is  the  absolute  advantage 
in  Time. 

While  no  mathematical  demonstration  of  the  outcome 
of  a  game  at  Chess  is  possible,  nevertheless  there  are 
rational  grounds  for  assuming  that  with  exact  play,  White 
should  win. 


100  GRAND    RECONNAISSANCE 

This  decided  and  probably  decisive  advantage  pos- 
sessed by  White  can  be  minimized  only  by  correcting  a 
mathematical  blemish  in  the  gane  of  Chess  as  at  present 
constructed;  which  blemish,  there  is  reason  to  believe, 
did  not  originally  exist. 

This  imperfection  seemingly  is  the  result  of  unscien- 
tific modifications  of  the  Italian  method  of  Castling; 
which  latter,  from  the  standpoint  of  mathematics  and  of 
Strategetics,  embodies  the  true  spirit  of  that  delicate  and 
vital  evolution. 

To  the  mathematician  and  to  the  Strategist,  it  is  clear 
that  Chess  as  first  devised  was  geometrically  perfect. 
The  abortions  played  during  successive  ages  and  in 
various  parts  of  the  Earth,  merely  are  crude  and  un- 
scientific deviations  from  the  perfect  original. 

Thus,  strategetically,  the  correct  post  of  deployment 
for  the  Chess-King  is  at  the  extremity  of  a  straight  line 
drawn  from  the  center  of  that  Grand  Strategic  Front 
which  appertains  to  the  existing  formation. 

Hence,  in  the  grand  front  by  the  right,  the  King  in 
Castling  K  R,  properly  goes  in  one  move  to  KKtl,  his 
proper  post.  Conversely,  in  Castling  Q  R,  he  also  should 
go  in  one  move  to  QKtl,  his  proper  post  corresponding  to 
the  grand  front  by  the  left. 

Again,  whenever  the  formation  logically  points  to  the 
grand  front  by  the  right  refused,  the  King  should  go  in 
one  move  from  Kl  to  KR1.  When  the  formations  in- 
dicate the  grand  front  by  the  left  refused,  the  King 
should  go  in  one  move  from  Kl  to  QR1. 

In  each  and  every  case  the  co-operating  Rook  should 
be  posted  at  the  corresponding  Bishop's  square,  in  order 
to  support  the  alignment  by  P-B4,  of  the  front  adopted. 

The  faulty  mode  of  castling  today  in  vogue  clearly 
is  not  the  product  either  of  the  mathematic  nor  of  the 
strategetic  mind. 


MOBILITY  101 

The  infantile  definition  of  "the  books,"  viz.,  "The 
King  in  Castling  moves  two  squares  either  to  the  right 
or  to  the  left,"  displays  all  that  mania  for  the  common- 
place, which  characterizes  the  dilettante. 

All  that  can  be  done  is  to  call  attention  to  this  baleful 
excrescence  on  the  great  Game.  Of  course,  it  is  useless 
to  combat  it.     In  the  words  of  the  Count  de  Saxe : 

"The  power  of  custom  is  absolute.  To  depart  from  it 
is  a  crime,  and  the  most  inexcusable  of  all  crimes  is  to 
introduce  innovations.  For  most  people,  it  is  sufficient 
that  a  thing  is  so,  to  forever  allow  it  to  remain  so." 

Says  the  great  Frederic; 

"Man  hardly  may  eradicate  in  his  short  lifetime  all  the 
prejudices  that  are  imbibed  with  his  mother's  milk;  and 
it  is  well  nigh  impossible  to  successfully  wrestle  with 
custom,  that  chief  argument  of  fools." 

Also  bearing  in  mind  the  irony  of  Cicero,  who  regarded 
himself  fortunate  in  that  he  had  not  fallen  victim  to 
services  rendered  his  countrymen,  it  suffices  to  say: 

The  true  Chessic  dictum  in  regard  to  the  double 
evolution  of  the  King  and  Rook  should  read : 

"The  King  of  Castling  should  deploy  in  one  move  to 
that  point  where,  as  the  Base  of  Operations,  it  mathe- 
matically harmonizes  with  that  Strategic  Front,  which  is, 
or  must  become,  established. 

The  change  in  the  present  form  of  Castling,  herein 
suggested,  should  be  made  in  the  true  interests  of  the 
Royal  Game. 

The  instant  effect  of  such  change  will  be : 

1.  Largely  to  increase  the  defensive  resources  both 
of  White  and  Black; 

2.  To  minimize  the  handicap  on  the  second  player, 
due  to  White's  advantage  of  first  move; 


102  GRAND    RECONNAISSANCE 

3.  To  permit  open  play  on  the  Queen's  side  of  the 
board  and  thus  provide  a  broader  and  more  resplendent 
field  for  Strategetic  genius. 


In  all  our  modern-day  mis-interpretations  of  the  ethics 
of  Chess  and  our  characteristic  Twentieth  Century 
looseness  of  practice  as  applied  to  Chess-play,  perhaps 
there  exists  no  greater  absurdity,  than  that  subversion 
of  ordinary  intelligence,  daily  evinced  by  permitting  a 
piece  which  cannot  move,  to  give  check. 

It  is  a  well  known  and  in  many  ways  a  deserved  re- 
proach, cast  by  the  German  erudite,  that  the  mind  of 
the  Anglo-Saxon  is  not  properly  developed,  that  it  is 
able  to  act  correctly  only  when  dealing  with  known 
quantities,  and  is  inadequate  for  the  elucidation  of 
indeterminate  things. 

In  consequence,  they  say,  the  argumentative  attempts 
of  the  Anglo-Saxon  are  puerile;  the  natural  result  of  a 
mental  limitation  which  differs  from  that  of  monkeys 
and  parrots,  merely  in  ability  to  count  beyond  two. 

Surely  it  would  seem  that  a  very  young  child  readily 
would  sense  that : 

A  Chess-piece,  which  by  law  is  debarred  from  move- 
ment, is,  by  the  same  law,  necessarily  debarred  from 
capturing  adverse  material;  inasmuch  as  in  order  to 
capture,  a  piece  must  move. 

Nevertheless  consensus  of  opinion  today  among 
children  of  every  growth  and  whether  Anglo-Saxon  or 
German,  universally  countenance  the  paradox  that: 

A  piece  which  is  pinned  on  its  own  King,  can  give  check 
i.e.,  threaten  to  move  and  capture  the  adverse  King. 

To  argue  this  question  correctly  and  to  deduce  the 
logical  solution,  it  is  necessary  to  revert  to  first  principles 
and  to  note  that: 


MOBILITY  103 

It  is  a  fundamental  of  Chess  mathematics  that  the 
King  cannot  be  exposed  to  capture. 

Furthermore,  it  is  to  be  noted  as  equally  fundamental, 
that: 

1.  A  piece  exerts  no  force  against  that  point  upon 
which  it  is  posted; 

2.  That  whatever  power  a  piece  exerts,  always  is 
exerted  against  some  other  point  than  the  point  upon 
which  it  stands;  and  that; 

3.  In  order  to  exert  such  power,  it  is  an  all-essential 
that  the  piece  move  from  the  point  which  it  occupies  to 
the  point  at  which  its  power  is  to  be  exerted. 

Hence,  it  is  obvious  and  may  be  mathematically  dem- 
onstrated, that, 

1.  A  piece  which  cannot  move,  cannot  capture. 

2.  A  piece  which  cannot  capture,  does  not  exercise 
any  threat  of  capture;  and 

3.  Consequently,  a  piece  deprived  of  its  right  to 
move;  which  cannot  capture  nor  exercise  any  threat  to 
capture,  obviously  and  by  mathematical  demonstration, 
cannot  give  check,  inasmuch,  as  "check"  merely  is  the 
threat  by  a  piece  to  move  and  capture  the  adverse  King. 

Therefore,  whatever  may  be  the  normal  area  of  move- 
ment belonging  to  a  piece,  whenever  from  any  cause 
such  piece  loses  its  power  of  movement,  then, 

It  no  longer  can  capture,  nor  exercise  any  threat  of 
capture,  upon  the  points  contained  within  said  area;  and 
consequently  such  points  so  far  as  said  immovable  piece 
is  concerned,  may  be  occupied  in  safety  by  any  adverse 
piece  including  the  adverse  King,  for  the  reason  that: 

An  immovable  piece  cannot  move;  and  not  being  able 
to  move  it  cannot  capture,  and  not  being  able  to  capture, 
it  does  not  exercise  any  threat  of  capture,  and  conse- 
quently it  cannot  give  check. 


104  GRAND    RECONNAISSANCE 

This  incongruity  of  permitting  an  immovable  piece  to 
give  check  constitutes  the  second  mathematical  blemish 
in  the  game  of  Chess,  as  at  present  constructed. 

This  fallacy,  the  correction  of  which  any  schoolboy 
may  mathematically  demonstrate,  is  defended,  even  by 
many  who  would  know  better,  if  they  merely  would  take 
time  for  reflection;  by  the  inane  assumption,  that: 

A  piece  which  admittedly  is  disqualified  and  rendered 
dormant  by  all  the  fundamentals  of  the  science  of  Chess, 
and  which  therefore  cannot  legally  move  and  conse- 
quently cannot  legally  capture  anything;  by  some 
hocus-pocus  may  be  made  to  move  and  to  capture  that 
most  valuable  of  all  prizes,  the  adverse  King;  and  this 
at  a  time  and  under  circumstances  when,  as  is  universally 
allowed,  it  cannot  legally  move  against,  nor  legally  cap- 
ture any  other  adverse  piece. 

The  basis  of  this  illogical,  illegal,  and  untenable  as- 
sumption is: 

The  pinned  piece,  belonging  to  that  force  which  has 
the  privilege  of  moving,  can  abandon  its  post,  and  cap- 
ture the  adverse  King;  this  stroke  ends  the  game  and 
the  game  being  ended,  the  pinning  piece  never  can  avail 
of  the  abandonment  of  the  covering  post  by  the  pinned 
piece  to  capture  the  King  thus  exposed. 

The  insufficiency  of  this  subterfuge  is  clear  to  the 
mathematical  mind.  Its  subtlety  lies  in  confounding 
together  things  which  have  no  connection,  viz: 

Admittedly  the  given  body  of  Chess-pieces  has  the 
right  to  move,  but  it  is  of  the  utmost  importance  to 
note  that  this  privilege  of  moving  extends  only  to  a  single 
piece  and  from  this  privilege  of  moving  the  pinned  piece 
is  debarred  by  a  specific  and  fundamental  law  of  the 
game,  which  declares  that : 


MOBILITY  105 

"A  piece  shall  not  by  removing  itself  uncover  the 
kindred  King  to  the  attack  of  a  hostile  piece.' ' 

Thus,  it  is  clear,  that  a  pinned  piece  is  a  disqualified 
piece;  its  powers  are  dormant  and  by  the  laws  of  the 
game  it  is  temporarily  reduced  to  an  inert  mass,  and 
deprived  of  every  faculty  normally  appertaining  to  it  as  a 
Chess-piece.  On  the  other  hand,  as  is  equally  obvious, 
the  pinning  piece  is  in  full  possession  of  its  normal  powers 
and  is  qualified  to  perform  every  function. 

To  hold  that  a  piece  disqualified  by  the  laws  of  the 
game  can  nullify  the  activities  of  a  piece  in  full  possession 
of  its  powers,  is  to  assert  that  black  is  white,  that  the 
moon  is  made  of  green  cheese,  that  the  tail  can  wag  the 
dog,  or  any  other  of  those  things  which  have  led  the  Ger- 
man to  promulgate  his  caustic  formula  on  the  Anglo- 
Saxon. 

Hence,  artificially  to  nullify  the  normal  powers  of  an 
active  and  potential  piece  which  is  operating  in  con- 
formity to  the  laws  of  the  game,  and  artificially  to  re- 
vivify the  dormant  powers  of  a  piece  disqualified  by  the 
same  laws;  to  debar  the  former  from  exercising  its 
legitimate  functions  and  to  permit  the  latter  to  exercise 
functions  from  which  by  law,  it  specifically  is  debarred, 
is  a  self-evident  incongruity  and  any  argument  whereby 
such  procedure  is  upheld,  necessarily  and  obviously, 
is  sophistry. 


No  less  interesting  than  instructive  and  conclusive, 
is  reference  of  this  question  to  those  intellectual  principles 
which  give  birth  to  the  game  of  Chess,  per  se,  viz. : 

As  a  primary  fundamental,  with  the  power  to  give 
check,  is  associated  concurrently  the  obligation  upon 
the  King  thus  checked,  not  to  remain  in  check. 

Secondly:  The  totality  of  powers  assigned  to  the 
Chess-pieces  is  the  ability  to  move,  provided  the  King  be 


106  GRAND    RECONNAISSANCE 

free  from  check.     This  totality  of  powers  may  be  denoted 
by  the  indefinite  symbol,  X. 

The  play  thus  has  for  its  object: 

The  reduction  to  zero  of  the  adverse  X,  by  the  opera- 
tion of  the  kindred  X. 

This  result  is  checkmate  in  its  generalized  form.  In 
effect,  it  is  the  destruction  of  the  power  of  the  adverse 
pieces  to  move,  by  means  of  check  made  permanent. 

By  the  law  of  continuity  it  is  self-evident  that : 
The  power  to  move  appertaining  either  to  White  or  to 
Black,  runs  from  full  power  to  move  any  piece  (a  power 
due  to  freedom  from  check),  down  to  total  inability  to 
move  any  piece,  due  to  his  King  being  permanently 
checked,  i.e.,  checkmated. 

This  series  cannot  be  interrupted  without  obvious 
violation  of  the  ethics  of  the  game;  because,  so  long  as 
any  part  of  X  remains,  the  principle  from  which  the 
series  emanated  still  operates,  and  this  without  regard 
to  quantity  of  X  remaining  unexpended. 

Thus,  a  game  of  Chess  is  a  procedure  from  total  ability 
to  total  disability;  i.e.,  from  one  logical  whole  to  another; 
otherwise,  from  X  to  zero. 

Checkmate,  furnishes  the  limit  to  the  series;  the  game 
and  X  vanish  together. 

This  is  in  perfect  keeping  with  the  law  of  continuity, 
which  acts  and  dominates  from  beginning  to  end  of  the 
series,  and  so  long  as  any  part  of  X  remains. 

Hence  to  permit  either  White  or  Black  to  move  any 
piece,  leaving  his  King  in  check,  is  an  anomaly. 


Denial  to  the  Pawn  of  ability  to  move  to  the  rear  is  an 
accurate  interpretation  of  military  ethics. 

Of  those  puerile  hypotheses  common  to  the  man  who 


MOBILITY  107 

does  not  know,  one  of  the  most  entrancing  to  the  popular 
mind,  is  the  notion  that  Corps  d'armee  properly  are  of 
equal  numbers  and  of  the  same  composition. 

This  supposition  is  due  to  ignorance  of  the  fact  that 
the  multifarious  duties  of  applied  Strategetics,  require 
for  their  execution  like  variety  of  instruments,  which 
diversity  of  means  is  strikingly  illustrated  by  the  differing 
movements  of  the  Chess-pieces. 

The  inability  of  the  Pawn  to  move  backward  strate- 
gically harmonizes  with  its  functions  as  a  Corps  of  Posi- 
tion, in  contradiction  to  the  movements  of  the  pieces, 
which  latter  are  Corps  of  Evolution. 

This  restriction  in  the  move  of  the  Pawn  is  in  exact 
harmony  with  the  inability  of  the  Queen  to  move  on 
obliques,  of  the  Rook  to  move  on  obliques  or  on  diag- 
onals, of  the  Bishop  to  move  on  obliques,  verticals  and 
horizontals,  of  the  Knight  to  move  on  diagonals,  verti- 
cals, and  horizontals,  and  of  the  King  to  move  like  any 
other  piece. 


Possessed  of  the  invaluable  privilege  of  making  the 
first  move  in  the  game,  knowing  that  no  move  should 
be  made  without  an  object,  understanding  that  the  true 
object  of  every  move  is  to  minimize  the  adverse  power 
for  resistance  and  comprehending  that  all  power  for 
resistance  is  derived  from  facility  of  movement,  the 
student  easily  deduces  the  true  object  of  White's  initial 
move  in  every  game  of  Chess,  viz. : 


108  GRAND    RECONNAISSANCE 

PRINCIPLE 

To  make  the  first  of  a  seizes  of  movements,  each  of  which 
shall  increase  the  mobility -of  the  kindred  pieces  and  cor- 
respondingly decrease  the  mobility  of  the  adverse  pieces. 

As  the  effect  of  such  policy,  the  power  for  resistance 
appertaining  to  Black,  ultimately  must  become  so  in- 
sufficient that  he  no  longer  will  be  able  adequately  to 
defend : 

1.  His  base  of  operations. 

2.  The  communications  of  his  army  with  its  base. 

3.  The  communications  of  his  corps  d'armee  with 
each  other,  or, 

4.  To  prevent  the  White  hypothetical  force  penetrat- 
ing to  its  Logistic  Horizon. 

To  produce  this  fatal  weakness  in  the  Black  position 
by  the  advantage  of  the  first  move  is  much  easier  for 
White  than  commonly  is  supposed. 

The  process  consists  in  making  only  those  movements 
by  means  of  which  the  kindred  corps  d'armee,  pro- 
gressively occupying  specified  objectives,  are  advanced, 
viz.: 

I.  To  the  Strategetic  Objective,  when  acting  against  the 
communications  of  the  adverse  Determinate  Force  and  its 
Base  of  Operations. 

II.  To  the  Logistic  Horizon,  when  acting  against  the 
communications  between  the  adverse  Determinate  and  the 
adverse  Hypothetical  Forces. 

III.  To  the  Strategic  Vertices,  when  acting  against  the 
communications  of  the  hostile  corps  d'armee  with  each  other. 

To  bring  about  either  of  these  results  against  an  op- 
ponent equally  equipped  and  capable,  of  course  is  a 


MOBILITY  109 

much  more  difficult  task  than  to  checkmate  an  enemy- 
incapable  of  movement. 

Yet  such  achievement  is  possible  to  White  and  with 
exact  play  it  seemingly  is  a  certainty  that  he  succeeds  in 
one  or  the  other,  owing  to  his  inestimable  privilege  of 
first  move. 

For  the  normal  advantage  that  attaches  to  the  first 
move  in  a  game  of  Chess  is  vastly  enhanced  by  a  peculi- 
arity in  the  mathematical  make-up  of  the  surface  of  the 
Chess-board,  whereby,  he  who  makes  the  first  move  may 
secure  to  himself  the  advantage  in  mobility,  and  con- 
versely may  inflict  upon  the  second  player  a  correspond- 
ing disadvantage  in  mobility. 

This  peculiar  property  emanates  from  this  fact: 

The  sixty-four  points,  i.e.,  the  sixty-four  centres  of  the 
squares  into  which  the  surface  of  the  Chess-board  is  divided, 
constitute,  when  taken  collectively,  the  quadrant  of  a  circle, 
whose  radius  is  eight  points  in  length. 

Hence,  in  Chessic  mathematics,  the  sides  of  the  Chess- 
board do  not  form  a  square,  but  the  segment  of  a  cir- 
cumference. 

To  prove  the  truth  of  this,  one  has  but  to  count  the 
points  contained  in  the  verticals  and  horizontals  and  in 
the  hypothenuse  of  each  corresponding  angle,  and  in 
every  instance  it  will  be  found  that  the  number  of  points 
contained  in  the  base,  perpendicular,  and  hypothenuse, 
is  the  same. 

For  example : 

Let  the  eight  points  of  the  King's  Rook's  file  form  the 
perpendicular  of  a  right  angle  triangle,  of  which  the 
kindred  first  horizontal  forms  the  base;  then,  the  hy- 
pothenuse of  the  given  angle,  will  be  that  diagonal  which 
extends  from  QR1  to  KR8.     Now,  merely  by  the  pro- 


110  GRAND    RECONNAISSANCE 

cesses  of  simple  arithmetic,  it  may  be  shown  that  there 
are, 

1.  Eight  points  in  the  base. 

2.  Eight  points  in  the  perpendicular. 

3.  Eight  points  in  the  hypothenuse. 
Consequently  the  three  sides  of  this  given  right  angled 

triangle  are  equal  to  each  other,  which  is  a  geometric 
impossibility. 

Therefore,  it  is  self-evident  that  there  exists  a  mathe- 
matical incongruity  in  the  surface  of  the  Chess-board. 

That  is,  what  to  the  eye  seems  a  right  angled  triangle, 
is  in  its  relations  to  the  movements  of  the  Chess-pieces, 
an  equilateral  triangle.  Hence,  the  Chess-board,  in  its 
relations  to  the  pieces  when  the  latter  are  at  rest,  properly 
may  be  regarded  as  a  great  square  sub-divided  into  sixty- 
four  smaller  squares;  but  on  the  contrary,  in  those  cal- 
culations relating  to  the  Chess-pieces  in  motion,  the 
Chess-board  must  be  regarded  as  the  quadrant  of  a  circle 
of  eight  points  radius.     The  demonstration  follows,  viz : 

Connect  by  a  straight  line  the  points  KR8  and  QR8. 
Connect  by  another  straight  line  the  points  QR8  and 
QR1.  Connect  each  of  the  fifteen  points  through  which 
these  lines  pass  with  the  point  KR1,  by  means  of  lines 
passing  through  the  least  number  of  points  intervening. 

Then  the  line  KR8  and  QR8  will  represent  the  segment 
of  a  circle  of  which  latter  the  point  KR1  is  the  center. 
The  lines  KR1-KR8  and  KR1-QR1  will  represent  the 
sides  of  a  quadrant  contained  in  the  given  circle  and 
bounded  by  the  given  segment,  and  the  lines  drawn  from 
KR1  to  the  fifteen  points  contained  in  the  given  segment 
of  the  given  circumference,  will  be  found  to  be  fifteen 
equal  radii  each  eight  points  in  length. 


Having  noted  the  form  of  the  Static  or  positional  sur- 
face of  the  Chess-board  and  its  relations  to  the  pieces  at 


MOBILITY  111 

rest,  and  having  established  the  configuration  of  the 
Dynamic  surface  upon  which  the  pieces  move,  it  is  next 
in  sequence  to  deduce  that  fundamental  fact  and  to  give 
it  that  geometric  expression  which  shall  mathematically 
harmonize  these  conflicting  geometric  figures  in  their 
relations  to  Chess-play. 

As  the  basic  fact  of  applied  Chessic  forces,  it  is  to  be 
noted,  that : 

PRINCIPLE 

The  King  is  the  SO  URCE  from  whence  the  Chess- 
pieces  derive  all  power  of  movement;  and  from  his  ability  to 
movey  emanates  ALL  power  for  attack  and  for  defence 
possessed  by  a  Chessic  army. 

This  faculty  of  mobility,  derived  from  the  existence  of 
the  kindred  King,  is  the  all  essential  element  in  Chess- 
play,  and  to  increase  the  mobility  of  the  kindred  pieces 
and  to  reduce  that  of  the  adverse  pieces  is  the  simple,  sure 
and  only  scientific  road  to  victory;  and  by  comparison 
of  the  Static  with  the  Dynamic  surface  of  the  Chess- 
board, the  desired  principle  readily  is  discovered,  viz., 

The  Static  surface  of  the  Chess-board  being  a  square, 
its  least  division  is  into  two  great  right  angled  triangles 
having  a  common  hypothenuse. 

The  Dynamic  surface  being  the  quadrant  of  a  circle, 
its  least  division  also  is  into  two  great  sections,  one  of 
which  is  a  right  angled  triangle  and  the  other  a  semi- 
circle. 

Comparing  the  two  surfaces  of  the  Chess-board  thus 
divided,  it  will  be  seen  that  these  three  great  right  angled 
triangles  are  equal,  each  containing  thirty-six  points; 
and  having  for  their  common  vertices,  the  points  KR1, 
QR1  and  R8.  j 

Furthermore,  it  will  be  seen  that  the  hypothenuse 


112  GRAND    RECONNAISSANCE 

common  to  these  triangles,  also  is  the  chord  of  that 
semi-circle  which  appertains  to  the  Dynamic  surface. 

Again,  it  will  be  perceived  that  this  semi-circle,  like 
the  three  right  angled  triangles,  is  composed  of  thirty-six 
points,  and  consequently  that  all  of  the  four  sub-divisions 
of  the  Static  and  Dynamic  surfaces  of  the  Chess-board 
are  equal. 

Thus  it  obviously  follows,  that : 

1.  The  great  central  diagonal,  always  is  one  side  of 
each  of  the  four  chief  geometric  figures  into  which  the 
Chess  board  is  divided;  that: 

2.  It  mathematically  perfects  each  of  these  figures 
and  harmonizes  each  to  all,  and  that : 

3.  By  means  of  it  each  figure  becomes  possessed  of 
eight  more  points  than  it  otherwise  would  contain. 

Hence,  the  following  is  self-evident: 


PRINCIPLE 

That  Chessic  army  which  can  possess  itself  of  the  great 
central  diagonal,  thereby  acquires  the  larger  number  of 
points  upon  which  to  act  and  consequently  greater  facilities 
for  movement;  and  conversely: 

By  the  loss  of  the  great  central  diagonal,  the  mobility  of 
the  opposing  army  is  correspondingly  decreased. 

It  therefore  is  clear  that  the  object  of  any  series  of 
movements  by  a  Chessic  army  acting  otherwise  than  on 
Line  of  Operations,  should  be : 


PRINCIPLE 

Form  the  kindred  army  upon  the  hypothenuse  of  the  right 
angled  triangle  which  is  contained  within  the  Dynamic  sur- 
face of  the  Chess-board;  and  conversely, 


MOBILITY  113 

Compel  the  adverse  army  to  act  exclusively  within  that 
semi-circle  which  appertains  to  the  same  surface. 

Under  these  circumstances,  the  kindred  corps  will  be 
possessed  of  facilities  for  movement  represented  by  thirty- 
six  squares;  while  the  logistic  area  of  the  opposing  army 
will  be  restricted  to  twenty-eight  squares. 

There  are,  of  course,  two  great  central  diagonals  of  the 
Chess-board;  but  as  the  student  is  fully  informed  that 
great  central  diagonal  always  is  to  be  selected,  which 
extends  towards  the  Objective  Plane. 


Mobility,  per  se,  increases  or  decreases  with  the  number 
of  squares  open  to  occupation. 

But  in  all  situations  there  will  be  points  of  no  value, 
while  other  points  are  of  value  inestimable;  for  the  reason 
that  the  occupation  of  the  former  will  not  favorably  affect 
the  play,  or  may  even  lose  the  game;  while  by  the  occu- 
pation of  the  latter,  victory  is  at  once  secured. 

But  it  is  not  the  province  of  Mobility  to  pass  on  the 
values  of  points;  this  latter  is  the  duty  of  Strategy.  It  is 
sufficient  for  Mobility  that  it  provide  superior  facilities 
for  movement;  it  is  for  Strategy  to  define  the  Line  of 
Movement;  for  Logistics,  by  means  of  this  Line  of 
Movement,  to  bring  into  action  in  proper  times  and 
sequence,  the  required  force,  and  for  Tactics,  with  this 
force,  to  execute  the  proper  evolutions. 

Mobility  derives  its  importance  from  three  things 
which  may  occur  severally  or  in  combination,  viz. : 

1.  All  power  for  offense  or  for  defense  is  eliminated 
from  a  Chess-piece  the  instant  it  loses  its  ability  to  move. 

2.  The  superiority  possessed  by  corps  acting  offen- 
sively over  adverse  corps  acting  defensively,  resides  in 
that  the  attack  of  a  piece  is  valid  at  every  point  which  it 


114  GRAND    RECONNAISSANCE 

menaces;  while  the  defensive  effort  of  a  piece,  as  a  rule, 
is  valid  only  at  a  single  point.     Consequently : 

PRINCIPLE 

Increased  facilities  for  movement  enhance  the  power  of 
attacking  pieces  in  a  much  greater  degree  than  like  facilities 
enhance  the  power  of  defending  pieces. 

Such  increasing  facilities  for  movement  ultimately 
render  an  attacking  force  irresistible,  for  the  reason  that 
it  finally  becomes  a  physical  impossibility  for  the  oppos- 
ing equal  force  to  provide  valid  defences  for  the  numerous 
tactical  keys,  which  at  a  given  time  become  simul- 
taneously assailed.     Hence: 

PRINCIPLE 

Superior  facilities  for  occuping  any  point  at  any  time 
and  with  any  force,  always  ensure  the  superior  force  at  a 
given  point,  at  a  given  time. 

The  relative  advantage  in  mobility  possessed  by  one 
army  over  an  opposing  army  always  can  be  determined 
by  the  following,  viz : 

RULE 

1.  That  army  whose  strategic  front  of  operations  is 
established  upon  the  Strategetic  Center  has  the  relative 
advantage  in  Mobility. 

2.  To  utilize  the  advantage  in  Mobility  extend  the 
Strategic  Front  in  the  direction  of  the  objective  plane. 

3.  To  neutralize  the  relative  disadvantage  in  Mobility 
eliminate  that  adverse  Corps  d'armee  which  tactically 
expresses  such  adverse  advantage;  or  so  post  the  Prime 
Strategetic  Point  as  to  vitiate  the  adverse  Strategic  front. 


MOBILITY  115 

Advantage  in  Mobility  is  divided  into  two  classes,  viz : 

I.  General  Advantage  in  Mobility. 

II.  Special  Advantage  in  Mobility. 

A  General  Advantage  in  Mobility  consists  in  the 
ability  to  act  simultaneously  against  two  or  more  vital 
points  by  means  of  interior  logistic  radii  due  to  position 
between : — 

1.  The  adverse  army  and  its  Base  of  Operations. 

2.  Two  or  more  adverse  Grand  Columns. 

3.  The  wings  of  a  hostile  Grand  Column. 

4.  Two  or  more  isolated  adverse  Corps  d'armee. 

Such  position  upon  interior  lines  of  movement  is 
secured  by  occupying  either  of  the  Prime  Offensive  Ori- 
gins, i.e. : 

1.  Strategic  Center  vs.  Adverse  Formation  in  Mass. 

2.  Logistic  Center  vs.  Adverse  Formation  by  Grand 

Columns. 

3.  Tactical  Center  vs.  Adverse  Formation  by  Wings. 

4.  Logistic  Triune  vs.  Adverse  Formation  by  Corps. 

Special  Advantage  in  Mobility  consists  in  the  ability 
of  a  corps  d'armee  to  traverse  greater  or  equal  distances 
in  lesser  times  than  opposing  corps. 


116  GRAND     RECONNAISSANCE 


MILITARY  EXAMPLES 

"Never  interrupt  your  enemy  when  he  is  making  a 
false  movement."  Napoleon. 

In  the  year  (366  B.C.)  the  King  of  Sparta,  with  an 
army  of  30,000  men  marched  to  the  aid  of  the  Mantineans 
against  Thebes.  Epaminondas  took  up  a  post  with  his 
army  from  whence  he  equally  threatened  Mantinea  and 
Sparta.  Agesilaus  incautiously  moved  too  far  towards 
the  coast,  whereupon  Epaminondas,  with  70,000  men 
precipitated  himself  upon  Lacedaemonia,  laying  waste 
the  country  with  fire  and  sword,  all  but  taking  by  storm 
the  city  of  Sparta  and  showing  the  women  of  Lacedae- 
monia the  campfire  of  an  enemy  for  the  first  time  in  six 
hundred  years. 


Flaminius  advancing  incautiously  to  oppose  Hannibal, 
the  latter  took  up  a  post  with  his  army  from  whence  he 
equally  threatened  the  city  of  Rome  and  the  army  of  the 
Consul.  In  the  endeavor  to  rectify  his  error,  the  Roman 
general  committed  a  worse  and  was  destroyed  with  his 
entire  army. 


At  Thapsus,  April  6,  46  B.C.,  Caesar  took  up  a  post 
with  his  army  from  whence  he  equally  threatened  the 
Roman  army  under  Scipio  and  the  African  army  under 
Juba.  Scipio  having  marced  off  with  his  troops  to  a 
better  camp  some  miles  distant,  Caesar  attacked  and 
annihilated  Juba's  army. 


At    Pirna,  Frederic  the    Great,  captured  the  Saxon 
army  entire,  and  at  Rossbach,  Leuthern  and  Zorndorf 


MOBILITY  117 

destroyed  successively  a  French,  an  Austrian  and  a 
Russian  army  merely  by  occupying  a  post  from  whence 
he  equally  threatened  two  or  more  vital  points,  awaiting 
the  time  when  one  would  become  inadequately  de- 
fended. 


Washington  won  the  Revolutionary  War  merely  by 
occupying  a  post  from  whence  he  equally  threatened  the 
British  armies  at  New  York  and  Philadelphia;  refusing 
battle  and  building  up  an  army  of  Continental  regular 
troops  enlisted  for  the  war  and  trained  by  the  Baron  von 
Steuben  in  the  system  of  Frederic  the  Great. 


Bonaparte  won  at  Montenotte,  Castiglione,  Areola, 
Rivoli  and  Austerlitz  his  most  perfect  exhibitions  of 
generalship,  merely  by  passively  threatening  two  vital 
points  and  in  his  own  words:  "By  never  interrupting  an 
enemy  when  he  is  making  a  false  movement." 


Perfection  in  Mobility  is  attained  whenever  the 
kindred  army  is  able  to  act  unrestrainedly  in  any  and 
all  directions,  while  the  movements  of  the  hostile  army 
are  restricted. 


NUMBERS 


"In  warfare  the  advantage  in  numbers  never  is  to  be 
despised."  Von  Moltke. 


"Arguments  avail  but  little  against  him  whose  opinion  is 
voiced  by  thirty  legions." 

Roman  Proverb. 


"That  king  who  has  the  most  iron  is  master  of  those  who 
merely  have  the  more  gold." 

Solon. 


It  never  troubles  the  wolf  how  many  sheep  there  are." 

Agesilaus. 


NUMBERS 


"A  handful  of  troops  inured  to  Warfare  proceed  to 
certain  victory;  while  on  the  contrary ,  numerous  hordes  of 
raw  and  undisciplined  men  are  but  a  multitude  of  victims 
dragged  to  slaughter." 

Vegetius. 


uTurenne  always  was  victorious  with  armies  infinitely 
inferior  in  numbers  to  those  of  his  enemies;  because  he 
moved  with  expedition,  knew  how  to  secure  himself  from 
being  attacked  in  every  situation  and  always  kept  near  his 
enemy."  Count  de  Saxe. 


"Numbers  are  of  no  significance  when  troops  are  once 
thrown  into  confusion." 

Prince  Eugene. 


Humanity  is  divisible  into  two  groups,  one  of  which 
relatively  is  small  and  the  other,  by  comparison,  very 
large. 

The  first  of  these  groups  is  made  up  comparatively  of 
but  a  few  persons,  who,  by  virtue  of  circumstances  are 
possessed  of  everything  except  adequate  physical 
strength;  and  the  second  group  consists  of  those  vast 
multitudes  of  mankind,  which  are  destitute  of  everything 


124  GRAND    RECONNAISSANCE 

except  of  incalcuable  prowess,  due  to  their  overwhelming 
numbers. 

Hence,  at  every  moment  of  its  existence,  organized 
Society  is  face  to  face  with. the  possibility  of  collision  into 
the  Under  World;  and  because  of  the  knowledge  that 
such  encounter  is  inevitable,  unforeseeable  and  perhaps 
immediately  impending,  Civilization,  so-called,  ever  is 
beset  by  an  unspeakable  and  all-corroding  fear. 

To  deter  a  multitude,  destitute  of  everything  except  the 
power  to  take,  from  despoiling  by  means  of  its  irresistible 
physique,  those  few  who  are  possessed  of  everything  except 
ability  to  defend  themselves,  in  all  Ages  has  been  the 
chief  est  problem  of  mankind;  and  to  the  solution  of  this 
problem  has  been  devoted  every  resource  known  to  Edu- 
cation, Legislation,  Ecclesiasticism  and  Jurisprudence. 

This  condition  further  is  complicated  by  a  peculiar 
outgrowth  of  necessary  expedients,  always  more  or  less 
unstable,  due  to  that  falsity  of  premise  in  which  words 
do  not  agree  with  acts. 

Of  these  expedients  the  most  incongruous  is  the  arming 
and  training  of  the  children  of  the  mob  for  the  protection 
of  the  upper  stratum;  and  that  peculiar  mental  insuf- 
ficiency of  hoi  poloi,  whereby  it  ever  is  induced  to  accept 
as  its  leaders  the  sons  of  the  Patrician  class. 

That  a  social  structure  founded  upon  such  anomalies 
should  endure,  constitutes  in  itself  the  real  Nine  Wonders 
of  the  World;  and  is  proof  of  that  marvellous  ingenuity 
with  which  the  House  of  Have  profits  by  the  chronic 
predeliction  of  the  House  of  Want  to  fritter  away  time 
and  opportunity,  feeding  on  vain  hope. 


The  advantage  in   Numbers  consists  in  having  in  the 
aggregate  more  Corps  d'armee  than  has  the  adversary. 


NUMBERS  125 

All  benefit  to  be  derived  from  the  advantage  in  Num- 
bers is  limited  to  the  active  and  scientific  use  of  every 
corp  d'armee;  otherwise  excess  of  Numbers,  not  only 
is  of  no  avail,  but  easily  may  degenerate  into  fatal  dis- 
advantage by  impeding  the  decisive  action  of  other 
kindred  corps.  Says  Napoleon:  "It  is  only  the  troops 
brought  into  action,  that  avails  in  battles  and  campaigns 
— the  rest  does  not  count." 

A  loss  in  Numbers  at  chess-play  occurs  only  when  two 
pieces  are  lost  for  one,  or  three  for  two,  or  one  for  none, 
and  the  like.  No  diminution  in  aggregate  of  force  can 
take  place  on  the  Chess-board,  so  long  as  the  number  of 
the  opposing  pieces  are  equal. 

This  is  true  although  all  the  pieces  on  one  side  are 
Queens  and  those  of  the  other  side  all  Pawns. 

The  reason  for  this  is : 

All  the  Chess-pieces  are  equal  in  strength,  one  to  the 
other.  The  Pawn  can  overthrow  and  capture  any  piece 
— the  Queen  can  do  no  more. 

That  is  to  say,  at  its  turn  to  move,  any  piece  can  cap- 
ture any  adverse  piece;  and  this  is  all  that  any  piece  can 
do. 

It  is  true  that  the  Queen,  on  its  turn  to  move,  has  a 
maximum  option  of  twenty-seven  squares,  while  the 
Pawn's  maximum  never  is  more  than  three.  But  as  the 
power  of  the  Queen  can  be  exerted  only  upon  one  point, 
obviously,  her  observation  of  the  remaining  twenty-six 
points  is  merely  a  manifestation  of  mobility,  and  her 
display  of  force  is  limited  to  a  single  square.  Hence,  the 
result  in  each  case  is  identical,  and  the  display  of  force 
equal. 

The  relative  advantage  in  Numbers  possessed  by  one 
army  over  an  opposing  army  always  can  be  determined 
by  the  following,  viz : 


126  GRAND    RECONNAISSANCE 

RULE 

That  army  which  contains  more  Corps  d'armee  than  an 
opposing  army  has  the  relative  advantage  in  Numbers. 


"With  the  inferiority  in   Numbers,  one  must  depend 
more  upon  conduct  and  contrivance  than  upon  strength" 

Caesar. 


NUMBERS  127 


MILITARY   EXAMPLES 

"He  who  has  the  advantage  in  Numbers,  if  he  be  not  a 
blockhead,  incessantly  will  distract  his  enemy  by  detach- 
ments, against  all  of  which  it  is  impossible  to  provide  a 
remedy." 

Frederic  the  Great. 

"  He  that  hath  the  advantage  in  Numbers  usually  should 
exchange  pieces  freely,  because  the  fewer  that  remain  the 
more  readily  are  they  oppressed  by  a  superior  force." 

Dal  Rio. 


At  Thymbra,  Cyrus  the  Great,  king  of  the  Medes  and 
Persians,  with  10,000  horse  cuirassiers,  20,000  heavy 
infantry,  300  chariots  and  166,000  light  troops,  con- 
quered Croesus,  King  of  Assyria  whose  army  consisted 
of  360,000  infantry  and  60,000  cavalry.  This  victory 
made  Persia  dominant  in  Asia. 


At  Marathon,  10,000  Athenian  and  1,000  Plataean 
heavy  infantry,  routed  110,000  Medes  and  Persians. 
This  victory  averted  the  overthrow  of  Grecian  civiliza- 
tion by  Asiatic  barbarism. 


At  Leuctra,  Epaminondas,  general  of  the  Thebans, 
with  6000  heavy  infantry  and  400  heavy  horse,  routed 
the  Lacedaemonean  army,  composed  of  22,000  of  the 
bravest  and  most  skillful  soldiers  of  the  known  world, 
and  extinguished  the  military  ascendency  which  for 
centuries  Sparta  had  exercised  over  the  Grecian  common- 
wealths. 


128  GRAND    RECONNAISSANCE 

At  Issus,  Alexander  the  Great  with  40,000  heavy  in- 
fantry and  7,000  heavy  cavalry  destroyed  the  army  of 
Darius  Codomannus,  King  of  Persia,  which  consisted  of 
1,000,000  infantry,  40,000  cavalry,  200  chariots  and  15 
elephants.  This  battle,  in  which  white  men  encountered 
elephants  for  the  first  time,  established  the  military 
supremacy  of  Europe  over  Asia. 


Alexander  the  Great  invaded  Asia  (May,  334  B.C.) 
whose  armies  aggregated  3,000,000  men  trained  to  war; 
with  30,000  heavy  infantry,  4000  heavy  cavalry,  $225,000 
dollars  in  money  and  thirty  days'  provisions. 

At  Arbela,  Alexander  the  Great  with  45,000  heavy 
infantry  and  8,000  heavy  horse,  annihilated  the  last 
resources  of  Darius  and  reduced  Persia  to  a  Greek 
province.  The  Persian  army  consisted  of  about  600,000 
infantry  and  cavalry,  of  whom  300,000  were  killed. 


Hannibal  began  his  march  from  Spain  (218  B.C.)  to 
invade  the  Roman  commonwealth,  with  90,000  heavy 
infantry  and  12,000  heavy  cavalry.  He  arrived  at 
Aosta  in  October  (218  B.C.)  with  only  20,000  infantry 
and  6,000  cavalry  to  encounter  a  State  that  could  put 
into  the  field  700,000  of  the  bravest  and  most  skillful 
soldiers  then  alive. 


At  Cannae,  Hannibal  destroyed  the  finest  army  Rome 
ever  put  in  the  field.  Out  of  90,000  of  the  flower  of  the 
commonwealth  only  about  3,000  escaped.  The  Car- 
thagenian  army  consisted  of  40,000  heavy  infantry  and 
10,000  heavy  cavalry. 


At  Alesia,  (51  B.C)  Caesar  completed  the  subjugation 
of  Gaul,  by  destroying  in  detail  two  hostile  armies  ag- 


NUMBERS  129 

gregating  470,000  men.  The  Roman  army  consisted 
of  43,000  heavy  infantry,  10,000  heavy  cavalry  and 
10,000  light  cavalry. 


At  Pharsaleus,  (48  B.C.)  Caesar  with  22,000  Roman 
veterans  routed  45,000  soldiers  under  Pompey  and  ac- 
quired the  chief  place  in  the  Roman  state. 


At  Angora,  (1,402)  Tamerlane,  with  1,400,000  Asiatics, 
destroyed  the  Turkish  army  of  900,000  men,  commanded 
by  the  Ottoman  Sultan  Bajazet,  in  the  most  stupendous 
battle  of  authentic  record. 

After  giving  his  final  instructions  to  his  officers,  Tamer- 
lane, it  is  recorded,  betook  himself  to  his  tent  and  played 
at  Chess  until  the  crisis  of  the  battle  arrived,  whereupon 
he  proceeded  to  the  decisive  point  and  in  person  directed 
those  evolutions  which  resulted  in  the  destruction  of  the 
Ottoman  army. 

The  assumption  that  the  great  Asiatic  warrior  was 
playing  at  Chess  during  the  earlier  part  of  the  battle  of 
Angora,  undoubtedly  is  erroneous.  Most  probably  he 
followed  the  progress  of  the  conflict  by  posting  chess- 
pieces  upon  the  Chessboard  and  moving  these  according 
to  reports  sent  him  momentarily  by  his  lieutenants. 

Obviously,  in  the  days  when  the  field  telegraphy  and 
telephone  were  unknown,  such  method  was  entirely 
feasible  and  satisfactory  to  the  Master  of  Strategetics  and 
far  superior  to  any  attempt  to  overlook  such  a  confused 
and  complicated  concourse. 


At  Bannockburne  (June  24,  1314),  Robert  Bruce, 
King  of  Scotland,  with  30,000  Scots  annihilated  the 
largest  army  that  England  ever  put  upon  a  battlefield. 


130  GRAND    RECONNAISSANCE 

This  army  was  led  by  Edward  II  and  consisted  of  over 
100,000  of  the  flower  of  England's  nobility,  gentry  and 
yeomanry.  The  victory  established  the  independence 
of  Scotland  and  cost  England  30,000  troops,  which 
could  not  be  replaced  in  that  generation. 


Gustavus  Adolphus  invaded  Germany  with  an  army 
of  27,000  men,  over  one-half  of  whom  were  Scots  and 
English.  At  that  time  the  Catholic  armies  in  the 
field  aggregated  several  hundred  thousand  trained  and 
hardened  soldiers,  led  by  brave  and  able  generals. 

At  Leipsic,  after  20,000  Saxon  allies  had  fled  from  the 
battlefield,  Gustavus  Adolphus  with  22,000  Swedes, 
Scots  and  English  routed  44,000  of  the  best  troops  of 
the  day,  commanded  by  Gen.  Tilly.  This  victory 
delivered  the  Protestant  princes  of  Continental  Europe 
from  Catholic  domination. 


At  Zentha  (Sept.  11,  1697),  Prince  Eugene  with  60,000 
Austrians  routed  150,000  Turks,  commanded  by  the 
Sultan  Kara-Mustapha,  with  the  loss  of  38,000  killed, 
4,000  prisoners  and  160  cannon.  This  victory  estab- 
lished the  military  reputation  of  this  celebrated  French 
General. 


At  Turin  (Sept.  7,  1706)  Prince  Eugene  with  30,000 
Austrians  routed  80,000  French  under  the  Duke  of 
Orleans.  Gen.  Daun,  whose  brilliant  evolutions  de- 
cided the  battle,  afterward,  as  Field-Marshal  of  the 
Austrian  armies,  was  routed  by  Frederic  the  Great  at 
Leuthern. 


At  Peterwaradin  (Aug.  5,  1716)  Prince  Eugene  with 
60,000  Austrians  destroyed  150,000  Turks.     This  victory 


NUMBERS  131 

delivered  Europe  for  all  time  from  the  menace  of  Ma- 
hometan dominion. 


At  Belgrade  (Aug.  26,  1717)  Prince  Eugene  with  55,000 
Austrians  destroyed  a  Turkish  army  of  200,000  men. 


At  Rosbach  (Nov.  5,  1757)  Frederic  the  Great  with 
22,000  Prussians,  in  open  field,  destroyed  a  French  army 
of  70,000  regulars  commanded  by  the  Prince  de  Soubisse. 


At  Leuthern  (Dec.  5,  1757)  Frederic  the  Great  with 
33,000  Prussians  destroyed  in  open  field,  an  Austrian 
army  of  93,000  regulars,  commanded  by  Field-Marshal 
Daun.     The  Austrians  lost  54,000  men  and  200  cannon. 


At  Zorndorf  (Aug.  25,  1758)  Frederic  the  Great  with 
45,000  Prussians  destroyed  a  Russian  army  of  60,000 
men  commanded  by  Field-Marshal  Fermor.  The  Rus- 
sians left  18,000  men  dead  on  the  field. 


At  Leignitz  (Aug.  15,  1760)  Frederic  the  Great  with 
30,000  men  out-manoeuvred,  defeated  with  the  loss  of 
10,000  men  and  escaped  from  the  combined  Austrian 
and  Russian  armies  aggregating  130,000  men. 


At  Torgau  (Nov.  5,  1760)  Frederic  the  Great  with 
45,000  Prussians  destroyed  an  Austrian  army  of  90,000 
men,  commanded  by  Field-Marshal  Daun. 


Washington,  with  7,000  Americans,  while  pursued  by 
20,000   British   and   Hessians   under   Lord  Cornwallis, 


132  GRAND    RECONNAISSANCE 

captured  a  Hessian  advance  column  at  Trenton 
(Dec.  25,  1776)  and  destroyed  a  British  detachment 
at  Princeton,  (Jan.  3,  1777). 


Bonaparte,  with  30,000  infantry,  3,000  cavalry  and  40 
cannon,  invaded  Italy,  (March  26,  1796)  which  was 
defended  by  100,000  Piedmontese  and  Austrian  regulars 
under  Generals  Colli  and  Beaulieu.  In  fifteen  days  he 
had  captured  the  former,  driven  the  latter  to  his  own 
country  and  compelled  Piedmont  to  sign  a  treaty  of 
peace  and  alliance  with  France. 

At  Castiglione,  Arcole,  Bassano  and  Rivoli,  with  an 
army  not  exceeding  40,000  men  Bonaparte  destroyed 
four  Austrian  armies,  each  aggregating  about  100,000 
men. 


At  Wagram,  Napoleon,  with  less  than  100,000  men, 
overthrew  the  main  Austrian  army  of  150,000  men, 
foiled  the  attempts  at  succor  of  the  secondary  Austrian 
army  of  40,000  men,  and  compelled  Austria  to  accept 
peace  with  France. 

In  the  campaign  of  1814,  Napoleon,  with  never  more 
than  70,000  men,  twice  repulsed  from  the  walls  of  Paris 
and  drove  backward  nearly  to  the  Rhine  River  an  allied 
army  of  nearly  300,000  Austrians,  Prussians  and  Rus- 
sians. 


In  the  year  480  B.C.,  Xerxes,  King  or  Persia,  invaded 
Greece  with  an  army,  which  by  Herodotus,  Plutarch  and 
Isocrates,  is  estimated  at  2,641,610  men  at  arms  and 
exclusive  of  servants,  butlers,  women  and  camp  followers. 

Arriving  at  the  Pass  of  Thermopolae,  the  march  of  the 
invaders  was  arrested  by  Leonidas,  King  of  Sparta, 
with  an  army  made  up  of  300  Spartans,  400  Thebans, 


NUMBERS  133 

700  Thespians,  1,000  Phocians  and  3,000  from  various 
Grecian  States,  posted  behind  a  barricade  built  across 
the  entrance. 

This  celebrated  defile  is  about  a  mile  in  length.  It 
runs  between  Mount  Oeta  and  an  impassible  morass, 
which  forms  the  edge  of  the  Gulf  of  Malia  and  at  each 
end  is  so  narrow  that  a  wagon  can  barely  pass. 

Xerxes  at  once  sent  a  herald  who  demanded  of  the 
Grecians  the  surrender  of  their  arms,  to  which  Leonidas 
replied : 

"Come  and  take  them.11 

On  the  fifth  day  the  Persian  army  attacked,  but  was 
unable  to  force  an  entrance  into  the  pass.  On  the  sixth 
day  the  Persian  Immortals  likewise  were  replused,  and  on 
the  seventh  day  these  troops  again  failed. 

That  night  Ephialtes,  a  Malian,  informed  Xerxes  of  a 
foot  path  around  the  mountains  to  the  westward,  and  a 
Persian  detachment  was  sent  by  a  night  march  en 
surprise  against  the  Grecian  rear.  On  the  approach  of 
this  hostile  body,  the  Phocians,  who  had  been  detailed 
by  Leonidas  to  guard  this  path,  abandoned  their  post 
without  fighting  and  fled  to  the  summit  of  the  mountains, 
leaving  the  way  open  to  the  enemy,  who,  wasting  no 
time  in  pursuit,  at  once  marched  against  the  rear  of  the 
Grecian  position. 

At  the  command  of  Leonidas,  all  his  allies,  with  the 
exception  of  the  700  Thespians,  who  refused  to  leave 
him,  abandoned  Thermopolae  in  haste  and  returned 
safely  to  their  own  countries. 

Xerxes  waited  until  day  was  well  advanced  and  his 
detachment  had  taken  post  upon  the  Grecian  rear. 
Then  both  Persian  columns  attacked  simultaneously. 
The  first  part  of  this  final  conflict  was  fought  outside 
and  to  the    north  of  the  barricade.     Leonidas   bebg 


134  GRAND    RECONNAISSANCE 

slain  and  their  numbers  reduced  over  half,  the  remaining 
Greeks  retired  behind  the  barricade  and  took  post  upon 
a  slight  elevation,  where  one  after  another  they  were 
killed  by  arrows  and  javelins.  The  four  days  of  fighting 
cost  the  Persians  over  20,000  of  their  best  troops. 

Upon  the  summit  of  the  hill  where  the  Spartans  per- 
ished a  marble  lion  was  erected,  bearing  the  inscription: 

"Go  tell  the  Lacedymonians,  O,  Stranger, 
That  we  died  here  in  obedience  to  the  law." 

A  second  inscription  engraved  upon  a  stone  column 
erected  upon  the  scene  of  conflict  read: 

"Upon  this  spot  four  thousand  Pelleponesians  con- 
tended against  three  hundred  myriads." 


The  largest  army  commanded  by  Epaminondas  was 
about  70,000  men.  Alexander  the  Great,  after  Arbela, 
had  135,000  trained  troops.  Hannibal  never  led  more 
than  60,000  men  in  action,  nor  Caesar  more  than  80,000. 
Gustavus  Adolphus,  just  before  Lutzen,  marshalled 
75,000  of  the  best  soldiers  in  the  world  under  the  banners 
of  Protestantism.  Turenne  never  fought  with  more 
than  40,000  troops;  Prince  Eugene  often  had  150,000 
in  hand,  and  Frederic  the  Great  several  times  commanded 
200,000  men.  At  Yorktown,  Washington  had  16,000 
Continentals,  6,000  French  regulars  and  18,000  Pro- 
vincial volunteers:  Napoleon's  largest  army,  that  of  the 
Austerlitz  campaign,  consisted  of  180,000  men,  while 
von  Moltke  personally  directed  at  Sadowa,  250,000  men; 
at  Gravelotte,  211,000  men  and  at  Sedan,  200,000  men. 


Perfection  in  Numbers  is  attained  whenever  the  kindred 
army  has  the  most  troops  in  the  theatre  of  decisive  action. 


TIME 


"  You  lose  the  time  for  action  in  frivolous  deliberations. 
Your  generals  instead  of  appearing  at  the  head  of  your 
armies,  parade  in  processions  and  add  splendor  to  public 
ceremonies.  Your  armies  are  composed  of  mercenaries, 
the  dregs  of  foreign  nations,  vile  robbers,  a  terror  only  to 
yourselves  and  your  allies.  Indecision  and  confusion  pre- 
vail in  your  counsels;  your  projects  have  neither  plan  nor 
foresight.  You  are  the  slaves  of  circumstance  and  oppor- 
tunities continually  escape  you.  You  hurry  aimlessly 
hither  and  thither  and  arrive  only  in  time  to  witness  the 
success  of  your  enemy. ,y 

Demosthenes. 


TIME 


"That  greatest  of  all  advantages — TIME!" 

Frederic  the  Great. 

"Ask  me  for  anything  except  — TIME." 

Napoleon. 

"Time  is  the  cradle  of  hope,  the  grave  of  ambition,  the 
solitary  counsel  of  the  wise  and  the  stern  corrector  of  fools. 
Wisdom  walks  before  it,  opportunities  with  it  and  repent- 
ance behind  it.  He  that  hath  made  it  his  friend  hath 
nothing  to  fear  from  his  enemies,  but  he  that  hath  made  it 
his  enemy  hath  little  to  hope  even  from  his  friends." 

Anon. 


The  absolute  advantage  of  Time  consists  in  being  able  to 
move  while  the  adversary  must  remain  stationary. 

The  conditioned  advantage  in  Time  i.e.,  the  Initiative, 
consists  in  artifically  restricting  the  adverse  ability  to  move. 

Advantage  in  Time  is  divided  into  two  classes : 

I.      The  Initiative. 

II.     Absolute. 

The  Initiative  treats  of  restrictions  to  the  movements 
of  an  army,  due  to  the  necessity  of  supporting,  covering 
or  sustaining  Points  or  corps  d'armee,  menaced  with 
capture  by  adverse  corps  offensive. 


140  GRAND    RECONNAISSANCE 

The  absolute  advantage  in  Time  is  the  ability  to  move, 
while  the  adverse  army  must  remain  immovable. 

Whenever  the  right  to  move  is  unrestricted,  any  de- 
sired Piece  may  be  moved  to  any  desired  Point. 

But  whenever  the  right  to  move  is  restricted  it  follows 
that  the  Piece  desired  cannot  be  moved;  or,  that  if 
moved  it  cannot  be  moved  to  the  desired  Point;  or,  that  a 
piece  not  desired,  must  be  moved  and  usually  to  a  Point 
not  desired. 

Such  restrictions  of  the  right  to  move,  quickly  pro- 
duce fatal  defects  in  the  kindred  Formation;  and  from 
the  fact  that  such  fatal  defects  in  Formation  can  be  pro- 
duced by  restricting  the  right  to  move,  arises  the  in- 
estimable value  of  the  advantage  in  Time. 

Perfection  in  Time  is  attained  whenever  the  kindred 
army  is  able  to  move  while  the  hostile  army  must  remain 
stationary. 

The  object  of  the  active  or  absolute  advantage  in 
Time  always  is  to  remain  with  the  Initiative,  or  Passive 
Advantage  in  Time;  which  consists  in  operating  by  the 
movement  made,  such  menaces,  as  compel  the  enemy: 

1.  To  move  corps  d'armee  which  he  otherwise  would 
not  move  and 

2.  Prevents  him  from  moving  corps  d'armee  which 
he  otherwise  would  move. 

PRINCIPLE 

Given  superior  brute  strength  and  no  matter  how  blunder- 
ingly and  clumsily  it  be  directed,  it  always  will  end  by 
accomplishing  its  purpose,  unless  it  is  opposed  by  Skill. 

Skill  is  best  manifested  by  the  proper  use  of  Time. 
Such  ability  is  acquired  only  through  study  and  ex- 
perience, guided  by  reflection,  and  it  can  be  retained  only 
by  systematic  and  unremitting  practice. 


TIME  141 

Most  people  imagine  that  Skill  is  to  be  attained  merely 
from  study ;  many  believe  it  but  the  natural  and  necessary 
offshoot  of  long  experience;  and  there  are  some  of  the 
opinion  that  dilettante  dabbling  in  book  lore  is  an  all- 
sufficient  substitute  for  that  sustained  and  laborious 
mental  and  physical  effort,  which  alone  can  make  perfect 
in  the  competitive  arts. 

Only  by  employing  his  leisure  in  reflection  upon  the 
events  of  the  Past  can  one  get  to  understand  those 
things  which  make  for  success  in  Warfare  and  in  Chess- 
play,  and  develop  that  all-essential  ability  to  detect 
equivalents  in  any  situation. 

For  in  action  there  is  no  time  for  such  reflection,  much 
less  for  development. 

Then,  moments  of  value  inestimable  for  the  achieving 
of  results  are  not  to  be  wasted  in  the  weighing  and  com- 
parison of  things,  whose  relative  importance  should  be 
discerned  in  the  twinkling  of  an  eye,  by  reason  of  prior 
familiarity  with  similar  conditions. 

The  relative  advantage  in  time  possessed  by  one  army 
over  an  opposing  army  always  can  be  determined  by  the 
following,  viz : 

RULE 

1.  That  army  which  is  in  motion  while  the  opposing 
army  must  remain  stationary  has  the  absolute  advantage  in 
Time. 

2.  That  army  which  although  at  rest  can  dictate  the 
movement  of  an  opposing  army  in  motion  has  the  conditioned 
advantage  in  Time,  i.  e.}  the  Initiative. 


"One  may  lose  more  by  letting  slip  a  decisive  opportunity 
than  afterwards  can  be  gained  by  ten  battles.1* 

Gustavus  Adolphus. 

"It  is  the  exact  moment  that  must  be  seized;  one  minute 
too  soon  or  too  late  and  the  movement  is  utterly  futile  " 

Napoleon. 


142  GRAND    RECONNAISSANCE 


MILITARY  EXAMPLES 

"The  movements  of  an  army  should  be  characterized  by 
decision  and  rapidity." 

Hannibal. 

"In  order  to  escape  from  a  dilemma  it  first  of  all  is  neces- 
sary to  gain  Time. 

Napoleon. 

Thebes  having  revolted,  Alexander  the  Great  marched 
400  miles  in  fourteen  days;  attacked  and  captured  the 
city  and  razed  it  to  the  ground  (335  B.C.)  sparing  only 
the  house  and  family  of  Pindar,  the  poet;  massacred  all 
males  capable  of  bearing  arms  and  sold  30,000  women  and 
children  into  slavery. 


To  gain  time  to  occupy  the  Strategic  center  and  to 
cut  the  communications  with  Rome  of  the  army  of  the 
Consul  Flaminius,  Hannibal  marched  his  army  for  three 
days  and  nights  through  the  marshes  of  the  Po. 


Caesar   marched   from   Rome   to   Sierra-Modena   in 
Spain,  a  distance  of  1350  miles  in  twenty-three  days. 


Frederic    the  Great  in  order   to   gain   time   usually 
marched  at  midnight. 


Bonaparte  finished  his  first  Italian  campaign  by  win- 
ing the  battles  of  St.  Michaels,  Rivoli  and  Mantua, 
marching  200  miles  and  taking  20,000  prisoners,  all  in 


TIME  143 

less  than  four  days.  In  1805,  the  French  infantry  in  the 
manoeuvres  which  captured  60,000  Austrians,  marched 
from  25  to  30  miles  a  day.  In  1806  the  French  infantry 
pursued  the  Prussians  at  the  same  speed.  In  1814, 
Napoleon's  army  marched  at  the  rate  of  30  miles  per  day, 
besides  fighting  a  battle  every  24  hours.  Retrograding 
for  the  succor  of  Paris,  Napoleon  marched  75  miles  in 
thirty-six  hours.  On  the  return  from  Elba,  1815,  the 
Imperial  Guard  marched  50  miles  the  first  day,  200  miles 
in  six  days  and  reached  Paris,  a  distance  of  600  miles,  in 
twenty  days. 


"The  fate  of  a  battle  always  is  decided  by  the  lack  of  the 
few  minutes  required  to  bring  separated  bodies  of  troops  into 
co-operation." 

Napoleon. 


POSITION 


POSITION 

"War  is  a  business  of  position" 


Napoleon. 


By  the  term  Position  is  signified  those  relative  ad- 
vantages and  disadvantages  in  location,  which  appertain 
to  the  aggregate  posts  occupied  by  the  kindred  army,  as 
compared  with  the  aggregate  posts  occupied  by  the  ad- 
verse army. 

Advantages  and  disadvantages  in  Position  are  of  three 
classes,  viz.: 

(a)  Those  which  appertain  to  the  Column  of  Attack 

(b)  Those  which  appertain  to  the  Column  of  Support. 

(c)  Those  which  appertain  to  the  Column  of  Ma- 
noeuvre. 

STRATEGETIC  SITUATIONS 

A  Strategic  Situation,  and  whether  in  warfare  or  in 
Chess-play,  is  produced  by  the  presence,  in  any  Strate- 
getic  Plane,  i.e.,  theatre  of  conflict,  of  two  or  more  oppos- 
ing Strategetic  Entireties,  i.e.,  contending  armies. 

These  latter  are  of  four  classifications  and  are  denom- 
inated as  follows: 

(a)  The  Kindred  Determinate  Force. 

(b)  The  Adverse  Determinate  Force. 


148  GRAND    RECONNAISSANCE 

(c)  The  Kindred  Hypothetical  Force. 

(d)  The  Adverse  Hypothetical  Force. 


RULE  I 

Given  the  Strategetic  Entireties  present  in  a  given  Strate- 
getic  Situation,  designate  the  opposing  Prime  Strategetic 
Factors  and  express  the  relative  values  of  each  in  the  terms  of 
the  Strategic  Syllogism. 


THE  STRATEGIC  SYLLOGISM 

Having  classified  the  existing  Strategetic  Situation,  it 
is  necessary  next  to  designate  the  opposing  Columns  of 
Attack,  of  Support,  and  of  Manoeuvre. 

Then,  by  comparing  these  Prime  Strategetic  Factors, 
to  determine  the  net  advantage,  disadvantage,  or  equality 
that  exist  between  them  and  to  express  this  condition  in 
the  terms  of  the  resulting  Strategic  Syllogism. 

In  the  construction  of  a  Strategic  Syllogism,  the 
Strategic,  i.e.,  the  positional  value  of  each  of  the  opposing 
Prime  Strategetic  Factors  contained  in  a  given  Strate- 
getic Situation,  is  expressed  in  terms  made  up  of  letters 
and  symbols,  viz., 

A  Signifies  Column  of  Attack. 
S  "      Column  of  Support. 

M  "      Column  of  Manoeuvre. 

4-  "      Advantage  in  Position. 

—  "      Disadvantage  in  Position. 

=  "      Equality  in  Position. 

The  positional  values  of  the  several  Prime  Strategetic 
Factors  are  obtained  as  follows : 


POSITION  149 

COLUMN  OF  ATTACK 

That  Column  of  Attack  which  is  posted  upon  the  supe- 
rior Strategic  front  as  compared  to  the  front  occupied  by 
the  immediately  opposing  formation  (cf,  Grand  Tactics, 
pp.  117  to  275),  has  the  advantage  in  position. 

This  relative  advantage  and  disadvantage  in  position 
of  the  Column  of  Attack  is  expressed  by  the  first  term  of 
the  Strategic  Syllogism,  viz.: 

a.)  en.) 

+A  or  —A 


-A  +A 

In  the  first  instance  (I) ,  the  White  Column  of  Attack 
has  the  advantage  and  the  Black  formation  has  the 
disadvantage;  in  the  second  case  (II),  this  condition  is 
reversed. 


COLUMN  OF  SUPPORT 

A  Column  of  Support  has  the  superiority  in  position, 
as  compared  with  the  adverse  Column  of  Support, 
whenever  it  contains  more  than  the  latter  of  the  following 
advantages,  viz. : 

I.   One,  or  more,  Passed  Pawns. 
II.  Two  united  Pawns,  overlapping  an  adverse  Pawn. 

III.  Two  isolated  Pawns  adjacent  to  a  single  adverse 

Pawn. 

IV.  Three,   or   more,    united   Pawns   at   their   fifth 

squares,  opposed  by  a  like  number  of  adverse 
Pawns  posted  on  their  Normal  Base  Line. 
V.   A  majority  of  kindred  Pawns  on  that  side  of  the 
Board  farthest  from  the  adverse  King. 


150  GRAND    RECONNAISSANCE 

The  relative  advantage  and  disadvantage  of  one  Col- 
umn of  Support,  over  the  opposing  Column  of  Support, 
is  expressed  by  the  second  term  of  the  Strategic  Syllogism, 
thus: 

(I.)  (II.) 

+S  or  -S 


-S  +S 

In  the  first  case  (I),  White  has  the  advantage  and 
Black  has  the  disadvantage.  In  the  second  case  (II), 
this  condition  is  reversed. 


COLUMN  OF  MANOEUVRE 

Columns  of  Manoeuvre  are  not  compared  with  each 
other.  The  advantage  of  one  over  another  is  determined 
by  comparing  their  respective  powers  of  resistance  to  the 
attack  of  the  corresponding  adverse  Columns  of  Support. 

That  Column  of  Manoeuvre  which  longest  can  debar 
the  adverse  promotable  Factors  from  occupying  a  point 
of  junction  on  the  kindred  Strategetic  Rear,  has  the  ad- 
vantage. 

The  relative  advantage  and  disadvantage  of  the  column 
of  Manoeuvre  is  expressed  by  the  third  term  of  the 
Strategic  Syllogism,  viz. : 

(I)  (ID 

+  M  or  — M 


-M  +M 

In  the  first  case  (I),  White,  has  the  advantage  and 
Black  the  disadvantage.  In  the  second  case  (II),  this 
condition  is  reversed. 

In  recording  the  values  of  the  opposing  Prime  Strate- 


POSITION  151 

getic  Factors,  the  terms  relating  to  White  are  written 
above  and  those  relating  to  Black,  below  the  line. 

The  terms  expressing  the  relative  values  of  the  Columns 
of  Attack  always  are  placed  at  the  left;  those  for  the 
Columns  of  Support  in  the  center,  and  those  for  the 
Columns  of  Manoeuvre  at  the  right. 

The  Strategic  Syllogisms  are  twenty-seven  in  number 
and  are  formulated,  viz. : 

TABLE  OF  STRATEGIC  SYLLOGISMS 

No.  1.       +A+S+M  No.  8.       +A-S=M 


_A_S-M 

No.  2. 

+A+S=M 

_A_S=M 

No.  3. 

+A+S-M 

-A-S+M 

No.  4. 

+A=S+M 

— A=S-M 

No.  5. 

+A=S=M 

-A=S=M 

No.  6. 

+A=S-M 

-A=S+M 

No.  7. 

+A-S+M 

-A+S=M 

No. 

9. 

+A-S-M 

-A+S+M 

No. 

10. 

=A+S+M 

=A-S-M 

No. 

11. 

=A+S=M 

=A-S=M 

No. 

12. 

=A+S-M 

= A-S+M 

No. 

13. 

=A=S+M 

=A=S-M 

No. 

U. 

=A=S=M 

-A+S-M  =A=S=M 


152  GRAND    RECONNAISSANCE 

No.  15.        =A=S-M  No.  22.       _A=S  +  M 


+  A-S  +  M 


=A=S+M  +A=S-M 

No.  16.        =A-S  +  M  No.  23.        -A=S=M 


=A  +  S-M  +A=S=M 

No.  17.         =A-S=M  No.  24.        _A=S-M 


=A  +  S=M  +A=S  +  M 

No.  18.        =A-S-M  No.  25        -A-S  +  M 


=A  +  S  +  M  +A  +  S-M 

No.  19.       -A  +  S  +  M  No.  26.       — A-S=M 


+A-S-M  +A+S=M 

No.  20.        -A  +  S=M  No.  27.       -A-S-M 


+  A-S=M  +A+S+M 

No.  21.       -A-f  S-M 


STRATEGIC    ELEMENTALS. 

Each  of  the  terms  contained  in  the  Strategic  Syllogism 
should  have  its  counterpart  in  a  tangible  and  competent 
mass  of  troops. 

This  principle  of  Strategetics,  when  applied  to  warfare, 
is  absolute,  and  admits  of  no  exception.  The  catastro- 
phies  sustained  by  the  French  armies  in  the  campaigns 
of  1812,  1813,  1814  and  1815  are  each  and  every  one 
directly  due  to  the  persistent  violation  by  Napoleon  of 


POSITION  153 

this  basic  truth,  in  devolving  the  duties  of  a  column  of 
support  and  a  column  of  manoeuvre  upon  a  single  Strate- 
gic Elemental. 

In  solemn  contrast  to  that  fatal  and  indefensible  rash- 
ness which  cost  Napoleon  five  great  armies  and  ulti- 
mately his  crown,  is  the  dictum  by  one  whose  trans- 
cendent success  in  warfare,  is  the  antithesis  of  the  utter 
ruination  which  terminated  the  career  of  the  famous 
Corsican. 

Says  Frederic  the  Great: 

"I  adhere  to  those  universal  laws  which  all  the  elements 
obey;  these,  jor  me  are  sufficient." 

Singularly  enough,  it  seemingly  has  escaped  the  notice 
of  the  great  in  warfare,  owing  to  the  subtle  mathe- 
matical construction  of  the  Chess-board,  its  peculiar  re- 
lations to  the  moves  of  the  Chess-pieces,  and  of  the  latter 
to  each  other,  that: 

PRINCIPLE 

I.  The  functions  of  all  three  terms  contained  in  a 
Strategic  Syllogism  may  be  combined  in  a  single  chess 
Pawn,  and,  that: 

II.  All  three  functions  are  contemplated  in  and  should 
be  expressed  by  every  movement  of  every  Chess-piece;  and 
every  move  upon  the  Chess-board  is  weak  and  unscientific  to 
the  extent  that  it  disregards  either  of  these  obligations. 


Those  advantages  in  position,  which  are  denoted  by 
the  plus  signs  of  the  Strategic  Syllogism,  have  their 
material  manifestation  upon  the  surface  of  the  earth  by 
Corps  d'armee,  and  by  Pieces  which  are  equivalents  of 
these  latter,  upon  the  Chess-board. 


154  GRAND    RECONNAISSANCE 

The  sign  +  A  in  the  Strategic  Syllogism  denotes  the 
superior  Strategic  Front.  That  point  whose  occupation 
by  a  kindred  piece  demonstrates  such  superiority  in 
position  is  termed  the  Key  of  Position.  The  kindred 
Corps  occupying  such  point  constitutes  a  Corps  en  Line, 
and  is  termed  the  First  Strategic  Elemental. 

The  sign  +S  in  the  Strategic  Syllogism  denotes  the 
larger  number  of  pawn  altitudes  open  to  the  kindred 
promotable  factors.  Those  points  occupied  by  such 
kindred  promotable  factors  are  termed  Logistic  Origins. 
The  kindred  Corps  which  occupy  such  points  constitute 
Corps  en  Route  and  collectively  are  termed  the  Second 
Strategic  Elemental.  The  objective  of  Corps  en  Route 
always  is  the  Kindred  Logistic  Horizon. 

The  sign  +M  in  the  Strategic  Syllogism  denotes  that 
the  shortest  open  pawn  altitude  is  occupied  by  a  kindred 
promotable  factor.  Such  kindred  promotable  factor  is 
termed  the  Corps  en  Touch,  and  the  point  occupied  by 
such  Corps  is  termed  the  Point  of  Proximity.  The 
Objective  of  such  Corps  always  is  a  designated  Point 
of  Junction  in  the  Kindred  Logistic  Horizon,  and  such 
Corps  constitutes  the  Third  Strategic  Elemental. 

In  Warfare  it  is  imperative  that  each  of  these  Strategic 
Elementals  be  represented  by  one  or  more  Corps  d'armee. 
But  it  is  a  second  peculiarity  of  the  Chessic  mechanism 
that  a  single  Chessic  Corps  d'armee  may  represent  in 
itself,  one,  two  or  three  Strategic  Elementals  and  thus 
constitute  even  the  entire  Strategic  Ensemble. 

Hence,  in  Chess  play,  the  Strategic  Ensemble  may  be 
either  single,  double,  or  triple,  viz. : 

A  Single  Strategic  Ensemble  consists  either  of : 

(a)    1.     Major  Vertex. 
2.     Grand  Vertex. 


POSITION  155 

(b)  Logistic  Origin. 

(c)  Point  of  Proximity. 

A  Double  Strategic  Ensemble  consists  of  either: 

(a)  1.     Major  Vertex,  plus    a    Kindred   Logistic 

Origin. 
2.     Grand    Vertex,  plus    a    Kindred   Logistic 
Origin. 

(b)  1.     Major  Vertex,   plus  a   Kindred  Point  of 

Proximity. 
2.     Grand  Vertex,  plus   a  Kindred   Point    of 
Proximity. 

(c)  Logistic   Origin,  plus  a  Kindred  Point  of 

Proximity. 

A  Triple  Strategic  Ensemble  consists  of: 

1.  Major  Vertex,  plus  a  Kindred  Logistic  Origin,  plus 

a  Kindred  Point  of  Proximity. 

2.  Grand  Vertex,  plus  a  Kindred  Point  of  Proximity, 

plus  a  Kindred  Logistic  Origin. 

PRINCIPLE 

The  relative  positional  advantage  expressed  by  the  plus 
signs  of  the  Strategic  Syllogism  decreases  as  the  number  of 
plus  signs  in  the  Strategic  Syllogism  exceeds  the  number  of 
corresponding  Strategic  Elementals. 

Failure  to  observe  the  amalgamation  of  the  duties  of 
the  three  Grand  Columns  in  each  and  every  move  upon 
the  Chess-board,  and  to  note  that  the  tangible  and  ma- 
terial expression  of  these  powers  and  advantages  may  be 
expressed  either  by  three,  by  two,  or  even  by  a  single 
Chessic  Corps  d'armee,  has  caused  doubt  of  the  exact 


156  GRAND    RECONNAISSANCE 

analogy  between  Chess  and  War;  and  hence  a  like  doubt 
of  the  utility  of  Chess-play. 

Recognizing  the  truth  of  the  foregoing,  the  Asiatic 
conqueror,  Tamerlane,  sought  to  rectify  this  discrepancy 
between  the  mechanism  of  Chess  and  that  of  War,  by 
increasing  the  size  of  the  Chess-board  to  one  hundred 
and  forty-four  squares,  and  the  number  of  pieces  to 
forty-eight. 

By  this  innovation  the  geometric  harmony  existing 
between  the  Dynamic  and  the  Static  surfaces  of  the 
Chess-board  was  destroyed ;  and  this  without  substituting 
therefor  another  like  condition  of  mathematic  perfection. 
Ultimately,  this  remedy  was  abandoned,  a  fate  which 
sooner  or  later,  has  overtaken  all  attempts  to  improve 
that  superlative  intellectual  exercise  of  which  says 
Voltaire : 

"Of  all  games,  Chess  does  most  honor  to  the  human 
mind.,, 

The  reason  why  the  scheme  devised  by  Tamerlane  did 
not  satisfy  even  himself,  and  why  all  attempted  altera- 
tions in  the  machinery  of  Chess  prove  unacceptable  in 
practice,  is  due  to  the  present  perfect  adaptation  of  the 
Board  and  the  Pieces  for  exemplifying  the  processes  of 
Strategetic  Art. 

Any  change  in  the  construction  of  the  Chess-board  and 
the  Chess-pieces,  to  be  effective,  must  largely  increase 
the  number  of  Chessmen,  correspondingly  increase  the 
number  of  squares,  and  equally  so,  increase  the  number  of 
moves  permitted  to  each  player  at  his  turn  to  play. 

That  is  to  say:  Such  innovation  to  be  correct  must 
permit  each  player  at  his  turn  to  play  to  move  one  of  the 
Corps  d'armee  contained  in  the  Column  of  Attack,  a 
second  in  the  Column  of  Support,  and  a  third  in  the 
Column  of  Manoeuvre.  Necessarily,  the  number  of 
pieces  must   be   increased  in   order  to  provide   Corps 


POSITION  157 

cTarmee  for  the  make-up  of  each  Grand  Column,  and  ob- 
viously, the  Board  must  be  sufficiently  enlarged  to  ac- 
commodate not  merely  this  increased  mass,  but  also  to 
permit  full  scope  for  the  increased  number  of  possible 
movements. 

The  student  thus  readily  will  perceive,  that  it  is  only  one 
step  from  such  an  elaboration  of  Chess,  to  an  army  and 
the  theatre  of  actual  campaigning. 


Perfection  in  Position  is  attained  whenever  the  kindred 
army  is  acting  or  is  posted  as  a  unit,  while  the  hostile 
army  is  not  so  posted  nor  able  so  to  act. 


158  GRAND    RECONNAISSANCE 

MILITARY   EXAMPLES 

COLUMN  OF  ATTACK 

"Frontal  attacks  are  to  be  avoided,  and  the  preference 
always  is  to  be  given  to  the  assault  of  a  single  wing,  with 
your  center  and  remaining  wing  held  back ;  because  if  your 
attack  is  successful  you  equally  destroy  the  enemy  without 
the  risk  of  being  routed  if  you  fail." 

Frederic  the  Great 


At  Leuctra  and  Mantinea,  Epaminondas  won  by  the 
oblique  or  Strategic  order  of  battle.  Alexander  the 
Great  won  by  the  same  order  at  Issus  and  the  Haspades. 
Cyrus  won  at  Thymbra  and  Hannibal  won  at  Trebia, 
Thrasymene,  Cannae  and  Herdonea,  by  the  three  sides 
of  an  octagon  or  enveloping  formation.  Caesar  won  by 
the  oblique  order  at  Pharsaleus. 


Gustavus  Adolphus  won  at  Leipsic  by  acting  from  the 
Tactical  Center  and  Turenne  and  Prince  Eugene  gained 
their  victories  by  the  same  means. 


Frederic  the  Great  won  at  Hohenfriedberg,  Sohr, 
Rosbach,  Leuthern,  Zorndorf  and  Leignitz  by  the  oblique 
order  and  at  Torgau  by  acting  from  the  tactical  center. 


Washington  won  at  Trenton  and  Princeton  acting  by 
three  contiguous  sides  of  an  octagon. 


POSITION  159 

Bonaparte  won  at  Montenotte,  Castiglione,  Areola, 
Rivoli,  Ulm,  Austerlitz,  Jena,  Friedland,  Wagram  and 
Ligny,  by  acting  from  the  tactical  center.  Never  did 
he  attack  by  the  oblique  order  of  battle. 


Von  Moltke's  victories  all  were  won  by  acting  in  strict 
accord  with  the  system  laid  down  for  the  use  of  the 
Prussian  army  by  Frederic  the  Great. 


COLUMN  OF  SUPPORT 

The  most  magnificent  illustration  both  of  the  proper 
and  of  the  improper  use  of  the  Column  of  Support  is 
found  in  that  Grand  Operation  executed  by  the  Roman 
consuls,  Claudius  Nero  and  Marcus  Livius,  whereby 
the  Carthagenian  Army  under  Hasdrubal  was  destroyed 
at  the  river  Metaurus  207  B.C. 

Hannibal,  with  the  main  Carthagenian  army,  posted 
in  the  south  of  Italy  near  Canusium,  was  observed  by 
Nero  and  his  troops;  while  in  the  west,  Hasdrubal, 
observed  by  Livius  was  slowly  advancing  southward  to 
form  a  junction  with  his  brother,  a  most  unscientific 
procedure. 

Livius  permitted  Hasdrubal  to  penetrate  into  Italy  to  a 
point  a  few  miles  south  of  the  Metaurus  River;  whereupon 
Nero,  taking  7,000  of  his  best  troops,  by  a  rapid  march 
of  200  miles  united  with  Livius;  and  the  two  consuls  at 
once  falling  upon  Hasdrubal  utterly  annihilated  the 
Carthagenian  army.  Nero  returned  at  all  speed  and 
the  first  news  of  his  march  and  of  the  death  blow  to  the 
Carthagenian  projects  against  Rome  was  furnished  by 
the  sight  of  his  brother's  head,  which  Nero  cast  into 
Hannibal's  camp  from  a  military  machine. 

The  true  method  for  uniting  the  Columns  of  Support 


160  GRAND    RECONNAISSANCE 

to  a  Column  of  Attack  is  thus  shown  by  Gustavus 
Adolphus: 

"We  encamped  about  Nuremberg  the  middle  of  June, 
the  army  after  so  many  detachments  was  not  above 
11,000  infantry  and  8,000  horse  and  dragoons.  The 
King  posted  his  army  in  the  suburbs  and  drew  intrench- 
ments  around  the  circumference  so  that  he  begirt  the 
whole  city  with  his  army.  His  works  were  large,  the 
ditch  deep,  planked  by  innumerable  bastions,  ravelins, 
horn-works,  forts,  redoubts,  batteries  and  palisades,  the 
incessant  labor  of  8000  men  for  fourteen  days. 

"On  the  30th  of  June  the  Imperialists,  joined  to  the 
Bavarian  army  arrived  and  sat  down  60,000  strong, 
between  the  city  and  the  friendly  states;  in  order  to 
intercept  the  King's  provisions  and  to  starve  him  out. 

"The  King  had  three  great  detachments  and  several 
smaller  ones,  acting  abroad,  reducing  to  his  power  the 
castles  and  towns  of  the  adjacent  countries  and  these  he 
did  not  hasten  to  join  him  until  their  work  was  done. 

"The  two  chief  armies  had  now  lain  for  five  or  six 
weeks  in  sight  of  each  other  and  the  King  thinking  all 
was  ready,  ordered  his  generals  to  join  him.  Gustavus 
Horn  was  on  the  Moselle,  Chancellor  Oxenstern  about 
Mentz  and  Cologne  and  Dukes  William  and  Bernard 
and  Gen.  Bannia  in  Bavaria. 

"Our  friends  were  not  backward  in  obeying  the  King's 
command,  and  having  drawn  together  their  forces  from 
various  parts  and  ALL  joined  the  chancellor  Oxenstern, 
they  set  out  in  full  march  for  Nuremburg,  where  they 
arrived  Aug.  21,  being  30,000  old  soldiers  commanded 
by  officers  of  the  greatest  conduct  and  experience  in  the 
world."  

Only  once,  at  the  battle  of  Torgau,  (Nov.  5,  1760) 
did  Frederick  the  Great  rely  upon  the  co-operation  of  his 
Columns  of  Support  for  victory. 


POSITION  161 

As  the  result,  his  Column  of  Attack  of  25,000  men 
fought  the  entire  battle  and  was  so  ruined  by  the  fire  and 
sabres  of  90,000  enemies  and  400  pieces  of  artillery  that, 
as  the  sun  went  down  the  King  charged  at  the  head 
of  two  battalions,  his  sole  remaining  troops.  At  this 
moment  Gen.  Zeithen,  with  the  Column  of  Support,  of 
22,000  men  occupied  Siptka  Hill,  the  tactical  key  of  the 
battlefield,  and  fired  a  salvo  of  artillery  to  inform  the 
King  of  their  presence.  The  astonished  Austrians  turned 
and  fled;  the  King's  charge  broke  their  line  of  battle  and 
Frederic  grasped  a  victory,  "for  which"  says  Napoleon, 
"he  was  indebted  to  Fortune  and  the  only  one  in  which 
he  displayed  no  talent. " 

This  comment  of  course  is  not  true.  Frederic  dis- 
played magnificent  talent  that  day,  by  holding  in  check 
a  force  of  thrice  his  numbers  and  so  shattering  it  by  his 
incessant  attacks  that  it  crumbled  to  pieces  before  the 
mere  presence  and  at  sight  of  his  fresh  and  vigorous 
Column  of  Support.  Had  Napoleon  displayed  such 
talent  in  the  personal  conduct  of  battles  during  1813, 1814 
and  1815  it  is  possible  that  he  would  have  terminated  his 
career  at  some  other  place  than  at  St.  Helena. 

The  experience,  however,  was  enough  to  fully  satisfy 
Frederic,  and  never  again  did  he  attempt  a  Logistic 
battle. 


The  capture  of  Lord  Cornwallis  at  Yorktown  is  per- 
haps the  nearest  approach  to  the  achievement  of  Nero 
and  Livius  in  the  annals  of  the  military  art.  Decoyed 
by  the  retrograde  movements  of  Gen.  Greene,  the  British 
army  was  deluded  into  taking  up  a  position  at  Yorktown, 
having  the  unfordable  James  River  in  rear,  and  within 
striking  distance  of  the  main  American  army  under 
Washington  about  New  York  City. 

Lafayette   was    ordered    to   reinforce  Greene ;   Count 


162  GRAND    RECONNAISSANCE 

d'Esting  was  induced  to  bring  the  French  fleet  from  the 
West  Indies  to  Chesapeake  Bay  to  prevent  the  rescue  of 
Cornwallis  by  British  coming  by  the  ocean,  and  Count 
Rochambeau  was  requested  to  join  Washington  with  the 
French  army  then  in  Rhode  Island. 

All  this  took  time,  but  everything  was  executed  like 
clockwork.  The  French  fleet  arrived  in  the  Chesapeake; 
the  next  day  came  a  British  fleet  to  rescue  the  Earl's 
army.  In  the  naval  fight  which  ensued,  the  British  were 
driven  to  sea  and  so  damaged  as  to  compel  their  return 
to  New  York.  By  a  swift  march,  Washington,  with  his 
Continentals  and  the  French,  joined  Greene  and  La- 
fayette, and  two  of  his  redoubts  being  taken  by  storm, 
Lord  Cornwallis  surrendered.  This  victory  established 
the  independence  of  the  American  Colonies. 


The  Logistic  Battle,  i.e.,  the  combination  of  the  Col- 
umns of  Attack  and  of  Support  was  first  favorite  with 
Napoleon  and  to  his  partiality  for  this  particular  form 
of  the  tactical  offensive  was  due  both  the  spectacular 
successes  and  the  annihilating  catastrophes  which  mark 
his  astonishing  career. 

The  retrieving  of  his  lost  battle  of  Marengo,  by  the 
fortuitous  arrival  of  Dessaix  column,  seems  to  have  im- 
pressed Napoleon  to  the  extent  that  he  ever  after 
preferred  to  win  by  such  process,  rather  than  by  any 
other. 

The  first  attempt  to  put  his  new  hypothesis  into  prac- 
tice was  at  Jena.  Single  handed  his  column  of  attack 
destroyed  the  Prussian  main  body,  while  Davoust  with 
the  column  of  manoeuvre  held  in  check  over  three  times 
his  numbers. 

The  French  Column  of  Support  under  Bernadotte  did 
not  arrive  in  season  to  fire  a  shot. 


POSITION  163 

At  Eylau,  the  French  Column  of  Support  under  Da- 
voust  was  four  hours  in  advancing  six  miles  against  the 
opposition  of  the  Russian  general  Doctoroff.  The  second 
French  Column  of  Support  under  Ney  did  not  reach  the 
field  until  the  battle  was  over. 


In  the  retreat  from  Russia,  the  French  Column  of 
Support  under  the  Duke  of  Belluno  was  driven  from  its 
position  at  Smolensko,  thus  permitting  the  Russians 
under  Kutosof  to  occupy  the  Strategic  center,  which 
disaster  cost  Napoleon  30,000  men  in  clearing  his  com- 
munications. 


In  1813,  the  Column  of  Support  under  Ney  at  Bautzen 
was  misdirected  and  the  battle  rendered  indecisive  by  its 
lack  of  co-operation  with  the  French  Column  of  Attack. 


In  1814,  Napoleon  conformed  to  the  Art  by  acting  in 
three  columns,  but  yielding  to  his  besetting  military  sin, 
he  joined  his  Column  of  Support  to  his  Column  of  Attack 
and  through  the  open  space  thus  created  in  the  French 
Strategetic  Front,  Blucher  advanced  triumphantly  to 
Paris. 


In  the  Waterloo  campaign,  Napoleon  properly  began 
with  three  Grand  Columns.  At  the  battle  of  Ligny,  his 
Column  of  Support  arrived  upon  Blucher's  left  flank  and 
then  without  firing  a  shot,  wheeled  about  and  marched 
away. 


164  GRAND    RECONNAISSANCE 

At  Waterloo,  by  uniting  his  Columns  of  Attack  and  of 
Support  prematurely,  Napoleon  permitted  Blucher  to 
penetrate  the  French  Strategetic  Front  and  to  win  in 
the  same  manner  and  as  decisively  as  he  did  at  Paris. 


Von  Moltke  won  the  battle  of  Sadowa  by  the  arrival  of 
the  Prussian  Column  of  Support,  commanded  by  Prince 
Frederic  William.  But  in  the  interim,  the  German  main 
army  was  driven  in  several  miles  by  the  Austrians,  and 
Prince  Bismark's  first  white  hairs  date  from  that  day. 

COLUMN  OF  MANOEUVRE 

"A  small  body  of  brave  and  expert  men,  skillfully  handled 
and  favored  by  the  ground,  easily  may  render  difficult  the 
advance  of  a  large  army" 

Frederic  the  Great. 

At  the  river  Metaurus,  the  Roman  Consul  Livius  gave 
a  fine  example  of  the  duties  of  a  Column  of  Manoeuvre 
which  are  slowly  and  securely  to  retreat  before  an  ad- 
vancing enemy  and  never  to  be  induced  into  a  pitched 
battle  until  the  arrival  of  the  kindred  main  body. 


Frederic  the  Great  made  great  use  of  Columns  of 
Manoeuvre.  In  the  Seven  Years  War  he  constantly 
maintained  such  a  column  against  the  armies  of  each 
State  with  whom  Prussia  was  at  war;  while  himself  and 
his  brother  Henry  operated  as  Columns  of  Attack. 


In  the  Revolutionary  War,  Washington  maintained  a 
Column  of  Manoeuvre  against  the  British  in  Rhode 


POSITION  165 

Island,  another  against  the  British  in  the  south  and  a 
third  against  the  hostile  Indian  tribes  of  the  southwest. 


Napoleon  constantly  used  Columns  of  Manoeuvre  in 
all  his  campaigns;  notably  at  Montenotte,  Castiglione, 
Arcole,  Rivoli,  Ulm,  Austerlitz,  Jena,  in  1812,  1813,  1814 
and  at  Ligny  and  Waterloo  in  1815. 


PRIME  STRATEGETIC 

MEANS 


PRIME  STRATEGETIC 

MEANS 


11  It  is  necessary  exactly  to  weigh  the  means  we  possess  in 
opposition  to  the  enemy  in  order  to  determine  beforehand 
which  must  ultimately  predominate." 

Frederic  the  Great. 


Those  elemental  quantities  whose  comparative  values  are 
determined  by  Grand  Reconnaissance  and  which  are 
termed:  Organization,  Topography,  Mobility,  Numbers, 
Time,  and  Position,  collectively  constitute  Prime  Strate- 
getic  Means  whose  proper  employment  is  the  basis  of 
every  true  Prime  Strategetic  Process. 

POLICY  OF  CAMPAIGN 

That  relative  advantage  in  Numbers  expressed  by  the 
larger  aggregate  of  Chess-pieces  is  materially  manifested 
upon  the  Chess-board  by  additional  geometric  and  sub- 
geometric  symbols. 

Excess  or  deficiency  in  Numbers  determines  the  policy 
of  Campaign.     The  policy  of  the  inferior  force  is : 

1.     To  preserve  intact  its  Corps  d'armee,  and 


170  GRAND    RECONNAISSANCE 

2.  To  engage  in  battle  only  when  victory  can  be 
assured  by  other  advantages  in  Strategetic  means,  which 
nullify  the  adverse  advantage  in  Numbers;  and  even  then 
only  when  such  victory  is  decisive  of  the  Campaign. 

Hence,  the  policy  of  Campaign  of  that  army  superior 
in  Numbers,  is  : 

Incessantly  to  proffer  battles  which : 

(a)  Accepted,  constantly  reduces  the  inferior  army 
and  increases  its  disproportion  in  numbers,  or, 

(b)  Evaded,  compels  the  inferior  army  to  abandon 
important  posts,  for  whose  defence  it  cannot  afford  the  re- 
sulting loss  of  troops ;  thus  permittimg  to  the  numerically 
superior  army  a  continually  increasing  advantage  in 
Position. 


PRINCIPLE 

All  else  being  equal  the  advantage  of  Numbers  is  decisive 
of  victory  in  battle  and  Campaign. 

Things  being  unequal,  the  advantage  in  Numbers  may 
be  nullified  by  adverse  advantages  in  Organization,  To- 
pography, Mobility,  Time  and  Position. 

Victory  resulting  from  advantage  in  Numbers  is 
achieved  by  simultaneously  attacking  two  or  more  Tactical 
Keys  from  a  Kindred  Strategic  Key  and  two  or  more 
Kindred  Points  of  Command. 

TO  LOCATE  THE  AREA  OF 
CONCENTRATION 

That  relative  advantage  in  Mobility  expressed  by  the 
situation  of  the  Strategic  Front  upon  the  Strategetic 
Center  is  materially  manifested  upon  the  Chess-board  by 
Kindred  Chess-pieces  posted  upon  that  great  central 


PRIME    STRATEGETIC    MEANS  171 

diagonal  which  extends  towards  the  Objective  Plane. 
Such  advantage  determines  those  points  which  should  be 
occupied  in  the  proper  development  of  the  front  so  posted; 
and  consequently  designates  the  direction  and  location 
of  that  battlefield  upon  which  the  kindred  army  may  con- 
centrate in  overwhelming  force,  despite  all  possible 
resistance  by  the  enemy. 


MOST  FAVORABLE  BATTLEFIELD 

That  relative  advantage  in  Organization  expressed  by 
superior  potential  totality,  is  materially  manifested  upon 
the  Chess-board  by  the  geometric  and  sub-geometric 
symbols  of  those  Chess-pieces  possessed  of  the  superior 
potential  complement.  Such  symbols  taken  in  combi- 
nation, describe  that  field  of  battle  most  favorable  for 
the  execution  of  those  Major  Tactical  evolutions  which 
appertain  to  the  Chess-pieces  of  superior  organization. 


POSTS  OF  MAXIMUM  SECURITY 

That  relative  defensive  advantage  in  Topography  ex- 
pressed by  inaccessibility  to  hostile  attack  is  materially 
manifested  upon  the  Chess-board  by  Corps  of  Position, 
posted  upon  points  of  different  color  to  that  occupied 
by  the  adverse  Bishop;  and  this  advantage  designates 
those  posts  situated  on  a  projected  field  of  battle  which 
may  be  occupied  with  the  maximum  of  security. 

That  relative  offensive  advantage  in  Topography  ex- 
pressed by  accessibility  to  kindred  attack  is  materially 
manifested  upon  the  Chess-board  by  Corps  of  Position 
posted  upon  points  of  the  same  color  as  that  occupied 
by  the  kindred  Bishop;  and  this  advantage  designates 
those  posts  situated  on  a  projected  field  of  battle  which 
may  be  attacked  with  the  maximum  facility. 


172  GRAND    RECONNAISSANCE 

CHARACTER    OF    THE    MOST    FAVOR- 
ABLE BATTLE 

That  relative  advantage  in  Position  with  the  Column  of 
Attack,  expressed: 

1.  By  superior  location,  direction  and  development 
of  the  Kindred  Strategic  Front  of  Operations;  and 

2.  By  the  occupation  of  Points  of  Departure,  of 
Manoeuvre,  of  Command  and  of  the  Strategic  Key  of  a 
True  Strategic  Horizon,  indicates  that  a  Strategic  Grand 
Battle  in  the  first  instance;  and  in  the  second  case  that  a 
Tactical  Grand  Battle  is  most  favorable  in  the  existing 
situation. 

That  relative  advantage  in  Position  with  the  Column  of 
Support,  expressed  by  superior  facilities  for  occupying 
with  the  Kindred  Promotable  Factors  their  correspond- 
ing Points  of  Junction  in  the  Kindred  Logistic  Horizon, 
is  materially  manifested  upon  the  Chess-board  by  the 
larger  number  of  Pawn  Altitudes  which  either  are  open, 
or  may  be  opened,  despite  all  possible  resistance 
by  the  enemy;  and  such  advantage  designates  those 
adverse  Points  of  Impenetrability  and  Points  of  Resist- 
ance to  the  march  of  the  Kindred  Promotable  Factors, 
which  it  is  necessary  to  nullify. 

That  relative  advantage  in  Position  with  the  Column  of 
Manoeuvre,  expressed  by  the  security  of  the  Kindred  and 
the  exposure  of  the  adverse  Strategetic  Rear  to  attack 
by  the  Kindred  Column  of  Support,  is  materially  mani- 
fested upon  the  Chess-board  by  the  occupation  by  a 
Kindred  Promotable  Factor  of  the  Point  of  Proximity; 
and  such  advantage  indicates  that  the  advance  with  all 
possible  celerity  of  such  Promotable  Factor  and  Point 
of  Proximity  toward  the  corresponding  Point  of  Junction 
is  a  dominating  influence  in  the  existing  situation. 


PRIME    STRATEGETIC    MEANS  173 

PROJECTED  GRAND  BATTLE 

From  the  advantage  in  Position  appertaining  to  the 
three  Grand  Columns  is  deduced  the  character  of  the 
Grand  Battle  properly  in  sequence. 

Advantage  in  Position  with  the  Column  of  Attach  indi- 
cates the  opportunity,  all  else  being  equal,  to  engage  in  a 
victorious  Strategic  Grand  Battle  against  the  hostile 
Formation  in  Mass,  or  in  a  Tactical  Grand  Battle  against 
the  hostile  Formation  by  Wings. 

Advantage  in  Position  with  the  Column  of  Support 
indicates  the  opportunity  to  engage  effectively  in  a  series 
of  minor  battles,  as  though  having  the  advantage  in 
Numbers. 

Advantage  in  Position  with  the  Column  of  Manoeuvre 
indicates  the  opportunity  to  engage  in  a  victorious 
Logistic  Grand  Battle  against  the  adverse  Formation 
by  Grand  Columns. 


LEAST  FAVORABLE  ADVERSE  CON- 
DITION 

That  relative  advantage  in  Time  expressed  by  restric- 
tions of  the  adversary's  choice  of  movements  at  his  turn 
to  play,  is  materially  manifested  upon  the  Chess-board  by 
Feints  operated  by  Kindred  Chess-pieces  against  adverse 
vital  points;  and  such  advantage  of  the  Initiative  dictates 
the  next  move  of  the  opposing  army. 

The  advantage  of  the  Initiative  determines  which  of  the 
adverse  corps  d'armee  may  and  may  not  move. 

The  material  expression  of  this  advantage  always  is  a 
Feint  by  a  Kindred  Corps  against  a  vital  point  either 


174  GRAND    RECONNAISSANCE 

occupied  or  unoccupied,  which  necessitates  that  upon  his 
next  move,  the  enemy  either  evacuate,  support,  cover  or 
sustain  the  post  so  menaced. 

Such  feint,  therefore,  restricts  the  move  of  the  enemy 
to  those  of  his  corps  as  are  able  to  obviate  the  threatened 
loss  and  proportionately  reduces  the  immediate  activity 
of  his  army. 


RELATIVE  ADVANTAGES 
IN  LOCATION 

"It  is  only  the  force  brought  into  action  that  avails  in 
battles  and  campaigns — the  rest  does  not  count.  ' 

Napoleon. 

The  distance  which  separates  opposing  Corps  d'armee 
always  modifies  the  values  of  the  Prime  Strategetic  Means. 

Hence  in  the  making  of  Grand  Reconnaissance,  it  is 
next  in  sequence  to  determine  whether  the  Chess-pieces 
are: 

I.     In  Contact. 

II.     In  Presence. 

III.     At  Distance. 

Corps  d'armee  are  in  Contact  with  each  other  whenever 
their  logistic  radii  intersect;  or,  their  radii  offensive  and 
the  corresponding  adverse  radii  defensive  are  opposed 
to  each  other. 

Corps  d'armee  are  in  Presence  whenever  the  posts 
which  they  occupy  are  contained  within  the  same  Strate- 
gic front,  the  same  Strategetic  Horizon,  or  are  in  com- 
munication with  their  corresponding  posts  of  mobiliza- 
tion, development,  or  manoeuvre. 


PRIME    STRATEGETIC    MEANS  175 

Corps  d'armee  are  at  Distance  when  the  posts  which 
they  occupy  are  not  in  communication  with  Kindred 
Corps  d'armee  posted  upon  the  strategic  front  adopted, 
or  with  posts  of  mobilization  or  development  contained 
within  the  corresponding  Primary  Base  of  Operations, 
or,  within  the  True  Strategetic  Horizon. 


176  GRAND    RECONNAISSANCE 

REQUISITES  FOR   SUCCESSFUL 
CAMPAIGNING 

Every  Campaign,  whether  upon  the  surface  of  the 
Earth  or  upon  the  Chess-board  is  decided  and  usually  is 
terminated  by  a  Grand  Battle. 

Those  movements  of  opposing  Grand  Columns,  where- 
by such  decisive  conflict  is  brought  about  under  circum- 
stances which  ensure  victory,  by  reason  of  superior 
advantages  in  Strategetic  Means,  are  termed  Grand  Man- 
oeuvres; and  a  proper  series  of  Grand  Manoeuvres,  com- 
bined with  their  corresponding  feints,  strategems,  am- 
buscades and  minor  battles,  the  whole  terminated  by  a 
resulting  Grand  Battle,  is  termed  a  Grand  Operation. 

Those  processes  of  Grand  Manoeuvre,  which  produce 
an  opportunity  to  victoriously  engage  in  battle,  are  the 
most  subtle  and  difficult  known  to  the  Strategetic  Art. 

Successful  application  of  these  processes  in  practice  de- 
pends wholly  upon  proper  use  of  the  MEANS  at  hand 
and  the  doing  of  the  utmost  that  can  be  done  in  the  TIME 
available. 

Nothing  can  be  more  repugnant  to  high  art  in  Strate- 
getics  than  those  crudities  termed  in  the  specious  mouth- 
ings  of  pretentious  mediocrity  "waiting  moves,"  "de- 
layed strokes,"  "defensive-offensives,"  "masterly  inac- 
tivities," and  the  like. 

"Time  past  is  gone  and  cannot  be  regained;  time  future 
is  not  and  may  never  be;  time  present  is"  and  with  it 
Opportunity,  which  an  instant  later  may  be  gone. 

The  gain  of  but  "a  foot  of  ground  and  a  minute  of 
time"  would  have  saved  the  French  army  at  Rosbach 
and  have  cost  Frederic  the  Great  one  of  his  most  lustrous 
victories  and  perhaps  his  army  and  his  crown. 


PRIME    STRATEGETIC    MEANS  177 


PRINCIPLE 

In  Strategetics  there  is  but  a  single  method  whereby  Oppor- 
tunity may  be  availed  of,  and  that  is  by  so  augmenting  kin- 
dred advantages  and  so  depreciating  adverse  advantages  as  to 
acquire  for  the  kindred  army  that  particular  adantage  of 
Strategetic  means  which  in  the  given  situation  is  the  proper 
basis  of  the  Strategetic  movement  next  in  sequence. 


At  Distance. 

The  chief  requisite  for  success  when  acting  against  an 
adverse  army  at  Distance,  is  the  advantage  in  MOBILITY. 

The  primary  process  is  that  of  a  Grand  Manoeuvre 
against  an  adverse  army  acting  in  the  formation  by 
Grand  Columns,  and  the  object  of  such  Grand  Manoeuvre 
always  is,  by  superior  celerity  of  movement,  to  occupy: 

1.  The  Strategic  Center  by  the  Kindred  Column  of 
Attack,  thus  intersecting  the  Route  of  Communication 
between  the  adverse  main  body  and  its  Base  of  Opera- 
tion; or  to  occupy: 

2.  The  Logistic  Center  with  the  Kindred  Columns  of 
Support  and  of  Manoeuvre,  thus  intersecting  the  Route 
of  Communication  between  the  adverse  main  body  and  its 
Chief  Supporting  Column  and  clearing  the  way  for  the 
advance  of  the  Kindred  Column  of  Support  against  the 
flank  and  rear  of  the  adverse  Main  Body. 

Obviously,  the  united  Kindred  Columns  of  Attack 
and  of  Support  always  will  constitute  an  overwhelming 
superiority  in  Numbers  as  compared  with  the  adverse 
main  body. 


178  GRAND    RECONNAISSANCE 

In  Presence. 

The  chief  requisite  for  success  when  acting  against  an 
adverse  Grand  Column  in  Presence,  is  the  advantage  in 
POSITION. 

The  primary  process  is  that  of  a  Grand  Manoeuvre 
against  an  adverse  army  acting  in  the  Formation  by 
Wings,  and  the  object  of  such  Grand  Manoeuvre  always 
is,  by  availing  to  the  uttermost  of  its  situation  upon  the 
Tactical  Center,  i.e.,  upon  the  area  midway  between  the 
adverse  Wings  thus  isolated  from  each  other;  to  act  in 
overwhelming  Numbers,  first  against  one  and  then 
against  the  other  hostile  bodies. 

In  Contact. 

The  chief  requisite  for  success  when  acting  offensively 
against  an  adverse  Grand  Column,  or  Wing,  or  Corps 
d'armee,  in  Contact,  is  the  advantage  in  N  UMBERS. 

The  primary  process  is  that  of  a  Grand  Battle  in 
which  the  kindred  army  has  an  overwhelming  superiority 
in  Numbers  in  contact,  and  at  least  the  equality  in  all 
other  Prime  Strategetic  Means. 

In  this  circumstance,  the  object  of  such  Grand  Battle 
always  is : 

1.  To  attack  the  hostile  Formation  in  Mass  frontally 
at  the  center,  and  upon  both  wings  obliquely;  all  three 
attacks  being  made  simultaneously  and  the  evolutions  so 
executed  that  the  hostile  army  never  is  able  to  penetrate 
between  either  kindred  wing  and  the  kindred  center,  nor 
to  outflank  that  kindred  wing  which  may  be  in  the  air. 

2.  In  case  the  kindred  army  has  the  equality  or 
inferiority  in  all  other  Prime  Strategetic  Means,  then  the 
object  of  a  Grand  Battle  on  the  Offensive  is  to  attack  the 
hostile  Formation  in  Mass  obliquely  with  the  whole 


PRIME    STRATEGETIC    MEANS  179 

kindred  army,  and  preferably  upon  that  wing  which  covers 
the  route  of  communication  of  the  adverse  army  with 
its  Base  of  Operations,  but  always  upon  that  wing  which 
contains  the  Tactical  Key  of  the  actual  Battlefield. 

Obviously,  the  concentration  of  the  entire  kindred 
army  against  a  single  adverse  wing  always  will  constitute 
an  overwhelming  superiority  in  Numbers. 

In  making  such  attack  obliquely  against  a  single  ad- 
verse wing,  the  center  and  remaining  wing  of  the  kindred 
army  must  not  engage  until  the  kindred  Van  and  Corps 
of  Position  of  the  attacking  wing  first  have  formed  the 
center  of  three  sides  of  an  octagon ;  of  which  the  Kindred 
Corps  of  Evolution  will  form  the  farthest  side  and  the 
Kindred  Center  and  left  wing  Corps  d'armee  will  form  the 
nearest  and  latest  constructed  side. 


The  chief  requisite  for  success  when  acting  defensively 
against  a  Grand  Column,  or  Wing,  or  Corps  dfarmee  is  the 
advantage  in  TOPOGRA  PHY. 

The  primary  process  is  that  of  a  Grand  Battle  in  which 
the  kindred  army,  decidedly  inferior  in  Numbers  in  the 
aggregate,  has  the  advantage  in  Topography  and  equality 
in  all  other  Prime  Strategetic  Means. 

In  this  case  the  object  is  to  support  both  flanks  of  the 
inferior  army  upon  impassable  natural  barriers,  strength- 
ening both  wings  at  the  expense  of  the  center,  both  in 
quantity  and  in  quality  of  troops. 

If  the  Tactical  Defensive  be  selected,  the  center  should 
retire  before  the  oncoming  of  the  hostile  army  in  order 
to  enclose  it  between  the  Kindred  Wings,  which  will 
then  overwhelm  it  by  superior  Numbers,  while  the  natural 
barriers  on  the  flanks  being  impassable  will  prevent  the 
remaining  hostile  corps  from  participating  in  the  battle 
otherwise  than  as  spectators. 


180  GRAND    RECONNAISSANCE 

Should  the  Tactical  Offensive  be  selected,  that  kindred 
wing  best  adapted  for  attack  should  engage  supported 
by  all  kindred  Corps  of  Evolution,  while  advancing  the 
Kindred  Center  in  reserve  and  holding  the  remaining 
wing  refused  and  in  observation. 

All  else  being  equal,  relative  advantage  in  either 
branch  of  Prime  Strategetic  Means  is  sufficient  to  ensure 
victory  in  battle,  and  the  proper  use  of  such  advantage 
for  securing  victory  is  outlined  thus : 

PRINCIPLE 

Utilize  advantage  in  Prime  Strategetic  Means  to  obtain 
the  superiority  in  Numbers  at  the  Point  of  Contact  in  an 
Offensive  Battle;  and  to  nullify  the  adverse  superiority  in 
Numbers  at  the  point  of  contact  in  a  Defensive  Battle. 


Between  War  and  Chess  there  is  a  seeming  incongruity, 
which  is  the  basis  of  that  doubt  of  the  utility  of  Chess- 
play,  so  commonly  held  by  laymen,  and  which  fallacy 
few,  even  among  proficients,  are  competent  to  combat. 

This  doubt  most  frequently  is  voiced  by  the  query: 

If  Chess  and  War  are  analagous,  why  was  not  Napoleon 
a  Master  Chess-player  and  Morphy  a  great  military 
Commander? 

This  query  readily  is  answered  in  the  words  of  Frederic 
the  Great,  viz : 

"To  be  possessed  of  talent  is  not  sufficient.  Oppor- 
tunity to  display  such  talent  and  to  its  full  extent  is 
necessary.     All  depends  on  the  time  in  which  we  live." 


PRIME    STRATEGETIC    MEANS  181 

The  Strategetic  talent  possessed  in  common  by  Morphy 
and  Napoleon,  in  both  was  brought  to  perfection  by 
long  and  expert  training. 

But  circumstances  placed  the  twelve  year  old  Napoleon 
in  the  midst  of  soldiers  and  in  an  era  of  war,  while  cir- 
cumstances placed  the  twelve  year  old  Morphy  in  the 
midst  of  Chess-players  and  in  an  era  of  Peace. 

Napoleon  was  educated  a  General;  Morphy  was  edu- 
cated a  lawyer. 

To  develop  his  self-evident  and  superlative  Strategetic 
talent,  Napoleon's  education  was  of  the  best;  to  develop 
his  self-evident  and  superlative  Strategetic  talent,  Mor- 
phy's  education  was  of  the  worst. 

Napoleon  succeeded  as  a  General;  Morphy  failed  as  a 
lawyer. 

The  innate  capability  of  Napoleon  for  Strategetics  was 
developed  in  the  direction  of  Warfare ;  the  innate  capabil- 
ity of  Morphy  for  Strategetics  was  developed  in  the 
direction  of  Chess-play. 

In  War,  Napoleon  is  superlative;  in  Chess,  Morphy  is 
superlative. 

Educated  in  the  law,  Napoleon  might  have  proved  like 
Morphy  a  non-entity;  educated  in  Chess,  Napoleon 
might  have  proved  like  Morphy  a  phenomenon. 

Educated  in  War,  Morphy  might  have  rivalled  Na- 
poleon. 

For  the  Chess-play  of  Morphy  displays  that  perfect 
comprehension  of  Strategetics,  to  which  none  but  the 
great  Captains  in  warfare  have  attained. 

Perfection  in  Strategetics  consists  in  exactly  interpret- 
ing in  battle  and  campaign,  the  System  of  Warfare 
invented  by  Epaminondas. 

Those  able  to  do  this  in  War  have  achieved  greatness, 
and  the  great  at  Chess-play  are  those  who  best  have 
imitated  that  exactness  with  which  Morphy  employed 
this  system  on  the  Chess-board. 


182  GRAND    RECONNAISSANCE 

To  those  who  imagine  that  Strategetic  talent,  as  exem- 
plified in  Warfare,  is  different  from  Strategetic  talent  as 
exemplified  in  Chess-play,  the  following  may  afford 
matter  for  reflection. 


"Frederic  the  Great  was  one  of  the  finest  Chess-players 
that  Germany  ever  producd." 

Wilhelm  Steinitz. 


PRIME  STRATEGETIC 
PROPOSITION 


SECTION  ONE 


PRIME  STRATEGETIC 
PROPOSITION 

SECTION  ONE 

(First  Phase.) 

In  the  consideration  of  every  Strategetic  Situation 
possible  in  Warfare,  or  in  Chess-play,  the  initial  process 
always  is  a  Grand  Reconnaissance. 

Grand  Reconnaissance  is  that  exact  scrutiny  of  existing 
conditions,  whereby  is  determined  the  relative  advantages 
and  disadvantages  possessed  by  the  opposing  armies  in: 


1. 

Time. 

2. 

Numbers. 

3. 

Position. 

4. 

Organization. 

5. 

Mobility. 

6. 

Topography. 

The  First  Phase  in 

the  demonstration  of 

every 

Prime 

Strategetic  Proposition  consists: 

1.  In  determining  by  comparison  of  the  relative  ad- 
vantages and  disadvantages  in  Time,  which  of  the  opposing 
armies  has  the  ability  to  MOVE,  while  the  other  must  re- 
main stationary. 

2.  In  deducing  the  MOTIF  of  such  movement. 

3.  In  designating  the  DIRECTION  of  such  move- 
ment. 


186  GRAND    RECONNAISSANCE 

The  making  of  Grand  Reconnaissance  is  a  special 
privilege  which  exclusively  appertains  to  the  advantage 
in  Time.  It  always  should  be  made  by  the  Commander- 
in-chief  of  that  army  which  is  able  to  put  itself  in  motion, 
while  the  opposing  army,  must  remain  stationary,  and 
it  never  should  be  confounded  with  the  advance  of  the 
Cavalry  Corps,  nor  confused  with  the  work  of  scouts  and 
spies;  all  of  which  are  matters  entirely  separate  and 
distinct  from  Grand  Reconnaissance. 

In  the  Grand  Reconnaissance  of  any  given  Strategetic 
Situation  the  element  of  Numbers  primarily  is  to  be 
considered,  for  the  reason  that  the  basic  fact  of  the  Science 
of  Strategetics  is : 

"THE  GREATER  FORCE  ALWAYS  OVER- 
COMES THE  LESSER."  Napoleon. 

Hence,  unless  more  immediately  vital  considerations 
prevent,  superiority  in  Numbers,  of  itself,  is  decisive  of 
victory;  and  thus  it  readily  is  to  be  deduced  that  all 
else  being  equal,  the  advantage  in  Time  plus  the  ad- 
vantage in  Numbers  constitutes  the  easiest  and  simplest 
winning  combination  known  to  Strategetic  Art. 

But  it  so  happens  that  the  advantage  in  Time  may  be 
combined  not  only  with  the  greater  force,  but  also  with 
an  equal,  or  even  with  the  lesser  force,  and  from  this  it 
is  self-evident  that  Strategetic  Situations  are  divided 
into  three  classes,  viz: 

I.     Numerical  superiority,  plus  right  to  move. 
II.     Numerical  equality,  plus  right  to  move. 
III.     Numerical  inferiority,  plus  right  to  move. 

There  are  two  primary  methods  for  availing  of  superior- 
ity in  Numbers  to  destroy  the  opposing  lesser  force,  viz : 


PRIME    STRATEGETIC    PROPOSITION  187 

1.  By  the  Process  of  Attrition,  i.e.,  by  maintaining 
an  incessant  tactical  offensive  and  thus  wearing  down  the 
opposing  army  by  exchanging  pieces  at  every  opportunity. 

2.  By  Acting  in  Detachments,  i.e.,  by  means  of  the 
extra  corps,  simultaneously  to  attack  more  points  of  vital 
importance  than  the  hostile  army  is  able  simultaneously  to 
defend. 

From  the  foregoing  it  is  obvious  that  conversely  there 
are  two  principal  considerations,  which  all  else  being 
equal,  must  dominate  the  procedure  of  the  Numerically 
inferior  force,  viz: 

I.       To  avoid  further  diminution  of  its  aggregate. 
II.       To  avoid  creating  indefensible  vital  points. 


The  second  consideration  in  the  making  of  a  Grand 
Reconnaissance  by  the  commander-in-chief  of  an  army 
having  the  advantage  in  Time,  is  the  element  of  Position; 
for  the  reason  that  by  unscientific  posting  of  Corps 
d'armee,  relative  advantages  in  Time,  or  in  Numbers  or 
in  both,  may  be  rendered  nugatory,  on  account  of  in- 
ability of  the  kindred  Columns  of  Attack,  of  Support  and 
of  Manoeuvre  to  perform  their  functions. 

In  case  the  Corps  are  scientifically  posted  and  are  in 
positions  to  avail  of  advantage  in  Time  and  Numbers, 
those  adverse  vital  points  whose  occupation  may  be 
effected  by  superior  force,  always  will  be  the  objectives  of 
the  movements  of  the  latter. 

Hence,  the  following : 

PRINCIPLE 

As  the  advantage  in  Time  gives  the  right  to  MOVE  and 
the  advantage  in  Numbers  indicates  the  MO  TIF  of  move- 
ment; so  does  the  advantage  in  Position,  as  expressed  by  the 


188  GRAND    RECONNAISSANCE 

Strategic  Syllogism,  specify  the  DIRECTION  of  that 
movement  which  normally  appertains  to  the  army  having 
the  advantage  in  Time. 

The  proper  direction  of  that  movement  which  normally 
appertains  to  the  advantage  in  Time  always  is  indicated 
by  the  plus  signs  in  the  Strategic  Syllogism,  viz : 

+A.  Signifies  that  the  Normal  direction  of  movement 
for  the  army  having  the  advantage  in  Time  is  along 
the  Strategetic  Center  towards  the  Objective  Plane. 

+  S.  Signifies  that  the  Normal  direction  of  move- 
ment for  the  army  having  the  advantage  in  Time  is 
along  one  or  more  pawn  altitudes  towards  the  Kindred 
Logistic  Horizon. 

+  M.  Signifies  that  the  Normal  direction  of  move- 
ment for  the  army  having  the  advantage  in  Time  is 
along  the  shortest  open  pawn  altitude  towards  the 
Kindred  Point  of  Junction. 


+A  +  S.  Signifies  that  the  Normal  direction  of  move- 
ment for  the  army  having  the  advantage  in  Time  is 
double,  i.e., 

+A.     towards  the  Objective  Plane. 

4-S.  along  one  or  more  open  Pawn  altitudes  toward 
the  Kindred  Logistic  Horizon. 


+A+M.  Signifies  that  the  Normal  direction  of 
movement  for  the  army  having  the  advantage  in  Time, 
is  double,  i.e., 

+  A.    towards  the  Objective  Plane. 


PRIME    STRATEGETIC    PROPOSITION  189 

+M.     Along  the  shortest  open  pawn  altitude  toward 
the  Kindred  Point  of  Junction. 


+  S+M.  Signifies  that  the  Normal  direction  of 
movement  for  the  army  having  the  advantage  in  Time 
is  double,  i.e., 

+  S.  Along  one  or  more  open  Pawn  altitudes  toward 
the  Kindred  Logistic  Horizon. 

+  M.  Along  the  shortest  open  Pawn  Altitude  toward 
the  Kindred  Point  of  Junction. 


A+S  +  M.  Signifies  that  the  Normal  direction  of 
movement  is  triple,  i.e., 

+A.     Toward  the  Objective  Plane. 

+  S.  Along  one  or  more  open  Pawn  altitudes,  toward 
the  Kindred  Logistic  Horizon. 

+  M.  Along  the  shortest  open  Pawn  altitude,  toward 
the  Kindred  Point  of  Junction. 

The  First  Phase  in  the  demonstration  of  every  Strate- 
getic  Proposition  is  determined  by  the  following : 

THEOREM 

Given  the  Normal  ability  to  move,  to  determine  the 
Normal  motif  and  direction  of  movement. 

1.  Designate  that  army  having  the  advantage  in 
Time  and  express  such  advantage  by  the  symbol  +  T, 
express  the  corresponding  disadvantage  in  Time  which 
appertains  to  the  opposing  army,  by  the  symbol  — T,  and 
such  symbols  will  constitute  the  First  Term  of  the  First 
Phase  of  the  demonstration  of  any  Prime  Strategetic 
Proposition. 


190  GRAND    RECONNAISSANCE 

2.  Express  that  superiority,  equality,  or  inferiority 
in  Numbers,  which  appertains  to  each  of  the  opposing 
armies  by  the  symbols  +N,  =  N,  — N,  respectively; 
and  such  symbols  will  constitute  the  Second  Term  of 
the  First  Phase  of  the  demonstration  of  any  Prime 
Strategetic  Proposition. 

3.  Express  the  objectives  designated  by  the  plus 
terms  of  the  Strategic  Syllogism,  viz : 

(a)  Objective  of  +  A  =  Objective  Plane,  i.e.,  0.  P. 

(b)  +  S  =  Logistic  Horizon,  i.e.,  L.  H. 

(c)  +  M=  Point  of  Junction,  i.e.,  P.  J. 

and  the  symbols  denoting  such  objectives  will  constitute 
the  Third  Term  in  the  First  Phase  of  the  demonstration 
of  any  Prime  Strategetic  Proprosition. 

4.  Combine  those  three  terms  which  appertain  to  the 
advantage  in  Time,  then  combine  those  three  terms 
which  appertain  to  the  disadvantage  in  Time,  and  the 
resulting  equation  when  expanded  will  depict : 

(a)  The  normal  ability  to  move. 

(b)  The  normal  motif  of  movement. 

(c)  The  normal  directions  of  movement  which  ap- 
pertain to  each  of  the  opposing  armies. 

EXAMPLE 

White.      (+T+N)  +  (  +  A+S+M) 
Black.       (-T-N)  +  (-A-S-M) 


PRIME    STRATEGETIC    PROPOSITION  191 


EXPANDED 

First  Term.       +T=  Normal  ability  to  move. 

Second  Term.    +N=  Normal  motif  of  movement, 
(a)  Detachments,  (b)  Exchanges. 


(+O.P.  = 
J  +L.H.  = 
(  4  P.  J.  = 


+  0.  P.  =  Normal  objective  of  +  A. 
,  ^+L.H.  =        "  "  "+S. 

"  +M. 


Hence,  in  the  foregoing  example  the  normal  direction 
of  movement  for  White  may  be  either  toward  the  Object- 
ive Plane  with  the  Column  of  Attack,  or  toward  the  Logis- 
tic Horizon,  or  the  Point  of  Junction  with  the  Column  of 
Support,  or  toward  both  objectives,  with  both  columns 
simultaneously. 

Meanwhile,  the  Black  army  having  the  disadvantage 
in  Time  is  unable  to  move,  and  consequently  is  stationary. 

Furthermore,  White  having  the  superiority  in  Numbers 
may  move  with  an  equal  force  against  either  objective 
designated  by  the  Third  Term  of  the  equation,  and  with 
his  excess  force  against  one  or  more  adverse  vital  points, 
simultaneously,  against  which  latter  movement,  Black 
obviously  has  no  adequate  defence. 


192  GRAND    RECONNAISSANCE 

TACTICO-LOGISTIC  INEQUALITY 

The  Tactico-Logistic  Inequality  is  the  algebraic  ex- 
pression of  the  relative  advantages  and  disadvantages 
in  Time  and  in  Numbers  appertaining  to  opposing 
Strategetic  Entireties. 

Such  advantages  and  disadvantages  are  denoted  by 
the  terms,  viz : 

+  T.  Signifies  the  absolute  advantage  in  Time,  i.e., 
the  ability  of  an  army,  a  grand  column,  a  wing  or  a  corps 
d'armee  to  move,  while  the  opposing  force  must  remain 
stationary. 

— T.  Signifies  the  absolute  disadvantage  in  Time,  i.e., 
the  obligation  of  an  army,  a  grand  column,  a  wing,  or  a 
corps  d'armee  to  remain  stationary,  while  the  opposing 
force  is  in  motion. 

+  N.  Signifies  the  absolute  advantage  in  Numbers, 
i.e. ,  the  larger  number  of  corps  d'armee. 

— N.  Signifies  the  absolute  disadvantage  in  Numbers, 
i.e.,  the  smaller  number  of  corps  d'armee. 

=N.  Signifies  the  equality  in  Numbers,  i.e.,  the  same 
number  of  corps  d'armee. 

There  are  six  forms  of  the  Tactico-Logistic  Inequality, 
viz: 


1. 

+T+N 

4. 

-T  +  N 

-T-N 

+T-N 

2. 

+T=N 

5. 

-T-N 

-T-N 

+T=N 

3. 

+T-N 

6. 

-T-N 

-T+N  +T+N 


PRIME    STRATEGETIC    PROPOSITION  193 

INITIAL  STRATEGETIC  EQUATION 

The  Initial  Strategetic  Equation  is  made  up  of  those 
terms  which  compose  the  Strategic  Syllogism  and  the 
Tactico-Logistic  Inequality,  viz: 


(+A+S+M)  +  (+T+N)  -  (-A-S— M)  +  (-T-N)  = 
the  Normal  Motif  and  Direction  of  Effort. 

RULE 

1.  Set  down  in  parenthesis  those  terms  of  the  Strategic 
Syllogism  which  appertain  to  White. 

Set  down  in  parenthesis  those  terms  of  the  Tactico- 
Logistic  Inequality  which  appertain  to  White. 

Connect  the  two  kindred  terms  thus  constructed,  by  the 
sign  of  addition,  to  show  that  each  is  to  augment  the  other, 
and  superscore  all  by  the  same  vincula  to  show  that  all  are 
to  be  taken  together  to  form  one  side  of  the  resulting  equation. 


2.  Repeat  this  process  for  the  Black  terms  to  construct 
the  second  side  of  the  Initial  Strategetic  Equation,  and 
separate  the  White  from  the  Black  terms  by  a  minus 
sign. 


194 


GRAND    RECONNAISSANCE 


STRATEGETIC  VALUES 

The  Strategetic  Values  of  the  terms  contained  in  the 
Strategic  Syllogism  and  in  the  Tactico-Logistic  Inequa- 
lity are  shown  by  the  appended  tables,  viz : 


TABLE  OF  STRATEGIC  VALUES. 


Term. 
1.     +A 


Post. 
Grand  Vertex 


2.  +M  Point  Proximity 

en  Command 

3.  +A    Major  Vertex 


4.  -fM  Point  Proximity 

en  Menace 

5.  +M  Point  Proximity 

en  Presence. 

6.  -f  A    Minor  Vertex 


7.     +S 


Point  Proximity 
en  Observation. 


8.     +S    Point  Proximity 
en  Route. 


9.     +S 


Point  Proximity 
Remote. 


Direction. 
Tactical  Key    of 
Objective  Plane 
Point  of  Junction 

1.  Grand  Vertex 

2.  Point  Aligned 


Motif. 
To  give  checkmate 

To  queen  a  Pawn 

To    gain   winning 
Position  with  Col- 

3.  Point  en  Potence  umn  of  Attack 

Point  en  Command  To  gain  winning 
Position  with  Col- 
umn of  Support 
To  gain  winning 
Position  with  Col- 
umn of  Support 
To  gain  Superior 
Position  with  Col- 
umn of  Attack. 

Point  en  Presence  To  gain  Superior 
Position  with  Col- 
umn of  Support 

Point  en  Observa-  To  gain  superior 
Position  with  Col- 
umn of  Support 
To  gain  advantage 
with  Column  of 
Support 


Point  en  Menace 


1.  Major  Vertex 

2.  Point  Aligned 


tion 


Point  en  Route 


PRIME    STRATEGETIC     PROPOSITION  195 


TABLE  OF  LOGISTIC  VALUES 

Term. 

1.  +T    Unrestricted  privilege  to  move  any  Piece. 

2.  +T    Restricted  to  moving  a  Sustaining  Piece    en 

counter  attack. 

3.  +T    Restricted  to  moving  an  aggressive  Covering 

Piece. 

4.  +T    Restricted  to  moving  a  Passive  Covering  Piece. 

5.  +T    Restricted  to  moving  a  Supporting  Piece. 

6.  +T    Restricted  to  moving  the  King  out  of  check. 

7.  +T    Restricted  to  moving  the  King  from  an  un- 

tenable Objective  Plane. 

8.  +T    Restricted  to  moving  a  Piece  to  reduce   the 

value  of  the  Kindred  King's  Logistic  Radii. 


TABLE  OF  TACTICAL  VALUES 

1.  +N     Larger  numbers  of  Grand  Corps  d'armee  of 

Evolution. 

2.  +N     Larger  numbers  of  Major  Corps  d'armee  of 

Evolution. 

3.  +N     Larger  numbers  of  Minor  Corps  d'armee  of 

Evolution. 

4.  +N     Larger  numbers  of  Corps  d'armee  of  Position. 


PRIME  STRATEGETIC 
PROPOSITION 


SECTION  TWO 


PRIME  STRATEGETIC 
PROPOSITION 

SECTION  TWO 

THEOREM. 

Given  any  Strategetic  Situation  to  determine  the  True 
Tatical  Sequence. 

DEMONSTRATION. 

(First  Phase.) 

Let  the  term  +  A  in  its  degree  represent  the  relative 
advantage  in  Position  of  the  Column  of  Attack;  +S  in  its 
degree  the  relative  advantage  in  Position  of  the  Column 
of  Support,  and  +M  in  its  degree  the  relative  advantage 
in  Position  of  the  Column  of  Manoeuvre;  let  equality 
in  Position  of  the  several  Columns  be  represented  by  the 
terms  =A,  =S,  =M,  and  let  inferiority  in  Positions  of 
the  several  Columns  be  represented  by  the  terms  — A, 
— S,  — M,  and  let  those  terms  appertaining  to  the  White 
Columns  be  written  above  a  line  and  those  terms  apper- 
taining to  the  Black  Columns  be  written  below  the  line, 
and  let  that  collection  of  terms  containing  the  plus  and 
equal  signs  of  greater  Strategetic  value  be  the  Major 
Premise  and  that  collection  of  terms  containing  the 
signs  of  lesser  strategetic  value  be  the  Minor  Premise 
of  the  Strategic  Syllogism  thus  constructed. 


200  GRAND    RECONNAISSANCE 

Let  the  ability  to  move  while  the  opposing  force  must 
remain  stationary  be  represented  by  the  term  +T,  and 
let  the  converse  be  represented  by  the  term  — T,  and  let 
superiority  in  Numbers  be  represented  by  the  term 
+N;  the  equality  in  Numbers  by  the  term  =N,  and  in- 
feriority in  Numbers  by  the  term  — N,  and  let  the  com- 
bining of  any  form  of  the  terms  T  and  N  constitute  a 
Tactico- Logistic  Inequality. 

Let  any  combination  of  that  Strategic  Syllogism  which 
appertains  to  a  given  Strategetic  Situation  with  the 
corresponding  Tactico-Logistic  Inequality,  form  the 
Initial  Strategetic  Equation. 

Let  the  plus  terms  and  the  equality  terms,  which  are 
contained  in  the  Initial  Strategetic  Equation,  be  ex- 
panded into  their  highest  forms  according  to  the  table  of 
Strategetic  Values,  and  annex  to  each  of  such  terms  that 
numeral  which  expresses  the  relative  rank  of  such  term 
in  those  calculations  which  appertain  to  the  pending 
Prime  Strategetic  Proposition. 

Compare  the  values  so  obtained  and  let  the  highest 
Strategetically  be  regarded  as  the  menace  most  immedia- 
tely decisive,  then: 

If  the  term  +  T  appertain  to  the  Piece  operating  such 
menace,  let  such  Piece  be  regarded  as  the  Corps  d'armee 
en  Menace,  and  the  Objective  of  such  menace  as  the 
Prime  Decisive  Point;  the  occupation  of  such  Point  by 
such  Piece  as  the  Normal  Motif  of  Offensive  Effort,  and 
the  Logistic  Radius  connecting  the  Point  of  Departure 
occupied  by  such  Piece  and  the  Prime  Decisive  Point  as 
the  Normal  Direction  of  Offensive  Effort. 

If  the  term  +T  does  NOT  apply  to  that  menace  which 
combined  with  the  term  +T  would  be  most  immediately 
decisive,  then: 

By  further  comparison  of  the  terms  of  the  Initial 
Strategetic  Equation,  select  that  Decisive  Menace  strate- 
getically next  in  sequence  to  which  the  term  +T  does 


PRIME    STRATEGETIC    PROPOSITION  201 

appertain;  and  let  the  Piece  operating  such  Decisive 
Menace  be  regarded  as  the  Corps  d'armee  en  Menace; 
the  Objective  of  such  menace  as  the  Prime  Decisive 
Point;  the  occupation  of  such  Point  by  such  Piece  as 
the  Normal  Motif  of  Offensive  Effort,  and  the  Logistic 
Radius  connecting  the  Point  of  Departure  occupied 
by  such  Piece  and  the  Prime  Decisive  Points  as  the 
Normal  direction  of  Offensive  Effort. 

Provided: 

Whenever  the  term  +T  appertains  to  a  Menace  not 
so  immediately  decisive  as  another  menace  operated  by 
an  adverse  army,  column,  wing  or  corps  d'armee,  but 
to  which  the  term  +T  does  not  appertain,  then:  the 
Normal  motif  of  Effort  is  defensive,  and  the  Normal 
direction  of  Defensive  Effort  is  along  the  Logistic  Radius 
between  the  Point  of  Departure  of  that  Kindred  Piece, 
which  by  the  advantage  of  the  term  +  A,  is  able  to  nullify 
the  adverse  most  immediately  Decisive  Menace  and 
that  Point  of  Command  which  is  the  Objective  of  such 
Effort  en  Defence  and  from  whence  such  adverse  most 
immediately  Decisive  Menace  may  be  nullified. 


The  second  or  Intermediate  Phase  of  the  Prime 
Strategetic  Proposition  appertains  to  Grand  Manoeuvres; 
and  the  third,  or  Final  Phase,  appertains  to  Grand  Opera- 
tions. 


202  GRAND    RECONNAISSANCE 

However  vast  one's  capabilities  may  be,  there  is  no  mind 
so  comprehensive  but  that  it  has  much  to  learn  from  other 
minds  which  have  preceded  it,  and  no  talent  is  so  poten- 
tial but  that  its  development  is  proportional  to  its  exercise. 

For  no  matter  how  broad  and  exact  one's  knowledge,  the 
application  of  such  knowledge  alone  constitutes  Art,  and 
the  value  of  such  knowledge  always  is  commensurate  to  the 
degree  of  skill  attained  in  the  use  of  it. 

Hence,  there  is  a  training  of  the  physical  senses  which 
gives  quickness  and  strength  to  the  eye,  the  ear  and  the 
hand;  a  training  of  the  nervous  organism  which  gives 
courage  to  the  heart,  clearness  to  the  brain,  and  steadiness 
to  the  body;  a  training  of  the  intellect  which  fructifies  in 
originality,  ingenuity,  profundity  and  exactness  of  cal- 
culation. 

Such  training  is  to  be  acquired  only  from  systematic 
study  of  the  best  productions  by  Masters  of  the  Art,  and  by 
incessant  practice  with  the  best  proficients. 


W£?i<4*tBm*y 


14  DAY  USE 

RETURN  TO  DESK  FROM  WHICH  BORROWED 
LOAN*  DEPT. 

This  book  is  due  on  the  last  date  stamped  below,  or 

on  the  date  to  which  renewed. 

Renewed  books  are  subject  to  immediate  recall. 


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